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Introduction
This dissertation studies the behavior of two types of market participants: indi-
vidual investors and financial analysts. The former are information consumers while
the latter provide, through their reports, useful information to the market. Individ-
ual investors obtain information from stock prices, newspapers and financial analysts.
Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) identify two sources of value that analysts bring to the
market. First, they extract useful information for investors from public information.
Second, through a careful examination of accounting documents and contacts with
firm managers, they acquire information previously unknown to other market partic-
ipants. As such, their reports and forecasts are of great importance since they render
private information public. Analysts’ reports are typically composed of three main
figures: earnings forecasts, purchase recommendations and target prices.
The first part of this dissertation focuses on the herding behavior of individual
investors. Herding behavior corresponds to a mimetic behavior or can result from
correlated behavior patterns (correlated trading). This behavior typically arises from
payoﬀ externalities, reputational concerns or information externalities (Devenow and
Welch, 1996). A general consensus in the literature is that economic agents are
relatively prone to herd. Evidence of herding behavior has be found for mutual
1
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funds (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers,
1995; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Wermers, 1999), individual investors (Feng and
Seasholes, 2004; Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller, 2008; Barber, Odean, and Zhu,
2009; Venezia, Nashikkar, and Shapira, 2011) and financial analysts (Trueman, 1994;
Olsen, 1996; Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005).
The first chapter of this dissertation is the first study on herding behavior that
focuses on French individual investors. Our empirical analysis relies on a database
of nearly 8 million trades accomplished between 1999 and 2006 by 87,373 individual
investors. We show that the trading decisions of the investors in our sample are highly
correlated. Using the measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), we find a
similar level of herding than what is observed for U.S. individual investors (Barber,
Odean, and Zhu, 2009). However, the main contribution of this first chapter is the
study of the determinants of individual investors’ herding behavior.
Standard measures of herding behavior (such as the measure Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1992) permit to estimate, for a given stock, the level of herding. However,
they do not allow for studying herding at the individual level. We introduce a new
measure that allows us to track over time the level of herding of a given individual
investor. We are then able to investigate the determinants of herding at the investor
level and the motivations of individual investors to engage in this behavior. We
show that investors’ characteristics influence their propensity to herd. We find that
the degree of sophistication of an individual investor is negatively related to her
propensity to herd. Our results also indicate that, following a bad performance,
the trading decisions of individual investors are more correlated with their peers’.
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Finally, we intent to provide an answer to a question that remained unaddressed by
the literature: is herding profitable? We find that investors trading against the crowd
exhibit more extreme returns and poorer risk-adjusted performance than herders. We
also observe that investors trading against the crowd, contrary to herders, improve
their performance by trading. Although we are not able to provide an explanation to
why most investors decrease their performance by trading (Barber and Odean, 2000),
this result indicates that our measure is successful in determining who trades against
the crowd.
The second part of this dissertation focuses on financial analysts’ target prices.
A target price corresponds, for a given firm, to the analyst’s evaluation of the fu-
ture stock price (usually 12-month ahead). As pointed out by Bradshaw (2011), in
a survey on financial analysts, “the literature [...] suﬀers from an overemphasis on
earnings forecasts relative to other important tasks performed by analysts”. In addi-
tion to earnings forecasts and recommendations, most analysts now include a target
price to their reports. Although this statistic does not attract a lot of attention from
institutional investors, it is the most comprehensive one (relatively to earnings fore-
casts and recommendations). As such, this statistic is potentially the most useful for
individual investors.
As a consequence of the investors’ great interest for earnings forecasts, researchers
have investigated whether financial analysts have the ability to accurately forecast
earnings. A large stream of literature has focused on determining whether analysts’
earnings forecasts are superior to time-series forecasts (Cragg and Malkiel, 1968;
Elton and Gruber, 1972; Barefield and Comiskey, 1975; Brown and Rozeﬀ, 1978;
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Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown, Hagerman, Griﬃn, and Zmijewski, 1987). Once the
superiority of analysts’ forecasts was established, the literature investigated whether
some analysts were better than others. Stickel (1992) and Sinha, Brown, and Das
(1997) showed that financial analysts exhibit diﬀerential abilities to issue accurate
earnings forecasts.
One of the reasons why target prices have not yet attracted a lot of attention from
market participants is that it is unclear whether the information embedded in target
prices is reliable. Aside from the potential conflict of interests, we postulate that the
lack of confidence in target prices results from the absence of feedback. Contrary
to earnings forecasts, the literature has not yet provided a proper framework with
which to evaluate the quality of target prices. Without a consensual way to evaluate
whether some target prices are superior to others, brokerage firms cannot provide
analysts with incentives to issue accurate target prices. Furthermore, the lack of
short-term feedback (target price accuracy measures are usually ex-post measures: 12
months are typically needed to evaluate the quality of a target price) prevents analysts
from improving their ability to issue accurate target prices. As stated by Kahneman
(2011): “whether professionals have a chance to develop intuitive expertise depends
essentially on the quality and speed of the feedback”.
The second chapter of this dissertation intends to provide a comprehensive frame-
work for measuring the quality of analysts target prices. An important contribution
of our work is to consider, when evaluating target prices, the issue of forecast pre-
dictability. We show that measuring whether a target price is accurate or not is not
suﬃcient to assess its quality. Indeed, the diﬃculty of issuing an accurate target price
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varies across stocks and over time. This predictability issue is a well-known concern in
the literature on earnings forecasts (Huberts and Fuller, 1995; DeBondt and Forbes,
1999; Beckers, Steliaros, and Thomson, 2004). Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) note
that “forecasting diﬃculty is [...] like to diﬀer cross-sectionally”while Hong, Kubik,
and Solomon (2000) state that “some firms are more diﬃcult than others to predict
accurately”. These diﬀerences in predictability prevent, for instance, the direct ag-
gregation of individual forecast accuracies (forecasts issued on diﬀerent stocks) into
a measure of analyst accuracy. To circumvent this issue, researchers employ relative
measures of accuracy, that is, the quality of a forecast is determined with respect to
other forecasts issued in similar conditions (i.e., forecasts issued on the same firm
and during the same period of time). The use of relative measures, however, is not
possible when dealing with target prices. Contrary to earnings forecasts where all
forecasts issued during a given year predict the same thing (the earnings to be an-
nounced at the end of the fiscal year), target prices made on diﬀerent days forecast
diﬀerent things (the 12-month ahead stock price).
The predictability of a forecast depends on the variability of the predicted variable
and on the horizon of the forecast. Evidence of a link between horizon and predictabil-
ity has been established early in the literature on earnings forecasts (Brown, Richard-
son, and Schwager, 1987; O’Brien, 1988; Kross, Ro, and Schroeder, 1990; Brown,
1991; Lys and Soo, 1995; Sinha, Brown, and Das, 1997). Dichev and Tang (2009)
demonstrate the existence of a relationship between predictability and variability.
They show that earnings predictability is negatively related to earnings volatility.
The literature on earnings forecasts use relative measures of accuracy to control
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for diﬀerences in predictability. The use of relative measures comes from the fact
that the data on earnings does not permit to compute a good estimation of the
predictability. In the second chapter of this dissertation, we show that, in the case of
target prices, it is possible to estimate precisely the predictability (as the number of
observations for stock prices is much greater than for earnings). The predictability
can be measured as the expected value of the absolute forecast error. Estimating this
expected value is actually equivalent to pricing a straddle (a call and a put option
with the same strike price). We therefore use methodologies from the option-pricing
field to incorporate the predictability in our measure of target price quality. Beyond
the issue of predictability, our approach has the following advantages. First, our
measure of quality rewards bold accurate forecasts. Second, it is a dynamic measure;
our measure allows us to evaluate, at any moment in time, the quality of a target
price (one does not need to wait until the end of the forecast horizon to assess the
target price quality).
Taking into account the predictability has important consequences on the analysis
of target prices. For instance, previous papers (Bradshaw, Brown, and Huang, forth-
coming; Bilinski, Lyssimachou, and Walker, 2013) find some evidence that analysts
exhibit persistent diﬀerential abilities to issue accurate target prices. We show, using
a database of 649,471 target prices issued between 2000 and 2010 by 9,367 analysts
on 7,268 U.S. stocks, that this result is driven by persistence in volatility and does
not hold when predictability is taken into account.
The third chapter of this dissertation studies whether analysts’ characteristics -
such as the experience, the number of firms followed or the size of the employer - influ-
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ence their ability to issue accurate target prices.1 Bilinski, Lyssimachou, and Walker
(2013) find that target price accuracy is positively related to analyst experience and
to the number of firms followed. We show in this paper that coverage decisions are
heterogeneous with respect to experience. Our results indicate that experienced ana-
lysts and inexperienced analysts cover diﬀerent types of firms. Experienced analysts
follow primarily blue chips while inexperienced analysts cover mainly small, young,
growth firms. These diﬀerences in coverage decisions have important implications on
the predictability of analysts’ target prices as blue chips’ stock returns tend to be less
volatile. Because experienced analysts cover mainly blue chips, the stock prices of the
firms they cover are more predictable. Therefore, the probability of being accurate
is higher for experienced analysts, regardless of their ability. It is thus possible that
the results of Bilinski, Lyssimachou, and Walker (2013) are driven by diﬀerences in
predictability. In order to test the influence of analysts’ characteristics on analysts’
ability to issue accurate target prices, we use the target price quality measure intro-
duced in the second chapter which incorporates predictability. We obtain that target
price quality is positively related to analyst experience and to the number of firms
followed but negatively related to employer size. These results confirm that forecast-
ing skills improve with experience (learning by doing) or/and that analysts with low
ability do not manage to stay in the profession.
The diﬀerences in coverage decisions between experienced and inexperienced an-
alysts have implications beyond the sole topic of target prices. For instance, it sheds
a new light on analysts’ preferences. We postulate that these coverage diﬀerences
1We built proxies for analysts’ characteristics (following the methodology of Clement, 1999) using
all the one-year ahead earnings forecasts provided by I/B/E/S for the 1982-2010 period.
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between experienced analysts and inexperienced analysts appear because coverage
decisions are constrained by brokerage firms. Experienced analysts are assigned (or
get to choose) large, mature firms (blue chips) while inexperienced analysts are left
with firms that attract less attention from market participants. This type of or-
ganization for brokerage firms is not surprising. Indeed, in most business and law
firms, inexperienced employees start with small accounts and gradually obtain big-
ger accounts when they acquire a better knowledge of the job. We detail, in the
third chapter, the consequences, in terms of research, of these constraints imposed on
coverage decisions.
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Abstract
We introduce a new measure of herding that allows for tracking dynamics of individual
herding. Using a database of nearly 8 million trades by 87,373 retail investors between
1999 and 2006, we show that individual herding is persistent over time and that past
performance and the level of sophistication influence this behavior. We are also able
to answer a question that was previously unaddressed in the literature: is herding
profitable for investors? Our unique dataset reveals that the investors trading against
the crowd tend to exhibit more extreme returns and poorer risk-adjusted performance
than the herders.
Chapter 1: What drives the herding behavior of individual investors? 15
1.1 Introduction
The herding behavior is defined in a broad way as an investor’s imitation of the
actions of others. Devenow and Welch (1996) emphasize three reasons for herding.1
The first reason is payoﬀ externalities (the outcome of an action is increasing in
the number of agents undertaking it). For instance, investors tend to trade at the
same time to benefit from a deeper liquidity (see Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Dow,
2004). The second reason is reputational concerns and issues related to the principal-
agent theory (see Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Rajan, 1994; Graham, 1999). When
the performance of a manager is assessed relative to a benchmark (i.e., by using
the average performance of other managers, or the performance of a market/industry
index), it is quite tempting for her to mimic the benchmark. By doing so, the manager
sacrifices the potential to perform better than average but hedges herself against
a poor relative performance. It is often said that the manager hides in the herd.
Finally, the third explanation for rational herding is informational externalities. In
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Welch (1992), investors acquire
(noisy) information by observing the actions of the other agents. The externalities
may be so strong that an investor can voluntary decide to ignore her own information.
In the most extreme cases, individuals’ actions do not carry information anymore
because they result only from the imitation of others’ actions. In that case, an
informational cascade occurs.
Early studies such as Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) investigate a method
1Herding can be rational or irrational. Irrational herding is extremely diﬃcult to capture empir-
ically because it is driven by fashion and fads. We therefore do not address this issue in the rest of
the paper.
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to empirically measure correlated trading across groups of investors. The idea un-
derlying the measure proposed by the authors (the LSV measure, hereafter) is to
quantify the buying pressure on a given asset for a homogeneous subgroup (pension
funds, mutual funds, individual investors). For the market as a whole, each purchase
is balanced by a sale. However, for a given subgroup of investors and a given as-
set, there can be an excess of purchases or sales, indicating that the investors in the
subgroup herd. After the seminal work of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992),
herding among investors has been the subject of a number of empirical studies, which
are divided in two categories. The first category primarily addresses institutional
investors and the second category addresses individual investors. The present paper
belongs to this second stream of the literature.
The mimetic behavior of U.S. mutual funds and institutional investors has been
scrutinized (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers,
1995; Wermers, 1999). Similar studies have been performed outside of the U.S., in
particular in Germany (Oehler, 1998; Frey, Herbst, and Walter, 2007), the United
Kingdom (Wylie, 2005), Portugal (Loboa and Serra, 2007) and Poland (Voronkova
and Bohl, 2005).
In the second category of studies, targeting individual investors, the number of
studies is lower. These studies have been performed in the U.S. (Barber, Odean, and
Zhu, 2009), Germany (Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller, 2008), Israel (Venezia,
Nashikkar, and Shapira, 2011) and China (Feng and Seasholes, 2004). All of these
studies demonstrate that the trades of individuals are significantly correlated. The
herding behavior is clearly stronger for individuals than for fund managers and it
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exhibits a strong persistence over time (Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009). This behavior
is positively and significantly correlated with the volatility of the market returns
(Venezia, Nashikkar, and Shapira, 2011). Addressing the drivers of these findings,
Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009) show that psychological biases contribute to the
herding behavior. These biases, for instance, lead investors to buy stocks with strong
recent performance or with an abnormally high trading volume. In an original way,
Feng and Seasholes (2004) demonstrate a positive relationship between the herding
behavior of Chinese investors and their trading location.
Despite its popularity, the LSV measure suﬀers from some drawbacks. In partic-
ular, it does not permit for an evaluation of the herding level of a given investor, and
thus, fails to evaluate herding persistence over time at the investor level. Furthermore,
the drivers of the individual herding behavior cannot be investigated.
A key contribution of this paper is to provide a new measure of herding behav-
ior at the individual level. Our measure (the Individual Herding Measure, denoted
IHM hereafter) evaluates the individual herding for a given quarter as the weighted
sum of the signed LSV measures of the stocks for which changes in holdings, for the
quarter under consideration, occur. This measure allows for tracking dynamics of
individual herding and therefore has the potential to highlight sources of individual
heterogeneity. We conduct an empirical analysis of the herding behavior of individual
investors using a unique database of the trading records of 87,373 investors for the
1999-2006 period. Our results demonstrate a high level of herding and a significant
persistence of this behavior over time at the investor level. Our analysis of the in-
dividual heterogeneity of the herding behavior shows that a poor past performance
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increases the propensity to herd in the next quarter. By using direct and indirect
measures of sophistication (derivatives trading or portfolio value, for example), we
show that sophisticated investors are less prone to herd after a poor past performance.
However, the main contribution of the paper is to show that, contrary to the other
individual investors, those trading against the crowd improve their returns by doing
so. Unfortunately, this premium is not suﬃcient to compensate for the higher risk
that they bear. Consequently, they perform poorly, compared to the average investor.
This paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we describe the method-
ological framework and introduce our individual herding measure. In the second
section, we present the data used in this article. The third section focuses on the
herding behavior measured at the stock level. In the fourth section, we examine the
level and the persistence of the herding behavior at the investor level and highlight
the factors that impact this behavior. The last section concludes the paper.
1.2 The framework
We first define notations that are common to all measures. We denote by ni,j,t,
the number of shares (adjusted for splits and corporate actions) of stock j held by
investor i at time t. The universe contains J stocks.
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1.2.1 Measuring herding at the asset level: the LSV measure
and extensions
In Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), herding is defined as the tendency for
traders to accumulate on the same side of the market for a given stock and during
a given period. To measure this tendency, we observe the diﬀerence between the
number of shares held at time t and at time t− 1.2 If the diﬀerence ni,j,t − ni,j,t−1 is
positive (resp. negative), then it means that investor i increases (resp. decreases) her
holdings of asset j during the period [t− 1; t]. The investor is said to be on the buy
side (resp. sell side). We denote by bi,j,t (resp. si,j,t) a binary variable that takes the
value 1 if the investor i increases (resp. decreases) her holdings of stock j between
t − 1 and t and the value 0 otherwise. For a given asset j, the purchase intensity
pj,t is defined as the number of investors that increased their holdings divided by the
number of investors that traded the asset. We write
pj,t =
Ij,t∑
i=1
bi,j,t
Ij,t∑
i=1
(bi,j,t + si,j,t)
=
1
Ij,t
Ij,t∑
i=1
bi,j,t, (1.1)
where Ij,t is the number of active traders over the period [t − 1; t]. Notice that the
number of traders Ij,t varies across stocks and over time. The purchase intensity (thus
the LSV measure) is computed for a subgroup of investors only. Formally, the LSV
2We stress the fact that the variations in holdings between t−1 and t correspond to the variations
in the number of shares and not in weight because price variations would incur artificial increases
or decreases. It is also important to point out that corporate actions such as splits, new issues, etc.,
must be taken into account.
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measure of stock j at time t is written as
LSVj,t = |pj,t − pt| − E [|pj,t − pt|]︸ ︷︷ ︸
AFj,t
, (1.2)
where E [.] stands for the expectation, pt is the purchase intensity across all stocks
3
and AFj,t is an adjustment factor given by
AFj,t =
Ij,t∑
k=0
⎛
⎜⎝ Ij,t
k
⎞
⎟⎠ (pt)k (1− pt)Ij,t−k ∣∣∣∣ kIj,t − pt
∣∣∣∣ . (1.4)
The quantity pt is subtracted to account for systematic liquidity shocks, that is, when
the aggregation of investors on a given side (buy or sell) is not the consequence of
herding but rather the reaction to a common shock. The adjustment factor AFj,t
makes the LSV measure unbiased in the case of no herding.
As mentioned before, the LSV measure suﬀers from a few drawbacks and has
therefore been exposed to a number of criticisms. The LSV measure does not allow
us to observe the intertemporal herding behavior of investors. We are able to follow
how investors herd over time on a given asset, but we cannot observe the persistence
in herding of a given investor. We address this issue in the following subsection
by introducing an investor-specific herding measure. Among the other criticisms
3The purchase intensity across all stocks is computed as
pt =
J∑
j=1
Ij,t∑
i=1
bi,j,t
J∑
j=1
Ij,t
(1.3)
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addressed to the measure, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) first note that the LSV
measure captures both intentional and unintentional (or spurious) herding. According
to their definition, an investor is said to herd intentionally if, by observing the other
investors’ actions, she prevents herself from making an investment she would have
made otherwise (or conversely, she undertakes an investment that she would not have
undertaken otherwise). In other words, intentional herding corresponds to a deliberate
imitation of others’ actions. Alternatively, spurious herding occurs when investors
with similar preference sets are provided with the same information. Separating
these two types of herding is important because the latter is an eﬃcient outcome
whereas the former can destabilize markets and increase volatility. A second issue
discussed by Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) is that the LSV measure considers only
the number of traders and ignores the amount that is bought or sold. Oehler (1998)
and Wermers (1999) propose derived measures that aim to remedy this problem. This
issue has important consequences when studying the impact of herding on the market.
However, because we adopt a more behavioral approach and focus on the drivers of
the herding behavior, this issue does not have important consequences for our results.
Finally, Frey, Herbst, and Walter (2007) show that under the alternative hypoth-
esis of herding, the measure is biased downward. Therefore, because the adjustment
factor does not depend on the herding level, the LSV measure is biased downward
and this bias increases with the herding level. These authors also prove that the
bias declines with the number of active traders Ij,t. We will see in the empirical
results that the level of herding rises when we impose a minimum number of active
traders. This observation has crucial consequences for the interpretation of the em-
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pirical results. For example, Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2008) establish a
link between diﬀerences in opinion (proxied by trading activity) and herding behavior
because they observe a very important positive correlation between trading activity
and herding. It appears that the properties of the adjustment factor might explain
part of the observed correlation. Indeed, the higher the trading activity, the lower
the bias and the higher the herding measure. Even if trading activity and herding
behavior were independent, a positive correlation would appear.
To remedy this problem, Frey, Herbst, and Walter (2007) propose using square
values instead of absolute values in the expression of the LSV measure. Formally,
their new measure is defined as
FHW 2j,t =
(
(pj,t − pt)2 − E
[
(pj,t − pt)2
]) Ij,t
Ij,t − 1, (1.5)
where the notations are the same as in the previous equations.
For a given time period [t − 1; t] and a universe of J stocks, the average FHW
measure is computed as
FHW t =
√√√√ 1
J
J∑
j=1
FHW 2j,t. (1.6)
Monte-Carlo simulations show that this new measure does not suﬀer from the
bias that exists for the LSV measure. Frey, Herbst, and Walter (2007) show that for
varying values of the number of active traders and/or for the level of herding, their
measure is unbiased and possesses good statistical properties.
However, Bellando (2010) shows that the measure is unbiased only in the particu-
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lar setting considered by Frey, Herbst, and Walter (2007). As soon as the probability
of no herding is not null or when some asymmetry is introduced, the measure is biased
upward. It follows that it is virtually impossible to compute the true value of the
herding intensity. Nonetheless, we know that this true value is bounded below by the
LSV value and above by the FHW value.
1.2.2 Measuring herding at the investor level: the Investor
Herding Measure
We introduce now the new measure called the Investor Herding Measure (IHM
hereafter). IHM considers herding only for the stocks currently traded by the investor.
To analyze the tendency of individual investors to herd, we first discriminate between
buy herding (pj,t > pt) and sell herding (pj,t < pt). In the spirit of Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999), we define the signed herding measure as4
SLSVj,t =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
LSVj,t| pj,t > pt
− LSVj,t| pj,t < pt
= pj,t − pt +
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
− AFj,t| pj,t > pt
+ AFj,t| pj,t < pt
. (1.7)
4As in Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), we set the LSV measure equal to 0 if there are
less than 10 investors trading the stock.
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For a given transaction, there are six possible scenarios
Purchase Sale
SLSV > 0 Herding Anti-Herding
SLSV < 0 Anti-Herding Herding
SLSV = 0 No Herding No Herding
The IHM is then defined as
IHMi,t =
J∑
j=1
(ni,j,t − ni,j,t−1)P j,tSLSVjt
J∑
j=1
|ni,j,t − ni,j,t−1|P j,t
, (1.8)
where P j,t is the average price of asset j over the period [t − 1; t]. The value
(ni,j,t − ni,j,t−1)P j,t is the average value of the transaction made on stock j and the
denominator in the formula is the total value of all transactions5 made by investor i
in the considered period. In this way, we account only for the herding coeﬃcient of
the stocks that are traded during the considered period, and we weight them by the
size (euros-volume) of the transactions. The IHM measure indicates that investor i is
herding if it takes a positive value and that she is going against the herd if the value
is negative.
To compare with, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) define the “Fund Herd-
5We only observe the number of shares at time t and t− 1 but not the sequence of transactions
during the period under study. Hence, we use the average price to evaluate the value by which the
investor increases or decreases her holdings.
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ing Measure” as
FHMi,t =
J∑
j=1
(ωi,j,t − ωi,j,t−1)SLSVj,t,
where ωi,j,t is the weight of asset j in the portfolio of the i
−th fund at time t. A
potential issue associated with this measure is that an investor can be seen as herding
on an asset she does not trade (a transaction in one asset - or a price variation - causes
the weights of all the assets in the portfolio to change.).
1.3 Data and descriptive statistics
.
The primary data for our study consists of a eight-year panel (from 1999 to 2006)
of all executed trades and daily portfolio holdings of French individuals at a major
European brokerage house. We exclude investments in mutual funds, warrants and
options from the database. The total number of stock transactions is slightly below
8 millions. The database contains information on the opening date of the accounts
(if ever, closing date), the birth date, the gender and the state of residence of the
investors. At the beginning of the sample period, 33,130 investors had open positions.
The representative mean investor holds 4.8 stocks worth 19,113 euros and she executes
89 trades over the period. The median investor holds 2.92 stocks worth 5,163 euros
and trades 32 times.
In addition to the individual investor database, for each stock in our sample,
we obtain daily prices, returns, market capitalization and volumes from Bloomberg
Chapter 1: What drives the herding behavior of individual investors? 26
(1,180 stocks) and Eurofidai6 (1,311 stocks). Note that, due to missing data, we must
ignore a little over one thousand securities that represent only 1.51% of the total
number of transactions. Of the 2,491 stocks under consideration, 1,190 stocks are
listed on the French market, 1,020 in the U.S., 62 in Great Britain, 35 in Canada,
34 in Netherlands, 31 in Germany, 15 in Italy and 104 somewhere else. As one may
expect, the trading volume is not homogeneous across countries. The stocks listed
on the French market represent more than 90% of the total volume of trading, while
the stocks from U.S. account for less than 1%.
Figure 1.1 below shows the evolution, from January 1999 to December 2006, of
the number of investors, the average number of stocks, and the average portfolio value
(measured at the beginning of each quarter). To gain a deeper look into the structure
of the data, we present in Table 1.1 the distribution of portfolio values conditioned
on the number of stocks held, at three points in time.
1.4 Herding behavior at the stock level
1.4.1 Herding and stock characteristics
Table 1.2 provides the average values, on the 1999-2006 period of the semiannu-
ally, quarterly and monthly LSV and FHW measures. The first line provides the
average value across all stocks of the LSV and FHW measures. The following lines
report averages on subsets based on the capitalization (Large, Medium, Small), on
the volume of trading (High, Medium, Low) and on the industry classification (based
6European Financial Data Institute, www.eurofidai.org
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on the Industry Classification Benchmark).
The average value across all stocks of the LSV measure computed on a monthly
basis is equal to 0.1263. This means that, for a given stock and during a given
month, approximately 13% more investors are “on the same side” than what would
be predicted if decisions were randomly taken. Hence, French individual investors
exhibit a high degree of herding. These results are consistent with typical findings for
U.S. individual investors (Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009, find an average of monthly
LSV measures on all stocks equal to 0.1279), but slightly higher than the value of
0.064 obtained by Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2008) for Germany. This result
also supports previous findings that individual investors herd more than institutional
investors. In the U.S., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) provide an average
value of 0.02 for institutional investors and Wermers (1999) reports a value of 0.036.
More recently, in Israel, Venezia, Nashikkar, and Shapira (2011) obtain an average
herding measure of 0.058.
As in Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2008), our results highlight correlated
trading across all horizons and all industries. Concerning the impact of the capital-
ization, our results, using the LSV measure, confirm the findings of Dorn, Huberman,
and Sengmueller (2008) and contrast with those of Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009)
and of previous studies of institutional investors that demonstrate that investors herd
more on small firm stocks (Wermers, 1999, for example). In fact, we find that cor-
related trading is higher for larger capitalizations. However, this result is not robust
when using the FHW measure. Indeed, with this last measure, we find that the
herding behavior is more pronounced for smaller capitalizations.
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Finally, the LSV measure takes a higher value for the stocks ranked in the “high
volume of trading” category. Although further investigations are needed, this result
could be due to a concentration of purchases in attention-grabbing stocks (Barber and
Odean, 2008; Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009) or to informational signals. Once again
however, this result is not robust when using the FHW measure instead. Considering
these findings, it is natural to wonder how the downward bias of the LSV measure
(see the previous section) could impact our results. Comparing the level of the two
measures (Table 1.2), it is apparent that the values of FHW are sharply higher what-
ever the category under study. The monthly average value across all stocks of the
FHW measure is equal to 21.70%. The herding behavior is estimated as being 1.72
times stronger when this last measure is implemented. Note that this diﬀerence is
stable when the observation intervals are modified (6 months or 3 months). We can
conclude, for monthly observation intervals, that the true value of herding for the
French individual investors in our sample is high and takes a value between 12.63%
and 21.70%.
1.4.2 Persistence
In this section, we adopt another approach (following the methodology used by
Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009) to test whether investors’ trading decisions are cor-
related. We also analyze the persistence, at the stock level, of the herding behavior.
The herding behavior is said to be persistent if the autocorrelation of the purchase
intensity pj,t is high: a high (respectively low) level of purchase intensity at time t is
followed by a high (low) level in the consecutive periods.
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For each month, we divide the population of investors into two equally sized
random groups. We then calculate the assets’ monthly purchase intensity pG1j,t (re-
spectively, pG2j,t ) resulting from the transactions of group 1 (group 2). If the investors’
trading decisions are independent, we should observe no correlation between the pur-
chases intensities pG1j,t and p
G2
j,t . The transaction records span over 8 years, resulting in
a time-series of 96 contemporaneous correlations between purchases intensities. We
then compute the average correlation and employ a t-test to check whether the aver-
age correlation is significantly diﬀerent from 0. As explained by Barber, Odean, and
Zhu (2009), the null hypothesis of no correlation is similar to the null hypothesis of
no herding in the LSV and FHW herding measures. As in the previous analysis, it is
not possible to distinguish between spurious and intentional herding. The rejection
of the null hypothesis only indicates that trading decisions are correlated, but it does
not allow us to verify whether the investors intentionally herd.
Once we show that investors engage into correlated trading, we aim to see if they
tend to herd on the same assets over time. A high persistence in the herding behavior
would indicate that herding is influenced by characteristics that do not change much
over time such as industry classification, index membership and market capitalization.
On the contrary, a low persistence might indicate that herding is dynamic and is a
direct reaction to new information, new market conditions or new trading strategies.
To measure the persistence of herding, we first compute for each month the cor-
relation between stock purchase intensities at time t and time t+ τ with τ = 0, ..., 36.
Note that τ = 0 corresponds to a test of the null hypothesis of no herding while
τ > 0 corresponds to a test of the persistence in herding. For τ = 1, we measure
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the correlation between the purchase intensities between month t and the consecutive
month. We thus obtain a time series of 95 correlations that we average to obtain the
general persistence for a horizon equal to 1. It follows that we have a time-series of
94 correlations for τ = 2, ..., and a time-series of 60 correlations for τ = 36. We first
compute these correlations for the entire set of investors. In a second calculation,
we compute this persistence for two random groups of investors (in the fashion of
the analysis for contemporaneous correlations which is actually the particular case
where τ = 0). That is, we compute the correlation between the purchase intensities
obtained from the transactions of group 1 at time t, and the purchases intensities
obtained from the transactions of group 2 at time t+ τ .
Table 1.3 presents contemporaneous and time-series correlations of the purchase
intensities. The first row (τ = 0) indicates the contemporaneous correlation of pur-
chase intensities between groups 1 and 2. We observe that the average correlation
is very strong (a little over 85%), indicating that the investors’ trading decisions
are highly correlated. Our correlation is 10 points higher than the correlation found
by Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009). This finding is coherent with the fact that we
also obtain slightly higher values for the LSV measure. It follows that by knowing
the purchase intensities associated with one group, we are able to explain over 2/3
of the variations in purchase intensities of the second group. The rest of the table
presents the correlations between the purchase intensities at time t and time t + τ
where τ = 1, ..., 36. The persistence between two consecutive months is expressed
by an average correlation of 30.27%. The average correlations are all significantly
diﬀerent from zero up to a horizon of τ = 15. In comparison to Barber, Odean, and
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Zhu (2009), the correlations are slightly lower (30.27% instead of 46.7% for a horizon
of one month) and the persistence fades at a faster rate (the correlation at a 6 month
horizon is 9.10% in our study compared to 16.4% in Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009).
1.5 Herding behavior at the individual level
1.5.1 First results
We first provide a brief overview of the computed IHM values. Figure 1.2 gives the
distribution of the IHM at three time points (first quarter of 2000, 2003 and 2006).
Not surprisingly, we observe that most individuals have a positive IHM value. The
average IHM value is equal to 0.1003 for the first quarter of 2000, 0.1078 for the first
quarter of 2003 and 0.0770 for the first quarter of 2006. Medians are, respectively,
0.0954, 0.0887 and 0.0675.
1.5.2 Persistence
Using the same methodology as the one employed to measure the persistence at
the asset level, we check whether there is significant autocorrelation in the investor
herding behavior. That is, we verify if a high herding (anti-herding) behavior at a
quarter t is followed by high herding (anti-herding) in the subsequent quarters. The
presence of a strong autocorrelation would tend to indicate that some investors are
more prone to herd, regardless of the time-period considered. The results in Table
1.4 give an average correlation of 12.43% between the IHM values of two consecutive
quarters. The correlations appear to be significant for a horizon up to four years
Chapter 1: What drives the herding behavior of individual investors? 32
with a minimum of 4.74%. It follows that the herding behavior shows some signs of
persistence. However, this persistence is relatively weak and these results call for a
deeper investigation of the components of the individual herding behavior.
1.5.3 Herding and investor characteristics
We test here whether the investor’s profile determines part of the observed herding
behavior. The baseline assumption is that some investors might be more prone to
herd than others (regardless of the market conditions or other time-varying variables).
We test diﬀerent characteristics such as gender, sophistication and the wealthiness of
individuals.
The gender diﬀerences in investment behavior are well-documented. For instance,
Barber and Odean (2001) investigate overconfidence by using a “gender approach”
and show that men are more overconfident than women, leading them to trade 45%
more than women. This behavior consequently hurts portfolio performance and re-
duces net returns. It follows that it is a natural choice to test whether the herding
intensity diﬀers between women and men.
The second attribute we consider is the investor’s sophistication. Our hypothesis
is that sophisticated investors herd less on average. A number of researchers have
documented the role played by sophistication on trading behavior. For instance,
the individual diﬀerences in the disposition eﬀect - which describes the tendency of
investors to more readily sell winning stocks than losers - are significantly related to
financial sophistication (Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006). Because
sophisticated investors have a better ability to obtain and manage information (or, at
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least, they have the impression that they do), the need to rely on others’ information
is less pronounced.
We proxy sophistication using three diﬀerent variables. The first proxy is the total
number of transactions made by an investor over the sample period. The second proxy
is a dummy variable that equals one if the investor is trading warrants in addition
to common stocks (and zero otherwise).7 The third proxy is the investor average
portfolio value. It accounts for the wealth of the individuals. Of course, this variable
captures the wealth of individuals only imperfectly, because it neglects assets such as
real estate investments.
Table 1.5 reports the average IHM values for the diﬀerent categories: a) men versus
women, b) investors who trade warrants versus investors who do not, c) investors
with less than 100 trades versus investors with more than 200 trades d) investors
with an average portfolio value below 5,000e versus an average portfolio value above
100,000e.
For each attribute and each quarter, we aim at testing, for each category, whether
the average IHMs are equal. Under the null, there is no diﬀerence between the average
IHMs (i.e., males vs females). Because we do not know the theoretical distribution of
the diﬀerence, we run Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the p−values. For a given
attribute and a given quarter, we compute the average IHM of the two subgroups
that we denote as IHM1 and IHM2. IHM1 (respectively, IHM2) is the average of
the n1 (n2) IHM values of the investors that belong to the first (second) subgroup.
To estimate the empirical distribution of the diﬀerence, we randomly divide the pop-
7Trading warrants requires familiarity with option-like payoﬀs.
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ulation of investors into two subgroups of size n1 and n2. We compute the average
IHM for each subgroup and calculate the absolute value of the diﬀerence, which we
denote as
∣∣∣IHM∗1 − IHM∗2∣∣∣ This step is then repeated 10000 times. The p−value ξ
associated with the test of no diﬀerence is then equal to
ξ =
1
10000
10000∑
k=1
1{|IHM1−IHM2|<|IHM∗1,k−IHM∗2,k|}, (1.9)
where IHM1 (IHM2) is the average IHM value of the investors that belong to the
first (second) subgroup and IHM
∗
1,k (IHM
∗
2,k) is the average IHM value associated
with the first subgroup of n1 (n2) investors obtained by randomly dividing the sample
for draw k.
The quarterly results are provided in Table 1.5. It appears that, on average,
women herd more than men. The overall average IHM value for men is 0.1051 com-
pared to a value of 0.1094 for women. However, the reported p-values indicate that,
for most quarters, the diﬀerence is not significant. The results for sophistication re-
veal that the investors who trade warrants have, on average, a lower herding intensity
than the investors who do not. The individuals with a low number of transactions
tend to herd more than the investors who trade frequently. For both sophistication
attributes, the diﬀerences are highly significant. In particular, when considering the
number of transactions, we observe a very high magnitude (up to 8 points) diﬀerence
between the two subgroups’ average IHM values. The average IHM value for the
subgroup associated with a low number of transactions is 0.1150, whereas the value
for the subgroup associated with a high number of transactions is only 0.0870. Fi-
nally, we observe diﬀerences between the two subgroups when discriminating by the
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portfolio’s average value. Although these diﬀerences are significant for most quarters,
their sign varies over the diﬀerent quarters and prevents us from drawing any clear
conclusion.
1.5.4 Relationship between past performance and herding
To go deeper in analysis, we investigate now whether and how investors’ past per-
formance can influence herding. To this end, we use the investors’ quarterly gross re-
turns, computed from their daily positions. The portfolio returns are estimated using
total returns (i.e., dividends are included) calculated using Eurofidai and Bloomberg
data. We deliberately ignore the intraday movements and the transactions are eval-
uated using day closing quotes. The gross quarterly return Ri,t for investor i and
quarter t is therefore calculated as
Ri,t =
nt∏
τ=1
(
1 +
Niτ∑
j=1
ωj,τrj,τ
)
− 1, (1.10)
where nt is the number of days in quarter t; Niτ is the number of stocks composing
the portfolio of investor i for day τ of quarter t; ωj,τ is the weight of stock j and rj,τ
is its daily return.
In our first analysis, we compute the Spearman rank correlation between investor’s
IHM and the four moments of the investors’ portfolio past returns for each quarter.
The results in Table 1.6 indicate that there exists a strong rank correlation between
the past average returns and the investors’ herding (all but four coeﬃcients are signif-
icant at a 1% level). However, the sign of these coeﬃcients varies over time without
any clear pattern. The coeﬃcients for the Spearman correlation between the IHM
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and the portfolio’s standard deviation are all significant and negative. This result
means that the less risky investors are those that herd the most. The results for
skewness8 are less clear because only 20/28 of the coeﬃcients are significant at a 1%
level and the sign changes over time.
So far, we are not able to determine precisely how an investor’s own past perfor-
mance influences her herding behavior. However, it appears clear that a relationship
exists. We now wish to exploit both the cross-section and the time dimensions of our
database. For each quarter, we compute the investors’ IHM value, past performance,
level of diversification, and portfolio value. We then have unbalanced panel data.9
We aim to test the influence of past performances that vary across individuals and
over time. We thus run a panel data regression. The results of the Hausman test
lead us to reject the null hypothesis of random eﬀects. We therefore choose to include
both the investor and the time fixed eﬀects. We estimate the past performances by
using the risk-adjusted past return, that is, the return of the portfolio divided by its
standard deviation. The formulation of the regression is the following:
IHMi,t = γ0IHMi,t−1 + γ1IHMi,t−2 +
2∑
τ=1
βτRARi,t−τ
+ θEXPi,t + α1IFEi + α2TFEt + εi,t, (1.11)
8Mitton and Vorkink (2007) show that individual investors have a heterogeneous preference for
skewness. This heterogeneity helps explain why individual investors are underdiversified.
9The panel is unbalanced because investors are excluded from the quarters where they do not
trade.
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where IHMi,t is the herding value of investor i in quarter t, RARi,t−τ is the perfor-
mance of investor i in the quarter t−τ and EXPi,t is the investor experience, proxied
by the cumulative number of trades made up to quarter t by investor i. IFEi are
the individual fixed eﬀects and TFEt are the time fixed eﬀects. We include two lags
for IHM; more lags would too dramatically reduce the size of our sample. Thus, we
consider the observations that correspond only to investors trading three quarters
consecutively.
The results are presented in Table 1.7 (IFE and TFE not reported). The lags of the
herding measure appear to be significant and negatively correlated with the herding
measure. The estimates of the coeﬃcients are -0.0614 for lag 1 and -0.0312 for lag
2. The coeﬃcients for the performance over the preceding quarter and the quarter
before that take the negative values -0.0165 and -0.0208 and are significant. This
result confirms our hypothesis that poor past performance creates incentives to herd.
Additionally, we note that the variable EXP matters as θ is significant and negative.
This finding indicates that, as investors acquire experience on the stock market (and
therefore knowledge), they tend to rely more on their private information.
In models 2 to 4, we condition the performance RAR to the realization of a
sophistication variable. The new variable is equal to the risk-adjusted return if the
characteristic is realized and 0 otherwise. The sophistication characteristics are the
same as those used in the previous section. We find that trading warrants has an
impact on the coeﬃcient of the performance variable. Indeed, the coeﬃcient for
RARt−1 is not significantly diﬀerent from 0 for the investors that trade warrants,
while it is negative and highly significant for the others. When considering the second
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lag (t−2), both coeﬃcients are negative and significant, but the eﬀect is lower for the
sophisticated investors. In Model 3, we use the total number of transactions as the
sophistication variable. For the first lag, the performance is significant and negative
for investors with fewer than 100 trades while it is not significant for the investors
associated with a high number of transactions. For the second lag, although the
coeﬃcient is significant and negative for the active investors (over 200 transactions),
it is much lower than the coeﬃcients for the investors that do not trade frequently.
In Model 4, the sophistication is proxied by the Average Portfolio Value. The results
are consistent with Models 3 and 4. We observe that the eﬀect of past performance
is weaker for sophisticated investors (i.e., investors with a high Average Portfolio
Value).
1.5.5 Payoﬀ externalities
A question that was not yet addressed in the literature is whether there exist some
(positive) payoﬀs externalities for herding. In other words, we want to check whether
there is a rational motivation for this behavior that can be expressed in terms of
increased performance. At an aggregate level, some concerns are that herding could
increase volatility and destabilize markets (see Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001).
However, the literature is nearly non-existent on the consequences of herding on the
investors’ performance. A simple reason for this dearth of information is the lack of
herding measures at the individual level. We remedied this problem by introducing
the Individual Herding Measure (IHM).
A preliminary analysis consists in computing the Spearman rank correlation be-
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tween the IHM values and the investors’ average return, standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis for each quarter. The results in Table 1.8 appear to indicate that a re-
lationship exists between herding and returns. The correlation between the IHM and
the average return is significant for nearly all quarters. However, the sign does not
remain the same for every quarter. We thus cannot yet determine the relationship
between the two variables. The results for the standard deviation are easier to in-
terpret. All of the coeﬃcients are negative and significant at a 1% level indicating
that herders hold less risky portfolios. The interpretation of the coeﬃcients for skew-
ness and kurtosis is not straightforward because they change signs and are not all
significant.
To extend our analysis on the influence of herding on performance, we build four
average investors for whom we compute performance measures. First, we consider
an average investor who is representative of the entire population. Her return is
calculated as
RAVt =
1
It
It∑
i=1
Ri,t, (1.12)
where It is the number of investors for quarter t.
We then form, for each quarter, an average investor for each herding category,
whom we designate as an anti-herder, an independent trader and a herder. These
three average investors correspond, respectively, to investors trading against the crowd
(determined by an IHM value below −0.05), investors trading independently of others
(defined by −0.05 ≤ IHM ≤ 0.05) and investors engaging in a herding behavior
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(IHM > 0.05).10 The anti-herder quarterly return RAHt is estimated to be
RAHt =
1
IAHt
It∑
i=1
Ri,t1{IHMi<−0.05}, (1.13)
where It is the number of investors who trade at least once during quarter t and I
AH
t
is the number of investors with IHM values below −0.05.
The independent trader return RITt is computed as
RITt =
1
IITt
It∑
i=1
Ri,t1{−0.05≤IHMi≤0.05}, (1.14)
where IITt is the number of investors with IHM values between −0.05 and 0.05.
Finally, the herder return RHt is
RHt =
1
IHt
It∑
i=1
Ri,t1{IHMi>0.05}, (1.15)
where IHt is the number of investors with IHM values above 0.05.
We follow the approach of Barber and Odean (2000) when choosing the perfor-
mance measures. First, we compute the own-benchmark abnormal return. For a
given quarter, this return is simply the return that would have been obtained by the
beginning-of-quarter portfolio if no transactions had been made. For each quarter
and each individual, the abnormal return is thus computed as the diﬀerence between
the realized return (computed from daily returns) and the own-benchmark return.
Our second benchmark is the quarterly market-adjusted return. This return is sim-
10The limit of 0.05 is arbitrarily determined. However, our results do not change if we impose
diﬀerent bounds (in the neighborhood).
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ply the diﬀerence between the investors’ realized return and the market return. Our
third benchmark is the intercept obtained from Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
The intercept is obtained by estimating the following time-series regression
Ri,t −Rf,t = α + β (Rm,t −Rf,t) + θSMBt + λHMLt + ηMOMt + εi,t, (1.16)
where Rf,t is the EURIBOR 3-month rate, Rm,t is the quarterly return on the French
CAC All-Tradable index11, SMBt andHMLt are the two additional Fama and French
(1993) factors, respectively the quarterly return on a zero-investment size portfolio
and the quarterly return on a zero-investment book-to-market portfolio. The last
coeﬃcient MOMt is the momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), which is
the quarterly return on a zero-investment momentum portfolio.12
The results for the four average investors (the investor representative of the whole
population, the anti-herder, the independent trader and the herder) are presented
in Table 1.9. We obtain a negative and significant (as in Barber and Odean, 2000)
coeﬃcient of -0.23% for the own-benchmark abnormal return. This result means
that the investors would earn an additional 0.23 point by keeping their portfolio
unchanged. More interestingly, we observe a clear negative relationship between
the own-benchmark abnormal return and the Individual Herding Measure (IHM). It
appears that the investors who trade against the crowd dramatically increase their
11This index (also called SBF250) is composed of the 250 largest capitalizations on the French
market.
12The index and the Carhart (1997) factors are provided by Eurofidai (www.eurofidai.org).
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performance by trading contrary to the rest of the population.13 This finding suggests
that the trades made by anti-herders are motivated by information. The results for the
market-adjusted return and the intercept from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model
are not significant. This finding is not surprising because the under-diversification
and the particularities of the individual investors make these benchmarks unfit. It
is worth noting however, that the anti-herders and independent traders hold much
more aggressive portfolios than herders. The market betas for these investors are,
respectively, 1.3734 and 1.3859 compared to 1.2976 for herders. The tilt toward
small stocks is relatively strong for independent traders (the SMB coeﬃcient takes
the value 0.5016). Because the probability of trading with the other investors in the
sample is lower for smaller capitalizations, the investors who invest mainly in small
capitalizations tend to have an IHM value close to zero (because the LSV value of
the stocks they trade is zero).
To go one step further in our analysis, we choose another approach that evaluates
investors’ returns, conditional on their herding behavior, relative to the remainder of
the sample. That is, we want to evaluate whether an investor that herds has better
performance than the rest of the investors in the sample and, more generally, if there
exists a relationship of dependence between performance and herding.
For each quarter, we build a 10× 3 contingency table where the quarterly returns
are divided into ten deciles and investors are split in three categories (anti-herders,
independent traders and herders defined as before). The generic element αij of the
13This result is an indirect proof of the validity of our measure. Indeed, as documented by Barber
and Odean (2000), most of the individual investors decrease their performance by trading. The fact
that the investors with a negative IHM value increase their performance by trading shows that our
measure is successful in determining investors who trades against the crowd.
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table is the number of investors in decile i and category j. To test the null hypothesis
of independence between herding and returns, we use a χ2 test. The advantage
of this test is that nothing is assumed about the type of relationship between the
two variables (returns and IHM); in particular, it does not need to be linear. The
component of the chi-square CSij for decile i and category j is calculated as
CSij =
(
αij − α∗ij
)2
α∗ij
, (1.17)
where αij is the observed number of investors for decile i and category j and α
∗
ij is
the theoretical number of investors that should be observed under the null hypothesis
of independence.
The global chi-square value GCS is simply equal to
GCS =
10∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
CSij  χ
2 ((10− 1)(3− 1)) . (1.18)
The chi-square values for the 32 quarters from January 1999 to December 2006
range from 59.90 to 520.64 (unreported). With a critical value of 28.87 for 18 degrees
of freedom, these results indicate the existence of a relationship between herding and
returns. We then perform the same analysis with Sharpe ratios instead of returns.
We obtain chi-square values ranging from 22.56 to 230.90. We then reject the null
hypothesis of independence between the IHM and the Sharpe ratios for nearly all
quarters.
The limitation of the chi-square test is that while we are able to show that a
relationship exists between herding and performance, we do not have any informa-
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tion concerning its type. To make this distinction, we build, for each quarter, a new
contingency table where the generic element αij corresponds to the ratio of the ob-
served number of investors for decile i and category j over the theoretical number
that would be observed for this decile and this category if the IHM and performance
were independent.14 If the generic element αij is greater than one, it means that there
are more investors for this decile and this category than should be observed if there
was independence between herding and performance.
Because we do not know the theoretical distribution of the number of investors
for a given decile and a given category, we need to estimate it. The process that
is used is similar to the one used for Table 1.5. Each decile (category) contains
di, i = 1, ..., 10 (cj, j = 1, ..., 3) investors. For a given quarter, we randomly separate
the investors in the sample into ten categories (corresponding to the deciles) of size
di, i = 1, ..., 10 and in three categories of size cj, j = 1, ..., 3. We then compute
the number of investors Iij for each decile and category. We repeat this step 10000
times. The p−value ξij associated with the test of no diﬀerence between the observed
number of investors and the theoretical one is then
ξij =
1
10000
10000∑
k=1
1{|Iij−I∗ij|<|Iijk−I∗ij|}, (1.19)
where 1 is an indicator function, Iij is the observed number of investors for decile
i and category j, I∗ij is the theoretical number of investors that should be observed
under the null hypothesis of independence and Iijk corresponds to the number of
14The theoretical number of investors for decile i and category j is equal to the number of investors
in decile i times the number of investors in category j divided by the total number of investors.
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investors observed at draw k (where the sample is randomly divided).
Table 1.10 shows, for each decile i and category j, the average of the generic
elements αij of the 32 contingency tables computed for each quarter from January
1999 to December 2006. The numbers between parentheses indicate the number of
quarters for which the observed number of investors is significantly diﬀerent than the
theoretical number at the 5% level (using p−values computed with Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations as explained previously). In addition, we estimate the statistical significance
of the coeﬃcients by applying a t-test on the 32 values obtained.
We observe that the anti-herders have a higher probability of exhibiting extreme
returns. For the lowest (highest) return decile, this category contains 27% (15%)
more investors than it would contain under independence. On the contrary, the
values taken for deciles 4 through 8 range from 0.8866 to 0.9255. The result for the
herders is completely opposite. We find that the herders are underrepresented in the
lowest and highest deciles while there are more investors than would be expected
under independence in the intermediate ones. The lowest (highest) decile contains
7% (5.5%) fewer investors than would be observed if the herding behavior had no
impact on performance.
The results for Panel B (using Sharpe ratios instead of returns) are even more
striking. For the anti-herders, the proportion is 1.1772 for the first decile, and it
decreases monotonically to reach 0.9341 by decile 9. This trend appears to indicate
that the portfolios of the investors who trade against the crowd perform poorly.
The results for the herders show that these investors concentrate in the intermediate
deciles.
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To conclude, on the one hand, investors who invest against the crowd improve their
performance by trading. On the other hand, the portfolios of these same investors
exhibit lower Sharpe ratios. One possible explanation for these results is that, by
trading against the crowd, they earn a liquidity premium. However, the consequence
of this behavior is that they hold stocks that are more risky and that perform relatively
poorly (hence the lower Sharpe ratios).
1.6 Conclusion
Most studies focus on stock characteristics to explain the herding behavior of
individual or institutional investors. By introducing a new individual measure that
allows the herding behavior of a given investor to be evaluated over time, we are
able to investigate whether the herding behavior can be explained by some investor
attributes. In addition, this is the first study to analyze the relationship between
individual performance and herding. Our primary findings are the following. First,
by studying a unique sample of 87,373 French individual investors, we demonstrate
the importance and the persistence of the herding behavior. Our results confirm, at an
individual level, the observation made in previous studies that herding is much more
pronounced for individual investors than for institutional ones. Second, we were able
to show that sophisticated investors are less prone to herding. Additionally, we found
an interesting link between past performance and mimetic behavior. It appears that
an adverse performance decreases the incentives to gather information. When faced
with negative performance, investors (and, in particular, unsophisticated ones) tend
to herd in the next period. Finally, we provide original insights on the relationship
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between herding and performance. It appears that the investors who invest against
the crowd improve their performance by reallocating their portfolio. However, we
also found that these investors exhibit more extreme results and that they have lower
Sharpe ratios than the rest of the population.
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Figure 1.1
Characteristics of the sample
This figure presents the number of investors, the investors’ average number of stocks and their
portfolio average value in euros for each quarter of the January 1999 to December 2006 period.
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Figure 1.2
The IHM cumulative distribution
This figure presents the cumulative distribution of the IHM at three points in time (First quarter
of 2000, 2003 and 2006).
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Table 1.1
Descriptive statistics
Portfolio Value (e)
Portfolio Size Nb. of Observations Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Panel A: Portfolios as of January 2000
1 9,109 6,973 740 1,640 3,930
2 6,797 9,717 2,038 3,782 7,755
3 5,321 15,479 3,623 6,265 12,067
4 4,046 19,734 5,366 9,038 16,888
5 3,131 24,223 7,262 12,184 21,318
6-9 7,640 41694 11263 18,797 35,279
10+ 7,593 105,255 27,578 48,552 91,609
All 43,637 34,039 3,179 9,317 26,336
Panel B: Portfolios as of January 2003
1 11,421 2,154 218 502 1,329
2 7,925 3,738 700 1,417 3,115
3 6,087 6,377 1,330 2,532 5,304
4 4,793 7,585 2,040 3,750 7,561
5 3,692 10,275 3,002 5,254 10,061
6-9 9,256 16,380 4,969 8,714 16,297
10+ 9,866 44,771 13,471 24,499 46,293
All 53,040 14,341 1,160 4,027 12,572
Panel C: Portfolios as of January 2006
1 11,221 4,216 381 993 2,487
2 7,349 7,878 1,243 2,769 6,250
3 5,468 11,025 2,456 4,796 10,190
4 4,131 16,214 3,772 7,104 14,428
5 3,344 20,720 5,189 9,537 19,292
6-9 8,073 31,114 8,856 16,137 31,167
10+ 8,065 83,783 23,769 44,358 87,414
All 47,651 25,784 1,923 6,831 21,720
The dataset consists of the transaction records of 87373 investors at a major European broker for
the period from January 1999 to December 2006. The investors’ portfolios are sorted with respect
to the number of stocks held at three points in time (January 2000, January 2003 and January
2006). The first (second) column gives the number of stocks in the portfolio (of investors). The four
remaining columns indicate the mean, the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile of the
portfolio values in euros, conditional on the number of stocks held.
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Table 1.2
The LSV and FHW measures
Semiannually Quarterly Monthly
LSV FHW LSV FHW LSV FHW
All stocks 13.90 22.93 13.10 22.00 12.63 21.70
Market capitalization
Large capitalization 14.79 22.10 13.97 21.16 13.86 21.28
Medium capitalization 12.42 21.00 11.88 20.48 11.44 20.32
Small capitalization 12.54 22.54 12.09 21.97 12.04 22.16
Volume of trading
High volume of trading 14.58 21.13 13.68 20.13 13.35 20.16
Medium volume of trading 11.98 20.49 11.56 20.18 11.09 19.90
Low volume of trading 13.29 23.94 12.75 23.16 12.88 23.50
Industry
Oil & Gas 12.87 20.20 12.77 19.33 12.74 19.75
Basic Materials 14.20 23.33 13.36 22.17 13.67 22.71
Industrials 13.84 23.04 12.81 21.88 12.42 21.47
Consumer Goods 13.78 22.78 13.10 22.15 12.96 22.08
Health Care 13.14 21.93 11.89 20.63 11.86 20.84
Consumer Services 13.79 22.43 13.42 21.96 12.84 21.48
Telecommunications 18.24 27.67 16.33 24.83 14.51 22.50
Utilities 15.68 22.82 14.28 20.49 12.70 18.67
Financials 15.26 24.54 14.17 23.14 13.40 22.54
Technology 13.18 21.75 12.55 21.12 11.90 20.79
The LSV measure for stock j in period t is computed to be LSVjt = |pjt − pt| −E[|pjt − pt|], where
pjt is the purchase intensity for stock j, pt is the purchase intensity across all stocks, and E[|pjt−pt|]
is an adjustment factor. With the same notations, the FHW measure for stock j is computed to
be FHWjt = ((pjt − pt)2 − E[(pjt − pt)2]) Ijt(Ijt−1) where Ijt is the number of active traders and
E[(pjt − pt)2] is an adjustment factor. We consider a minimum number of 10 active traders per
stock. Stocks with fewer than 10 active traders in period t are excluded from the analysis for this
period. The average semiannual, quarterly and monthly LSV and FHW measures are calculated for
all stocks over the 1999-2006 period. The LSV and FHW measures are calculated for 3 levels of
capitalization (“Market capitalization”). Large (small) capitalizations correspond to the 30 % top
(bottom) capitalizations. The medium category contains the remaining observations. The LSV and
FHW measures are computed for 3 levels of trading volume in euros (“Volume of trading”). High
trading volume (low trading volume) corresponds to the 30 % top (bottom) volume. The medium
category contains the remaining observations. The herding measures of the diﬀerent industries
(“Industry”) are the average herding measures of the stocks that belong to the industry (using the
Industry Classification Benchmark, ICB). The results are expressed in percentages.
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Table 1.3
Mean contemporaneous and time-series correlation of purchase intensities by individual
investors
Horizon (τ)
Correlation of % buys in month t with
% buys in months t+L
t-Statistics
Whole set of
investors
Group 1 with group
2
Whole set of
investors
Group 1 with group
2
0 100.00 85.09 n.a. 2330.93***
1 30.27 31.59 22.64*** 215.61***
2 19.51 19.82 16.31*** 148.91***
3 15.11 14.49 13.74*** 118.87***
4 10.95 10.88 10.52*** 89.85***
5 11.22 11.14 10.77*** 90.53***
6 9.10 8.21 8.94*** 71.03***
7 6.48 5.88 6.61*** 53.10***
8 6.09 6.52 6.98*** 64.20***
9 3.96 3.39 4.00*** 29.47***
10 2.74 2.52 2.76*** 22.32***
11 3.66 3.55 3.47*** 29.91***
12 5.44 5.49 4.97*** 43.35***
13 2.96 1.83 2.79*** 15.80***
14 1.85 1.66 1.96* 14.88***
15 2.56 0.58 2.60** 5.13***
16 1.29 0.19 1.21 1.58
17 1.95 0.56 1.76* 4.32***
18 2.12 1.97 1.88* 14.95***
19 2.17 2.07 2.47** 18.32***
20 1.42 2.68 1.25 19.69***
21 0.43 −0.45 0.38 −3.37***
22 1.62 1.72 1.40 13.42***
23 2.68 3.24 2.73*** 26.06***
24 3.18 2.86 3.07*** 21.89***
25 1.34 1.45 1.33 11.37***
26 1.02 −1.14 1.02 −9.09***
27 −0.72 −1.31 −0.72 −9.58***
28 −2.12 −2.55 −1.76* −16.88***
29 −3.31 −3.68 −2.95*** −28.01***
30 −1.50 −1.15 −1.40 −8.56***
31 −0.18 −0.45 −0.17 −3.18***
32 0.25 −0.97 0.22 −6.66***
33 −0.49 −1.11 −0.44 −8.29***
34 −1.84 −1.56 −1.92* −12.64***
35 −0.67 0.51 −0.57 3.40***
36 −0.19 0.41 −0.17 2.99***
The results are based on trades data from a large European brokerage house for the January 1999
to December 2006 period. For each stock in each month, we compute the proportion of all trades
that are purchases. The second column of the table represents the correlations between the purchase
intensities at month t and month t + τ with τ = 1, ..., 36. The third column gives the correlations
between the purchase intensities by group 1 at time t with the purchase intensities by group 2 at
time t+ τ . The first element of this column is the mean contemporaneous correlation across groups.
T-statistics are based on the mean and the standard deviation of the calculated correlations. The
results are expressed in percentages.
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Table 1.4
Mean contemporaneous and time-series correlation of individual investors’ herding measure
Horizon (τ)
Correlation of % buys in month t
with % buys in months t+ τ
t-Statistics
Whole set of investors Whole set of investors
0 100.00 n.a.
1 12.43 12.19***
2 11.22 12.80***
3 10.23 12.73***
4 10.96 12.62***
5 9.71 16.79***
6 8.68 13.91***
7 7.98 12.49***
8 7.51 10.38***
9 7.13 9.75***
10 6.94 9.82***
11 6.73 9.21***
12 5.90 8.59***
13 5.36 9.08***
14 4.74 7.08***
15 4.74 7.13***
16 5.59 4.98***
The results are based on IHM values computed from trades data from a large European brokerage
house for the January 1999 to December 2006 period. The second column of the table represents the
correlations between the IHM values at quarter t and quarter t+ τ with τ=0,...,16. The t-statistics
are based on the mean and the standard deviation of the calculated correlations.
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Table 1.5
The Individual Herding Measure (IHM) and investors’ attributes
Gender Warrants Number of transactions Average Portfolio Value
Male Female P-value Yes No P-value < 100 > 200 P-value < 5000 > 100000 P-value
1999
Q1 0.1097 0.1094 0.9216 0.1135 0.1086 0.0566 0.1071 0.1134 0.0026 0.1058 0.1183 0.0000
Q2 0.1263 0.1188 0.0066 0.1166 0.1273 0.0000 0.1331 0.1077 0.0000 0.1351 0.1186 0.0000
Q3 0.1574 0.1590 0.5294 0.1408 0.1621 0.0000 0.1719 0.1309 0.0000 0.1763 0.1361 0.0000
Q4 0.1332 0.1373 0.0742 0.1269 0.1358 0.0000 0.1393 0.1240 0.0000 0.1342 0.1456 0.0000
2000
Q1 0.1011 0.0972 0.0370 0.1040 0.0994 0.0099 0.1032 0.0978 0.0008 0.1040 0.1006 0.0371
Q2 0.1336 0.1384 0.0343 0.1299 0.1358 0.0046 0.1349 0.1330 0.2826 0.1225 0.1518 0.0000
Q3 0.1499 0.1569 0.0029 0.1229 0.1581 0.0000 0.1677 0.1170 0.0000 0.1531 0.1573 0.0424
Q4 0.1233 0.1290 0.0072 0.1158 0.1265 0.0000 0.1309 0.1076 0.0000 0.1200 0.1242 0.0280
2001
Q1 0.1132 0.1214 0.0002 0.1073 0.1165 0.0001 0.1187 0.1016 0.0000 0.0988 0.1138 0.0000
Q2 0.1100 0.1135 0.1486 0.1035 0.1124 0.0003 0.1174 0.0913 0.0000 0.0969 0.1219 0.0000
Q3 0.0875 0.0888 0.5852 0.0837 0.0887 0.0298 0.0941 0.0698 0.0000 0.0763 0.0884 0.0000
Q4 0.1093 0.1142 0.0623 0.1016 0.1123 0.0000 0.1184 0.0882 0.0000 0.0927 0.1072 0.0000
2002
Q1 0.1566 0.1569 0.9114 0.1465 0.1590 0.0000 0.1617 0.1401 0.0000 0.1256 0.1662 0.0000
Q2 0.1129 0.1190 0.0204 0.1162 0.1136 0.3396 0.1154 0.1024 0.0000 0.0791 0.1163 0.0000
Q3 0.0799 0.0823 0.2552 0.0767 0.0812 0.0477 0.0828 0.0673 0.0000 0.0603 0.0825 0.0000
Q4 0.0953 0.1010 0.0291 0.0857 0.0988 0.0000 0.1087 0.0704 0.0000 0.0898 0.0768 0.0000
2003
Q1 0.1062 0.1143 0.0053 0.0974 0.1102 0.0000 0.1168 0.0885 0.0000 0.1055 0.1130 0.0033
Q2 0.1225 0.1432 0.0000 0.0982 0.1328 0.0000 0.1503 0.0771 0.0000 0.1158 0.0915 0.0000
Q3 0.0812 0.0927 0.0001 0.0732 0.0858 0.0000 0.0932 0.0663 0.0000 0.0687 0.0791 0.0000
Q4 0.0599 0.0613 0.5366 0.0506 0.0624 0.0000 0.0673 0.0483 0.0000 0.0502 0.0542 0.0656
2004
Q1 0.0608 0.0640 0.1471 0.0533 0.0633 0.0000 0.0687 0.0495 0.0000 0.0567 0.0552 0.4841
Q2 0.0906 0.1005 0.0005 0.0822 0.0950 0.0000 0.1017 0.0745 0.0000 0.0858 0.0811 0.0869
Q3 0.1328 0.1410 0.0157 0.1026 0.1417 0.0000 0.1641 0.0853 0.0000 0.1450 0.0847 0.0000
Q4 0.0982 0.0992 0.7272 0.0896 0.1006 0.0000 0.1104 0.0764 0.0000 0.0967 0.0689 0.0000
2005
Q1 0.0723 0.0785 0.0100 0.0731 0.0736 0.8490 0.0774 0.0646 0.0000 0.0549 0.0668 0.0000
Q2 0.1126 0.1158 0.2837 0.1084 0.1145 0.0395 0.1302 0.0827 0.0000 0.1101 0.0906 0.0000
Q3 0.1093 0.1144 0.0708 0.0929 0.1142 0.0000 0.1253 0.0850 0.0000 0.0998 0.0894 0.0002
Q4 0.0993 0.1046 0.0479 0.0905 0.1025 0.0000 0.1142 0.0748 0.0000 0.1114 0.0787 0.0000
2006
Q1 0.0764 0.0794 0.1589 0.0682 0.0789 0.0000 0.0854 0.0589 0.0000 0.0771 0.0577 0.0000
Q2 0.0786 0.0852 0.0059 0.0672 0.0827 0.0000 0.0965 0.0511 0.0000 0.0866 0.0611 0.0000
Q3 0.0839 0.0849 0.7015 0.0767 0.0858 0.0010 0.0889 0.0729 0.0000 0.0640 0.0841 0.0000
Q4 0.0793 0.0793 0.9763 0.0766 0.0799 0.1499 0.0859 0.0657 0.0000 0.0740 0.0677 0.0040
This table reports the average IHM values using various subsamples of investors. Four characteristics are considered: the gender, whether the
investor trades warrants during the sample period, the total number of transactions and the average portfolio value. For each characteristic
and each quarter, we compare the average IHM values of the two subsamples of investors. The reported p-values (computed with Monte-Carlo
simulations) correspond to the test of no diﬀerence between the average IHM values of the two subsamples of investors.
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Table 1.6
Correlation between investors’s portfolio past returns and herding behavior
Spearman correlation with IHM
Average Return Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
2000
Q1 −0.1388*** −0.0896*** 0.0235*** −0.0197***
Q2 −0.1138*** −0.2387*** 0.1085*** 0.0054
Q3 0.0582*** −0.1320*** −0.0049 −0.0331***
Q4 0.0203*** −0.1458*** −0.0265*** 0.0187***
2001
Q1 0.1269*** −0.1659*** −0.0265*** 0.0015
Q2 0.1231*** −0.1447*** −0.0293*** 0.0232***
Q3 −0.0288*** −0.0615*** −0.0261*** −0.0119*
Q4 0.0657*** −0.1061*** −0.0352*** 0.0826***
2002
Q1 0.0040 −0.0996*** 0.0067 −0.0785***
Q2 −0.0108* −0.0552*** 0.0327*** 0.0094
Q3 0.0281*** −0.0882*** −0.0188*** −0.0378***
Q4 0.0649*** −0.1033*** −0.0051 −0.0518***
2003
Q1 −0.0087 −0.1450*** −0.0252*** −0.0654***
Q2 0.1011*** −0.2723*** 0.0139** −0.0386***
Q3 −0.1097*** −0.1938*** −0.1117*** 0.0178**
Q4 0.0361*** −0.0884*** 0.0141** 0.0130*
2004
Q1 0.0256*** −0.1425*** 0.0129* 0.0122*
Q2 −0.0293*** −0.0851*** 0.0150** −0.0241***
Q3 0.0621*** −0.1209*** −0.1453*** 0.0131*
Q4 0.0446*** −0.0938*** −0.0513*** −0.0033
2005
Q1 −0.0342*** −0.0686*** −0.0321*** −0.0253***
Q2 0.0206*** −0.1005*** 0.0556*** 0.0301***
Q3 −0.0928*** −0.1228*** −0.0327*** −0.0080
Q4 −0.0739*** −0.0756*** −0.0393*** −0.0231***
2006
Q1 −0.0027 −0.1170*** −0.0340*** 0.0112*
Q2 −0.0873*** −0.1333*** −0.0263*** −0.0260***
Q3 0.0990*** −0.1624*** −0.0543*** −0.0847***
Q4 0.0799*** −0.0923*** 0.0028 −0.0460***
The quarterly returns are based on the investors’ daily portfolios from January 1999 to December
2006. This table presents the coeﬃcients of the Spearman correlation between investors’ IHM
and, respectively, the previous quarter portfolios’ average return, standard deviation, skewness and
kurtosis. *** corresponds to a p-value of 0.01, ** to a p-value of 0.05 and * to a p-value of 0.1.
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Table 1.7
Influence of past performance on herding behavior
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Explanatory Variable Coeﬃcients Coeﬃcients Coeﬃcients Coeﬃcients
(IHM)t−1 −0.0614*** −0.0614*** −0.0617*** −0.0614***
(-33.2600) (-33.2800) (-33.4100) (-33.2800)
(IHM)t−2 −0.0312*** −0.0311*** −0.0310*** −0.0312***
(-16.9000) (-16.8700) (-16.8100) (-16.8900)
(RAR)t−1 −0.0165***
(-6.3300)
(RAR)t−2 −0.0208***
(-8.0800)
(RAR)t−1|(WRT = 1) 0.0020
(0.5300)
(RAR)t−1|(WRT = 0) −0.0239***
(-8.4600)
(RAR)t−2|(WRT = 1) −0.0150***
(-4.0200)
(RAR)t−2|(WRT = 0) −0.0234***
(-8.3700)
(RAR)t−1|(NT < 100) −0.0363***
(-10.2100)
(RAR)t−1|(100 ≤ NT ≤ 200) −0.0247***
(-6.1500)
(RAR)t−1|(NT > 200) 0.0016
(0.5000)
(RAR)t−2|(NT < 100) −0.0356***
(-10.1400)
(RAR)t−2|(100 ≤ NT ≤ 200) −0.0231***
(-5.8300)
(RAR)t−2|(NT > 200) −0.0099***
(-3.0900)
(RAR)t−1|(APV < 5000) −0.0144***
(-2.6200)
(RAR)t−1|(5000 ≤ APV ≤ 100000) −0.0192***
(-6.9200)
(RAR)t−1|(APV > 100000) −0.0004
(-0.0800)
(RAR)t−2|(APV < 5000) −0.0243***
(-4.5300)
(RAR)t−2|(5000 ≤ APV ≤ 100000) −0.0215***
(-7.8300)
(RAR)t−2|(APV > 100000) −0.0123**
(-2.2400)
(Experience)t −0.0187*** −0.0189*** −0.0190*** −0.0190***
(-5.7200) (-5.7600) (-5.7900) (-5.8100)
Number of Observations 332154 332154 332154 332154
R-squared 0.2466 0.2467 0.2469 0.2466
This table presents the results of the panel regression estimated by IHMi,t = γ0IHMi,t−1 + γ1IHMi,t−2 +∑2
τ=1βτRARi,t−τ + θEXPi,t+α1IFEi+α2TFEt+ εi,t. The independent variable is the Investor Herding Measure
(IHM) for quarter t. We include two lagged values of the IHM (quarters t− 1 and t− 2) to account for autocorrela-
tion. RARt is the investor’s portfolio Risk Adjusted Return for quarter t, defined as the ratio of the average return
to the standard deviation. WRT is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor trades warrants at any
moment during the sample period and 0 otherwise. NT is the investor’s total number of transactions and APV is the
investor’s average portfolio value. Experiencet represents the number of transactions accomplished by the investor
up to quarter t. Models 1 to 4 incorporate individual- and time-fixed eﬀects. Returns are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. Coeﬃcients are standardized.
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Table 1.8
Correlation between investors’s portfolio contemporary returns and herding behavior
Spearman correlation with IHM
Average Return Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
1999
Q1 0.0426*** −0.0228*** −0.0041 −0.0136*
Q2 0.0338*** 0.0574*** 0.0043 −0.0040
Q3 −0.0026 0.0555*** 0.0330*** −0.1112***
Q4 0.0399*** 0.0211*** 0.0045 −0.0262***
2000
Q1 −0.0910*** −0.0628*** 0.0388*** 0.0324***
Q2 0.1421*** −0.1835*** −0.0574*** −0.1102***
Q3 −0.0298*** −0.0979*** 0.0441*** 0.0691***
Q4 0.1007*** −0.1111*** −0.0289*** 0.0089
2001
Q1 0.0411*** −0.1038*** −0.0028 −0.0677***
Q2 −0.0444*** −0.1142*** −0.0722*** −0.0827***
Q3 0.0105* −0.0595*** −0.0322*** 0.0270***
Q4 −0.0961*** −0.1089*** −0.0212*** −0.0153**
2002
Q1 0.0322*** −0.0831*** −0.0648*** −0.1073***
Q2 −0.0164*** −0.0160** −0.0189*** −0.0020
Q3 0.0647*** −0.1072*** 0.0216*** −0.0435***
Q4 −0.0468*** −0.0680*** −0.0112* −0.0196***
2003
Q1 −0.0481*** −0.1023*** −0.0419*** −0.0521***
Q2 −0.1517*** −0.2037*** −0.0892*** −0.0190***
Q3 −0.0069 −0.1688*** 0.0237*** −0.0365***
Q4 0.0219*** −0.0811*** −0.0014 0.0088
2004
Q1 0.0139** −0.0907*** −0.0649*** 0.0387***
Q2 0.0669*** −0.0654*** −0.0110 0.0121*
Q3 0.1045*** −0.1522*** 0.0001 −0.0386***
Q4 −0.0333*** −0.1009*** −0.0192*** −0.0796***
2005
Q1 0.0063 −0.0537*** −0.0113 0.0168**
Q2 −0.0496*** −0.1310*** 0.0074 −0.0441***
Q3 −0.1339*** −0.1474*** 0.0051 0.0365***
Q4 0.0395*** −0.1161*** 0.0223*** −0.0337***
2006
Q1 −0.0231*** −0.0921*** 0.0067 −0.0129*
Q2 0.0605*** −0.1272*** −0.0279*** −0.0334***
Q3 0.0814*** −0.1153*** −0.0180** −0.0656***
Q4 0.0016 −0.0840*** 0.0088 −0.0422***
Quarterly returns are based on the investors’ daily portfolios from January 1999 to December 2006.
This table presents the coeﬃcients of the Spearman correlation between investors’ IHM and, respec-
tively, the portfolios’ contemporary average return, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. ***
corresponds to a p-value of 0.01, ** to a p-value of 0.05 and * to a p-value of 0.1.
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Table 1.9
Panel regression of individual herding and performance
Excess Return Rmt −Rft HMLt SMBt MOMt Adjusted R2
Panel A: Average investor
Own-benchmark abnormal return −0.0023***
(-2.7867)
Market-adjusted return 0.0054
(0.4592)
Carhart four-factor 0.0004 1.3274*** −0.0678 0.4287* −0.1780 0.9144
(0.0400) (10.6648) (-0.3915) (1.9444) (-1.4301)
Panel B: Average anti-herder (IHM < −0.05)
Own-benchmark abnormal return 0.0069***
(5.8519)
Market-adjusted return 0.0034
(0.2641)
Carhart four-factor −0.0026 1.3734*** −0.0383 0.4099 −0.1670 0.9030
(-0.2217) (10.0789) (-0.2020) (1.6982) (-1.2251)
Panel C: Average independent trader (−0.05 ≤ IHM ≤ 0.05)
Own-benchmark abnormal return 0.0008
(1.4912)
Market-adjusted return 0.0069
(0.5293)
Carhart four-factor −0.0008 1.3859*** −0.0912 0.5016* −0.1423 0.8907
(-0.0657) (9.6000) (-0.4545) (1.9616) (-0.9858)
Panel D: Average herder (IHM > 0.05)
Own-benchmark abnormal return −0.0051***
(-4.1973)
Market-adjusted return 0.0049
(0.4431)
Carhart four-factor 0.0008 1.2976*** −0.0574 0.3927* −0.1831 0.9239
(0.0859) (11.2751) (-0.3584) (1.9264) (-1.5910)
Quarterly returns are based on the investors’ daily portfolios from January 1999 to December 2006.
Panel A corresponds to the average investor who is representative of the entire population. Panel
B corresponds to the anti-herders (IHM < −0.05), Panel C to the independent traders (−0.05 ≤
IHM ≤ 0.05) and Panel D to the herders (IHM > 0.05). The own-benchmark abnormal return is
the result of the diﬀerence between the realized return and the return of the beginning-of-quarter
portfolio. The market-adjusted return corresponds to the investor’s realized return minus the return
of the market (SBF 250) for the same period. The p-values are computed using the t-statistics
based on the 32 observations of the time-series. The Carhart four-factor model is a regression of the
individual investor excess return (using the EURIBOR 3-month rate) on the market excess return
Rmt − Rft, a zero-investment size portfolio (SMBt), a zero-investment book-to-market portfolio
(HMBt) and a zero-investment momentum portfolio (MOMt). The quarterly returns are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *** corresponds to a p-value of 0.01, ** to a p-value of 0.05 and *
to a p-value of 0.1.
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Table 1.10
The influence of herding behavior on investors’ portfolio performance
Panel A: Investors sorted on return
Lowest Returns 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest Returns
Anti-herder 1.2709*** 1.0729*** 1.0064 0.9255*** 0.9066*** 0.8878*** 0.8866*** 0.9153*** 0.9848 1.1476***
(IHM < −0.05) (28) (14) (2) (10) (15) (18) (18) (15) (8) (21)
Independent trader 1.0457 1.0315* 0.9914 0.9720** 0.9683*** 0.9660*** 0.9641*** 0.9825 1.0286 1.0503*
(−0.05 ≤ IHM ≤ 0.05) (21) (16) (11) (10) (8) (7) (12) (8) (16) (23)
Herder 0.9330*** 0.9768*** 1.0057 1.0278*** 1.0331*** 1.0362*** 1.0385*** 1.0200*** 0.9850 0.9445***
(IHM > 0.05) (24) (17) (10) (15) (19) (22) (20) (16) (14) (22)
Panel B: Investors sorted on Sharpe ratio
Lowest Sharpe Ratio 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest Sharpe ratio
Anti-herders 1.1772*** 1.0691*** 1.0401** 0.9946 0.9678** 0.9585*** 0.9499*** 0.9473*** 0.9341*** 0.9657
(IHM < −0.05) (20) (11) (8) (6) (5) (4) (9) (7) (15) (17)
Independent traders 1.0284 1.0213 0.9986 0.9820** 0.9911 0.9873 0.9850 0.9758* 1.0125 1.0184
(−0.05 ≤ IHM ≤ 0.05) (18) (12) (9) (6) (4) (4) (8) (10) (14) (19)
Herders 0.9623*** 0.9796** 0.9929 1.0091* 1.0127*** 1.0138*** 1.0165*** 1.0164*** 1.0046 0.9925
(IHM > 0.05) (23) (18) (12) (7) (11) (5) (9) (14) (14) (18)
Quarterly returns are based on investors’ daily portfolios from January 1999 to December 2006. Investors are sorted into deciles on
quarterly return (Panel A) and Sharpe ratio (Panel B). Decile 1 corresponds to the lowest returns (respectively Sharpe ratios) while Decile
10 contains investors with the highest ones. Investors are separated into three categories: Anti-herders (IHM < −0.05), Independent traders
(−0.05 ≤ IHM ≤ 0.05) and Herders (IHM > 0.05). We compute, for each intersection of a performance decile and a herding category
the ratio of the number of investors on the theoretical number under independence between herding and performance. *** corresponds to a
p-value of 0.01, ** to a p-value of 0.05 and * to a p-value of 0.1. P-values are computed using the t-statistics based on the 32 observations
of the time-series. The values in brackets correspond to the number of quarters for which the diﬀerence between the realized number of
investors and the theoretical one is significant (with a significance level of 5 % and using Monte-Carlo simulations to assess the significance).
Quarterly returns are windsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Abstract
We show, in this paper, that measuring the accuracy of a target price is not
suﬃcient to assess its quality, because the forecast predictability (which depends
on the stock return volatility and on the forecast horizon) is likely to vary across
stocks and over time. We argue that the evidence of time persistent diﬀerences in
analysts’ target price accuracy, obtained in previous studies, cannot be interpreted
as a proof of persistent diﬀerential abilities. We demonstrate this claim by showing
that the persistence in accuracy remains when replacing the empirical target prices
by na¨ıve forecasts. Our analysis indicates that the persistence in accuracy is driven
by persistence in stock return volatility.
We introduce a measure of target price quality that considers both the forecast
inaccuracy and the forecast predictability. Using elements from option-pricing theory,
we provide a simple solution to the issue of estimating target price predictability. Our
empirical analysis reveals that, when forecast predictability is taken into account,
financial analysts do not exhibit significant persistent diﬀerential abilities to forecast
future stock prices.
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2.1 Introduction
Professional investors, [...], fail a basic test of skill: persistent achieve-
ment.
Daniel Kahneman (2011)
We show, in this paper, that measuring the accuracy of a target price is not
suﬃcient to assess its quality, because the forecast predictability (i.e. the diﬃculty
of issuing an accurate forecast) is likely to vary across stocks and over time. The
importance of the predictability, when assessing the quality of a forecast, is a well-
known concern in the literature on earnings forecasts (Huberts and Fuller, 1995;
DeBondt and Forbes, 1999; Beckers, Steliaros, and Thomson, 2004). For instance,
Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) note that “forecasting diﬃculty is [...] like to diﬀer cross-
sectionally”. Similarly, Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) state that “some firms are
more diﬃcult than others to predict accurately”. The existing literature on target
prices ignores this issue and considers that a target price is better than another if it is
more accurate. We show that omitting the issue of predictability (which is a function
of the volatility and of the forecast horizon) prevents from evaluating correctly the
ability of financial analysts to issue accurate target prices. Furthermore, we show
that the controls for the diﬀerences in volatility often used in multivariate analysis,
are not well-adapted as the relationship between volatility and target price accuracy
is nonlinear. We intend, in this paper, to provide a comprehensive framework to
evaluate the quality of target prices. The contributions of our new measure of quality
are the following: (1) it accounts for diﬀerences in predictability (i.e. diﬀerences
in stock return volatility and forecast horizon); (2) it takes into account forecast
boldness (i.e. how far the analyst’s target price is from the current price); and, (3) it
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is a dynamic measure (the forecast quality can be evaluated at any moment in time).1
When taking into account diﬀerences in predictability across target prices, we show
that analysts do not exhibit persistent diﬀerential abilities. Our results contrast with
previous studies (Bradshaw, Brown, and Huang, forthcoming; Bilinski, Lyssimachou,
and Walker, 2013).
Analysts play a key role in financial markets. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) iden-
tify two sources of value that analysts bring to the market. First, they extract useful
information for investors from public information. Second, through a careful ex-
amination of accounting documents and contacts with firm managers, they acquire
information previously unknown to other market participants. As such, their reports
and forecasts are of great importance since they render private information public.
Analysts’ reports are typically composed of three main figures: earnings forecasts,
purchase recommendations and target prices. Though the latter seems to be of great-
est interest to investors (as it gives a precise indication as to whether a stock is under-
or overvalued), it has also received the least attention from academics. However, a
few articles point out the important role of target prices both for individual investors
and practitioners. For instance, Brav and Lehavy (2003) and Asquith, Mikhail, and
Au (2005) report significant market reaction to target price revisions, even after con-
trolling for recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. Lawrence, Ryan, and
Sun (2012) analyze the web traﬃc of a leading website of analyst report information
and find that target prices are the type of analyst information for which the investors’
demand is greatest.
1Forecast quality/accuracy is usually evaluated ex-post.
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The main practice for earnings forecasts is to consider that a forecast is accurate if
the absolute error is small (i.e., the announced earnings value is close to the forecast).
The measures traditionally used to estimate the accuracy of target prices are defined
similarly, that is, a target price is considered to be accurate if the stock price at the
end of the forecast horizon is close to the target price. The accuracy (or conversely
the inaccuracy) is then used to assess the quality of the forecast. We argue, in this
article, that the accuracy in itself is not suﬃcient to evaluate the quality of a forecast
as it does not take into account the diﬃculty of making a correct forecast. Indeed,
the diﬃculty of forecasting a target price is not the same for all stocks. In particular,
two factors influence the diﬃculty of the analyst’s task: the stock return volatility
and the forecast horizon.2 The higher the volatility, the higher the expected value
of the absolute forecast error is. Similarly, the higher the horizon, the more diﬃcult
it is to forecast the future stock price. Thus, for a given absolute forecast error, it
is logical to consider a forecast made on a more volatile stock and/or with a longer
horizon to be of higher quality than a forecast made on a less volatile stock and/or
with a shorter horizon.
A simple way to measure the diﬃculty of forecasting a target price is to estimate
the expected value of the absolute error Et [|ST − Φt,T |] where Φt,T is the target price
issued at time t with horizon T − t and ST is the stock price at the end of the horizon.
The expected value of the absolute error is an increasing function of the stock return
2The predictability of a forecast depends on the variability of the predicted variable and on the
horizon of the forecast. Evidence of a link between horizon and predictability has been established
early in the literature on earnings forecasts (Brown, Richardson, and Schwager, 1987; O’Brien, 1988;
Kross, Ro, and Schroeder, 1990; Brown, 1991; Lys and Soo, 1995; Sinha, Brown, and Das, 1997).
Dichev and Tang (2009) demonstrate the existence of a relationship between predictability and
variability. They show that earnings predictability is negatively related to earnings volatility.
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volatility and the length of the forecast horizon. We can then define the quality
as the abnormal absolute forecast error, denoted Et [|ST − Φt,T |]− |ST − Φt,T | where
Et [|ST − Φt,T |] measures the diﬃculty of the forecast and |ST − Φt,T | measures the
inaccuracy.
An important issue here is to find a way to estimate the expected value of the
absolute forecast Et [|ST − Φt,T |]. However, option-pricing theory provides us with all
the necessary elements to estimate the expected value of the absolute forecast error.
First, we note that the absolute forecast error |ST − Φt,T | corresponds to the final
payoﬀ of a straddle with a strike price equal to Φt,T , that is, a portfolio containing
a call option and a put option on the same underlying stock; the two options are
characterized by the same strike price Φt,T and the same maturity T − t. Second, we
note that the price of the straddle at time t corresponds to the discounted expected
value of the final payoﬀ. It follows that, when issuing a target price, an analyst acts
as if she shorts a straddle. Selling a straddle implies that she receives up front the
discounted expected value of the absolute forecast error Et [|ST − Φt,T |]. She will then
pay the realized absolute forecast error |ST − Φt,T | at the end of the horizon.
The contributions of our approach are the following. First, our approach permits
to account for diﬀerences in volatility. Second, it allows us to consider forecasts with
diﬀerent horizons. Third, we account for the boldness of the forecasts. Fourth, we
are able to measure the quality of a forecast at any moment in time: the quality of
a target price at time t + τ, τ ∈ [0;T ] is simply the price of the straddle at time t
capitalized until time t + τ minus the price of the straddle at time t + τ .3 In other
3The quality of the target price at time t+ τ is equal to Et [|ST − Φt,T |]− Et+τ [|ST − Φt,T |].
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words, we use the price at time t + τ to “mark-to-market” the quality. This last
feature is particularly important as it provides a simple and consistent solution to the
issue of measuring, when a revision occurs, the quality of the initial target price .
In the second part of the paper, we conduct an empirical analysis based upon our
measure which investigates whether financial analysts exhibit skills in forecasting fu-
ture prices. Kahneman (2011) exposes two basic conditions for the possible existence
of expertise skills: (1) an environment that is suﬃciently regular to be predictable;
and (2) an opportunity to learn the regularities through prolonged practice. Although
the second condition is met, the first condition is not likely to be fulfilled. Indeed, one
can hardly define the stock market as a regular environment. Even without assuming
any kind of market eﬃciency, predicting stock prices at a 12-month or longer horizon
is an extremely diﬃcult task.
Furthermore, as stated by Kahneman (2011), “whether professionals have a chance
to develop intuitive expertise depends essentially on the quality and speed of the
feedback”. In the case of target prices with 12-month or longer horizon, the use of
ex-post measures implies that the speed of the feedback is drastically low. Taking
into account these diﬀerent elements, we therefore expect financial analysts not to
demonstrate any significant skill in forecasting future stock prices.
Using a dataset similar to ours, Bradshaw, Brown, and Huang (forthcoming) find
statistically significant (albeit economically weak) evidence that financial analysts are
able to consistently forecast accurate target prices.4 We show in this paper that this
persistence is mechanically induced by the persistence in volatility. Analysts tend to
4Although their results are statistically significant, their analysis shows that evidence of persistent
diﬀerential abilities is rather limited.
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issue target prices for a small pool of stocks. This pool of stocks is relatively stable
over time, meaning that the analysts cover the same stocks for several periods. We
show that, because the magnitude of the absolute forecast error is highly correlated
with stock return volatility, analysts who cover a pool of stocks with low volatility
exhibit low persistent absolute forecast errors. We provide empirical evidence for
this causality. Our results indicate that a significant persistence in accuracy remains
when considering na¨ıve forecasts. When taking into account diﬀerences in volatility,
that is, when considering the quality of the forecasts rather than the accuracy, we
show that the persistence in correctly forecasting future stock prices disappears (the
relation is no more statistically significant). Our findings are robust to a number of
changes such as restricting the sample to experienced financial analysts, or restricting
the validity of target prices to a shorter period of time.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the data used in our
study. In section 3, we discuss the importance of target price predictability and we
show why target price accuracy cannot be used to measure the ability of financial
analysts to forecast future stock prices. In section 4, we introduce our measure of
target price quality. Section 5 reports the empirical results and the last section
concludes.
2.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our primary dataset consists of a total of 686,863 target prices made by 10,137
analysts (620 brokers) on 7,646 U.S. stocks for the 2000-2010 period. The provider for
the target prices is I/B/E/S. For each forecast, we have the code of the analyst (and
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the broker code) who issues the forecast, the issue date, the horizon in months (usually
6 or 12 months), and the target price. We remove from the database the forecasts for
which the stock price is not available on the issue date (20,766 forecasts), or is less
than one dollar (2,044 forecasts). We also delete from the database the forecasts for
which the ratio of the target price over the stock price is in the bottom one percent of
the distribution (7,468 forecasts) and the forecasts for which this ratio is higher than
four (2,313 forecasts). Finally, we discard the observations for which the price history
is too short to compute an acceptable estimation of the historical volatility5 (4,801
forecasts). After deleting these 37,392 observations, 770 analysts are removed from
the database as they are left with no forecasts. Our final sample consists of 649,471
target prices made by 9,367 analysts (583 brokers) on 7,268 stocks.
Our secondary dataset consists of the prices, capitalization levels and volumes
of trading for the 7,268 stocks considered. This second dataset comes from CRSP.
Target prices and stock prices are adjusted for splits and corporate actions.
Table 2.1 reports for each year the number of forecasts, number of active analysts,
the average, median and maximum number of active analysts per stock, and the
average, median and maximum number of stocks covered per analyst. We observe
that the number of forecasts per year more than doubles over the sample period while
the number of active analysts remains roughly constant. It appears that the inclusion
of a target price in analysts’ reports is an increasingly popular practice. An analyst
typically covers 4 diﬀerent stocks at the beginning of the sample period; this number
increases to 7 in the last years. Conversely, the number of analysts covering a given
5We delete the observations for which there are less than 2 months of price history prior to the
forecast.
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stock increases over the sample period from 4 to 6.
On average, the analysts in our sample revise their forecasts approximately every
6 months (137 trading days). The target prices in our sample are on average 23%
higher than the current stock price.6 This statistic is similar to what can be observed
for other periods and/or countries. For instance, Brav and Lehavy (2003) find that
target prices on U.S. stocks for the 1997-1999 period are on average 28% higher than
the current price while Kerl (2011) reports an implicit return of 18.07% for German
stocks for the 2002-2004 period. Finally, it appears that the analysts in our sample
are mainly optimistic about stock prices with only 13% of the target prices forecasted
below the concurrent price.
2.3 Target price accuracy
2.3.1 Definition and shortcomings
Similarly to earnings forecasts, the most popular measure of target price accuracy
is the absolute forecast error. It is defined as
|TPERROR|t =
|ST − Φt,T |
St
, (2.1)
where Φt,T is the value of a target price issued at time t with horizon T , ST is the
stock price at the end of the forecast horizon and St is the stock price at the time the
forecast was issued.
6The annualized return for the S&P 500 Composite index for the same period is −1.21%.
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Despite its wide use in the literature, this measure of accuracy has a number of
drawbacks and is not well suited to evaluate whether a forecast is better than another
or whether an analyst is better than her peers at issuing accurate target prices. The
main drawbacks of the absolute forecast error are: (1) it does not reward bold accurate
forecasts; (2) the ex-post approach implies a low feedback speed (the accuracy can be
evaluated only at the end of the target price horizon, usually 12 months); (3) it does
not permit a clean treatment of target price revisions; and, (4) it does not account
for stock price predictability (i.e., the diﬃculty of issuing an accurate target price).
This section studies the issue of target price revisions and stock price predictability.
2.3.2 Stock price predictability
The stock price (un)predictability corresponds to the diﬃculty of issuing an accu-
rate target price. This diﬃculty is a function of both the stock return volatility and
the target price horizon. As a consequence, there exists a mechanical relationship
between accuracy and stock return volatility.7 We provide here both empirical and
theoretical evidence that target price accuracy is mechanically influenced by stock
return volatility. Furthermore, we show that this relationship is nonlinear.
Existence of a relationship between volatility and accuracy
Each year, we assign target prices to five quintiles with respect to the volatility
of the underlying stock. For each quintile, we report the average accuracy of the
target prices in the quintile. Table 2.2 provides the average accuracy per quintile for
7We do not consider here the issue of target price horizon as most studies consider only target
prices with a 12-month horizon.
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the 2000-2010 period. Panel A reports the results using actual target prices. Panel
B provides the average accuracy using na¨ıve forecasts. Na¨ıve forecasts are defined
as the stock price at the issued date capitalized by the risk-free rate. We report
results using na¨ıve forecasts in order to eliminate the possibility that the relationship
between accuracy and stock return volatility ensues entirely from financial analysts
being particularly good at forecasting stock prices for high volatility firms. Our
findings indicate a strong monotonic relationship between stock return volatility and
target price accuracy. This result holds both for actual data and na¨ıve forecasts.
Nonlinearity of the relationship
We now show that the relationship between stock return volatility and target
price accuracy is nonlinear. In order to demonstrate this nonlinearity, we perform the
following regression
|TPERROR|jt =
10
α +
∑
k=1
βk1
k
jtσjt + ǫjt, (2.2)
where |TPERROR|jt is the absolute forecast error of a target price on firm j issued
by any analyst at time t, σjt is the stock return volatility of stock j measured at time
t and 1kjt is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the stock return volatility σjt belongs
to the k-th volatility decile and 0 otherwise.
The idea underlying this regression is the following one. In case of perfect linearity,
all the coeﬃcients βk will take the same value. On the contrary, if the relationship
between accuracy and volatility is nonlinear, we will find diﬀerences in the values
taken by the coeﬃcients βk. For instance, if the coeﬃcient βk decreases (increases)
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with k, the relationship between volatility and accuracy will be concave (convex).
Table 2.3 reports the results of the regression. The coeﬃcient βk increases with
k, indicating that the relationship between volatility and accuracy is nonlinear and
convex.
We now provide theoretical evidence of the nonlinearity of the relationship between
volatility and accuracy. Assuming, as it is common in the financial literature, that
stock prices can be modeled as a Geometric Brownian Motion, we have
log(ST ) ∼ N
(
log(St) +
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
(T − t) , σ2 (T − t)
)
, (2.3)
where µ is the drift and σ is the volatility.
The probability that the stock price ends up inside an interval [bl; bu] at the end
of a determined horizon is equal to
Pr [log(bl) < log(ST ) < log(bu)] = Pr
[
log(bl/St)−(µ− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t) < z <
log(bu/St)−(µ− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t)
]
= Pr [b∗l < z < b
∗
u]
= G (b∗u)−G (b∗l ),
(2.4)
where b∗l and b
∗
u are defined by
b∗l =
log(bl/St)− (µ− 12σ2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t) and b
∗
u =
log(bu/St)− (µ− 12σ2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t) , (2.5)
G is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution and z is
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a standard Gaussian variable.
The probability for the stock price to end up inside a given interval at the end of
a determined horizon is a nonlinear function of both the volatility and the horizon.
It follows, by extension, that the expected value of the absolute forecast error is a
nonlinear function of both the stock return volatility and the target price horizon.
The nonlinearity of the relationship between volatility and accuracy implies that
it is not possible to introduce, in multivariate analyses, the volatility as a control
variable. It follows that a new framework of evaluation is needed for measuring the
ability of financial analysts to issue accurate target prices.
2.3.3 The issue of target price revisions
Target prices are generally issued with a 12-month horizon. However, in practice,
analysts often revise their forecasts before the end of this horizon. Bonini, Zanetti,
Bianchini, and Salvi (2010) provide an interesting insight on the issue of computing
an ex-post measure of accuracy when forecast revisions occur. When a target price is
revised, the two possible approaches to address the problem are:
(1) to consider the revised target price as a new forecast and to estimate the global
accuracy on the two overlapping periods; and,
(2) to assess the accuracy of the first forecast by adjusting the time horizon and
to consider the revision as a new forecast.
To illustrate the two approaches, we use two well-known stocks. Assume that
an analyst issues the 2nd of July 2012 (date t), a 12-month target price of $50 on
Facebook, with the current price at date t being $30.77. One month later, the analyst
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becomes convinced the stock price is overvalued. She revises her forecast and sets
a new 12-month target price at $10 (while the current stock price is $20.04). If we
consider the first approach, we now have two forecasts on Facebook; the first one is
at $50 starting at the beginning of July 2012, and the second one is at $20 starting
at the beginning of August 2012. As noted by Bonini, Zanetti, Bianchini, and Salvi
(2010), there are a number of problems associated with this approach. Mainly, there
is no obvious economic meaning in considering two opposite forecasts. (One forecast
is higher than the stock price and the revised one is lower.) Indeed, if the stock price
of Facebook decreases, the analyst is considered simultaneously inaccurate (on the
first target price) and accurate (on the second target price).
What happens if we follow the second approach? Two successive forecasts are
considered: first, a 1-month forecast with a target price of $50, and second, a 12-month
forecast with a $20 target price. This second approach also has obvious drawbacks.
Let us consider a second example to illustrate them. Suppose an analyst issues a
12-month target price of $800 on Apple, the current stock price being $592.52. In
doing so, she translates her optimistic expectations about Apple’s future sales. One
month later, the analyst learns that Apple is about to reveal the Ipad mini and the
Iphone 5. She then anticipates that the launch of these two new products will boost
Apple’s stock price. Consequently, she revises her forecast at $1000. According to
the second approach of target price revisions, the accuracy of the first target price
is measured by considering the first forecast as a 1-month target price of $800. In
other words, this assumption means that the analyst expected an annualized return
of 351% (while it was only an annualized return of 35% when issued with a 12-month
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horizon)!
These two simple examples show that dealing smoothly with revisions is not so
easy. We show, in the next section, that it is possible to remedy the problem by using
the expected value of the absolute forecast error to estimate the (in)accuracy at the
time the revision occurs.
2.4 A measure of forecasting quality
2.4.1 Definition
The ex-post absolute forecast error is equal to |ST − Φt,T | and corresponds to the
inaccuracy of the target price. In order to measure the quality of a target price, we
should take into account the diﬃculty of the forecast, which is a function of the stock
return volatility and the length of the forecast horizon. For a given stock price of
SAt = S
B
t and a target price of Φt,T , the expected value of the absolute forecast error
Et
[∣∣SAT − Φt,T ∣∣] on stock A will be higher than the expected value of the absolute
forecast error Et
[∣∣SBT − Φt,T ∣∣] on stock B if the volatility of stock A is higher than
the volatility of stock B. Similarly, if a target price is issued with a longer horizon, the
expected value of the absolute forecast error will be higher than the expected value
of the absolute forecast error of the target price issued with a smaller horizon.
The quality of a target price corresponds to the balance between the forecast
diﬃculty (or predictability) and the forecast inaccuracy. We therefore define the
quality of a target price Φt,T so that it is equal to Et [|ST − Φt,T |]− |ST − Φt,T |. The
absolute forecast error |ST − Φt,T | corresponds to the final payoﬀ of a straddle on the
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stock with a strike price equal to Φt,T , that is, a portfolio containing a call option and
a put option on the same underlying stock; the two options are characterized by the
same strike price and the same maturity. A possible way to estimate the expected
value of the forecast error, denoted as Et [|ST − Φt,T |], is to consider the price of the
straddle at time t capitalized until time T . In other words, we consider that the
absolute forecast error |ST − Φt,T | is the penalty that should be paid by the analyst
for forecasting Φt,T in place of ST . The price of the straddle corresponds to the reward
associated with the diﬃculty of forecasting the target price. When an analyst issues
a target price of Φt,T at time t, it is equivalent to her short-selling a straddle with
a strike price Φt,T , cashing in the value of the straddle, investing it in the risk-free
asset, and waiting until the end of the horizon T . The value of the straddle at the
end of the horizon T is equal to |ST − Φt,T |. Therefore, the liquidation value of the
straddle at any time t+ τ is a good way to measure the inaccuracy of a target price.
Consequently, we define the quality of a target price at any time t+ τ as follows.
Definition 1 The quality γt,t+τ at time t + τ, τ ∈ [0;T − t] of a target price Φt,T ,
issued at time t with an horizon equal to T − t, on a stock S, is denoted γt,t+τ and is
defined as
γt,t+τ = Et [|ST − Φt,T |]− Et+τ [|ST − Φt,T |]
= (Ct + Pt) e
rτ − (Ct+τ + Pt+τ ) , (2.6)
where Ct (Pt) is the price at time t of a call (put) option on the stock S with maturity
date T and strike price Φt,T .
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Before going further, we consider two special cases: τ = 0 and τ = T − t. The
first case corresponds to the issue date while the second case corresponds to the ex-
post version of the measure. At the time the target price is issued (τ = 0), we have
γt,t = 0. This result translates the idea that at the time of the issue, one does not
know the quality of the forecast. At the end of the horizon (τ = T − t), we have
γt,T = (Ct + Pt) e
r(T−t)− |ST − Φt,T |. As mentioned before, the absolute forecast error
|ST − Φt,T | is the penalty paid by the analyst for not having issued a perfect forecast.
So our approach is economically sound because shorting the straddle at date t leads to
an amount (Ct + Pt) e
r(T−t) at time T . As a consequence, γt,T is the amount obtained
after the liquidation of the position. This amount is maximum if the forecast is perfect
(Φt,T = ST ) and is equal to γt,T = (Ct + Pt) e
r(T−t).
As we need to compare the quality of forecasts made on stocks with diﬀerent price
levels, we require the measure of quality to be homogeneous of degree one (we do not
want the stock price level to influence the measure of quality). This means that we
assume the stock price to be equal to 1 at the time the target price is issued. We
write St = 1. We adjust the target price Φt,T accordingly.
If we assume a geometric Brownian motion for the stock price, the ex-post quality
of a target price issued at time t can be calculated according to the Black and Scholes
(1973) model8 as
8For simplicity’s sake, we choose to compute the value of the straddle using Black and Scholes
(1973) model. However, our measure of forecasting quality could be extended to more complex
models of option pricing.
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γt,T = e
r(T−t) [N(d1,t)−N(−d1,t)− Φt,T e−r(T−t) (N(d2,t)−N(−d2,t))]− |ST − Φt,T |
= er(T−t) [2N(d1,t)− 1]− Φt,T [2N(d2,t)− 1]− |ST − Φt,T | ,
(2.7)
with
d1,t =
ln
(
1
Φt,T
)
+
(
r + 1
2
σ2t
)
(T − t)
σt
√
T − t
d2,t = d1,t − σt
√
(T − t), (2.8)
where N() is the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian random
variable, t is the time at which the forecast is issued, and σt is the stock return
volatility estimated at time t. Remember the assumption St = 1 which explains the
way d1,t is written.
It follows from the previous definition that the ex-post quality γt,T is a continu-
ous function of the target price Φt,T . When the analyst issues the target price, she
“receives” the value of the call and the value of the put. At the end of the horizon,
there are three possible scenarios. If the stock price is below the target price (the
strike price), the value of the call is null and the put is exercised. (The analyst has
to pay the diﬀerence between the target and the current stock price.) The quality of
the forecast is therefore equal to (Ct + Pt) e
r(T−t) − (Φt,T − ST ). If the stock price is
higher than the strike price, we have the opposite situation. The put is worth zero
and the call is exercised. The quality of the forecast is (Ct + Pt) e
r(T−t)− (ST −Φt,T ).
Chapter 2: The (lack of) forecasting quality of financial analysts’ target prices 82
Finally, if the target price and the stock price coincide perfectly, both the call and put
are worth zero and the analyst does not have to repay anything. The quality of the
forecast is then equal to the initial value of the straddle capitalized at the risk-free
rate (Ct + Pt) e
r(T−t).
Our approach implies that we do not distinguish between under- and over-achievement.
If we consider two forecasts Φ1t,T = St−∆ and Φ2t,T = St+∆, we should obtain the same
forecasting quality if, at the end of the horizon, we have
∣∣ST − Φ1t,T ∣∣ = ∣∣ST − Φ2t,T ∣∣.
However, because ln( St
St+∆
) = − ln( St
St−∆), this is not the case. In order to solve this
issue, we apply a simple transformation (see Appendix A).
2.4.2 Properties
Our measure is composed of two components: the reward for forecasting a target
price (i.e., the diﬃculty) and the penalty for not being accurate (i.e., the inaccuracy).
The reward must meet two requirements. It needs to increase with the stock return
volatility σt and it needs to be positively linked with the length of the forecast horizon
T − t (e.g. the task of forecasting a 24-month target price is more diﬃcult than the
task of forecasting a 12-month target price).
Proposition 2 For a given final stock price ST and a given target price Φt,T , the
quality γt,T of a target price is an increasing function of the length of the horizon.
Proposition 3 For a given final stock price ST and a given target price Φt,T , the
quality γt,T of a target price is an increasing function of the volatility.
The proofs for these two propositions can be found in Appendix B.
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2.4.3 Target price revisions
In practice, analysts often revise the target prices before the end of the horizon.
We consider the initial forecast and the revision as two separate forecasts. Once a
revision occurs at time t+ τ , the first forecast is no longer valid. However, we need to
compute the forecasting quality over the period ]t; t+ τ ]. It follows from the previous
definitions that the value at time t + τ of the absolute forecast error |ST − Φt,T | is
simply equal to the value of the straddle. In other words, the analyst buys back the
straddle she shorted. We then consider the revised forecast as if the analyst shorts a
new straddle with a strike price equal to the new target price and a reset maturity
(forecast horizon).
For a given stock, the forecasting quality FQ of the target prices of an analyst
over a given period is equal to the sum of the qualities of the diﬀerent forecasts over
this period. When a revision occurs at time t+ τ, the forecasting quality FQ over a
period ]t; t+ τ + τ ′] is defined as follows.
Definition 4 Let us consider a target price Φ1t,T1−t with a horizon of T1− t issued at
time t and a revision equal to Φ2t+τ,T2−(t+τ) with a horizon of T2− (t+ τ) occurring at
time t + τ with t < t + τ < t + τ + τ ′. For the period ]t; t + τ + τ ′], the forecasting
quality FQt,t+τ+τ ′ of the analyst on this stock is defined as
FQt,t+τ+τ ′ = γ
(
Φ1t,T1−t, σt, T1 − t
)
t,t+τ
+ γ
(
Φ2t+τ,T2−(t+τ), σt+τ , T2 − (t+ τ)
)
t+τ,t+τ+τ ′
. (2.9)
Remark 5 Note that the volatility is set constant for a given forecast. That is, once a
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target price is set, we use the stock volatility at the time of the forecast to estimate the
value of the straddle. This same volatility is used until a new target price (revision)
is issued. If the volatility was not set constant during the target price horizon, an
increase in volatility will lower the forecasting quality of an analyst, even though the
stock price moves toward her target price. With this methodology, we distinguish
between the forecasts made on stocks with diﬀerent volatilities (cross-section) but the
variations over time do not influence the quality of the forecast (time-series).
2.4.4 Illustration of the new measure
To gain a clear understanding of how the quality is computed, in Figure 2.1, we
present an example of three target prices made on a stock by a given analyst. In
this example, the risk-free rate is equal to 0. The first forecast is made at time t1
and is equal to 45 (while the stock price is equal to 35.76). The second forecast (first
revision) is made at time t2 with a target price set at 30 (while the stock price is
equal to 31.88). Finally, at time t2, the analyst revises her forecast and announces a
target price of 33 (while the stock price is equal to 49.34).9
At time t1, we consider that the analyst shorts a straddle with a strike price equal
to 45. The price of the straddle10 is computed with a 6-month historical volatility of
σt1 = 0.3905 and is equal to 0.4091. The price of this straddle is used to evaluate the
diﬃculty of the forecast. The forecasting quality FQ of the analyst over the period
]t1; t2] is then equal to the value of the straddle at time t1 (i.e., the diﬃculty) minus
9Every forecast has a 12-month horizon.
10Remember that the stock price is normalized to 1.
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the value of the straddle at time t2 (i.e., the inaccuracy). The price of the straddle at
time t2 is computed using the same volatility as the one used to compute the price of
the straddle at t1 (σt1 = 0.3905). The straddle at time t2 is worth 0.4249. As a result,
the forecasting quality for the period ]t1; t2] is equal to FQt1,t2 = γt1,t2 = −0.0158.
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the forecasting quality for the period ]t2; t3] is equal
to FQt2,t3 = γt2,t3 = −0.2901. It follows that the forecasting quality for the period
]t1; t3] is equal to FQt1,t3 = γt1,t2 + γt2,t3 = −0.3059.
We see that for the period ]t1; t2], the sensitivity of the quality measure to the
stock price (the delta of the quality) is positive (because the stock price is below the
target price). The forecasting quality increases when the stock price increases (i.e.,
gets closer to the target price) and decreases otherwise. The delta of the forecasting
quality becomes negative for the period ]t2; t3] as the target price is below the stock
price. Because the target prices are not too far from the stock price, the sensitivity
to the horizon is positive.
To illustrate the influence of the volatility on target prices’ quality, we assume in
the previous example that the volatility is multiplied by 1.2 (everything else being
equal). Figure 2.2 shows the quality computed using the real volatility (solid line)
and the quality computed with a volatility set 20% higher (dashed line). Because the
sensitivity of our measure to the volatility is positive, it appears on the graph that
the quality is higher when the volatility is higher.
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2.5 Empirical analysis
The main objective of this paper is to determine whether financial analysts exhibit
genuine skills in forecasting future stock prices. Observing a positive forecasting
quality is not suﬃcient to conclude to the existence of a forecasting ability. This
positive forecasting quality can be the result of skill, luck or simply the fact that by
being overly optimistic, the quality increases when the market rises. A first analysis
of the existence of forecasting skills is to check whether analysts exhibit persistent
forecasting quality. As stated by Kahneman (2011): “the diagnostic for the existence
of any skill is the consistency of individual diﬀerences in achievement”. We will thus
consider an analyst to be skilled if she manages to consistently beat the other analysts.
Our analysis can be broken down into two parts. First, we investigate whether the
diﬀerential forecasting abilities found in previous studies may be mechanically induced
by the persistence in volatility. Second, we evaluate if the forecasting quality is still
persistent after controlling for volatility.
2.5.1 Persistence in accuracy and volatility of stock returns
We show in this section that the persistence in accuracy found in previous studies is
mechanically caused by persistence in volatility. Analysts covering less volatile stocks
automatically obtain, when using classical measures, a higher forecasting accuracy.
The persistence in volatility and the fact that analysts tend to cover the same pool of
stocks over time imply that the analysts covering stocks with low volatility exhibit a
persistent forecasting accuracy. Therefore, the persistence in accuracy is not a proof
of the existence of diﬀerential forecasting abilities. In order to evaluate the existence
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of forecasting skills, we need to demonstrate the existence of persistence in forecasting
quality.
Persistence in accuracy using empirical data
In this section, we test for the persistence in accuracy when the absolute forecast
error is chosen as the measure of accuracy.11 For a given target price, the absolute
forecast error |TPERROR| is defined as
|TPERROR|t =
|ST − Φt,T |
St
, (2.10)
where Φt,T is the value of a target price issued at time t with horizon T , ST is the
stock price at the end of the forecast horizon and St is the stock price at the time the
forecast was issued.
We then define the individual analyst performance as in Bradshaw, Brown, and
Huang (forthcoming). For a given period ]t; t+1], the individual analyst performance
is defined as the mean of the absolute forecast errors of all the target prices issued
by the analyst within this period ]t; t + 1]. It is important to note that because
the absolute forecast error is an ex-post measure, the individual analyst performance
can only be measured 12 months after the end of the period ]t; t + 1]. We are also
interested in the volatility of the stocks for which the analyst issues target prices. We
define the forecast underlying volatility as the stock return volatility for the 6 months
preceding the target price issue date. We then define the analyst forecast underlying
11In order to be able to compare the diﬀerent absolute forecast errors, we only keep the target
prices with a 12-month horizon.
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volatility as the mean of the forecast underlying volatilities of all the target prices
issued during the period under consideration.
The methodology employed by Bradshaw, Brown, and Huang (forthcoming) con-
sists of assigning analysts to five quintiles with respect to their individual performance
over the measurement period ]t; t+ 1]. The persistence is then measured by estimat-
ing their individual performance over the test period ]t+ τ + 1; t+ τ + 2] conditional
on their ranking over the measurement period. A lag of τ = 12 months is added
between the measurement period and the test period because the absolute forecast
error is an ex-post measure of accuracy (the individual performance over the period
]t; t + 1] is computed at time t + τ + 1). This lag insures that the measurement
period and the test period do not overlap. We therefore avoid mechanically induc-
ing a positive relation between the current and subsequent performance. Financial
analysts exhibit a persistent accuracy if the most (least) accurate analysts over the
measurement period ]t; t + 1] are ranked in the highest (lowest) quintile for the test
period ]t+ τ + 1; t+ τ + 2] and if the diﬀerence of accuracy between quintiles 1 and
5 is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Table 2.4 presents the results using the target prices in our sample. As our
database is similar to the one of Bradshaw, Brown, and Huang (forthcoming), it
is not surprising that we obtain the same results. Table 2.4 indicates that analysts
with a lower average absolute forecast error in the measurement period do have a
lower average absolute forecast error in the test period. When the individual analyst
performance is computed using a quarterly frequency, the analysts in the first quintile
(last) exhibit an absolute forecast error of 0.1551 (0.9693) in the measurement period
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and 0.3322 (0.5779) in the test period. We observe, however, that the analyst forecast
underlying volatility is lower in the first quintile than in the last one. The analyst
forecast underlying volatility increases with the quintiles both in the measurement
period and in the test period. This result indicates that if we observe a persistence
in accuracy, as measured by the absolute forecast error, we also observe a persistence
in volatility.
Persistence in accuracy using na¨ıve forecasts
We observe in the previous results both a persistence in accuracy and a persistence
in volatility. Here, we want to check whether the persistence in volatility could cause
the observed persistence in accuracy. In order to do so, we replace the target prices in
our data with na¨ıve forecasts. We build our na¨ıve forecasts so that the implied stock
return (Φt,T − St) /St of a 12-month horizon target price is equal to the 12-month
risk free rate. As the target prices result from a mechanical rule, the analysts cannot
exhibit diﬀerential abilities in forecasting stock prices. If, when using na¨ıve forecasts,
we observe a persistence in accuracy, we can conclude that the persistence in volatility
drives the persistence in accuracy. Such a result would indicate that the accuracy is
not the right measure to estimate the ability of financial analysts to forecast future
stock prices.
As can be seen in Table 2.5, the accuracy is persistent even though the target
prices in the sample are na¨ıve forecasts. The average absolute forecast errors range
from 13.17% to 76.14% for the measurement period. In the test period, we observe
a significant diﬀerence of 14.24% between the first and the last quintiles. This result
Chapter 2: The (lack of) forecasting quality of financial analysts’ target prices 90
indicates that the analysts that were the most (least) accurate in the measurement
period are still the most (least) accurate in the test period. We also observe a strong
persistence in volatility. Given that we considered na¨ıve forecasts, we can conclude
that the persistence in accuracy is mainly driven by the persistence in volatility.
Test of persistence in forecasting quality
We have shown that measuring the persistence in accuracy does not allow us to
make any inference on the existence of diﬀerential forecasting abilities. In order to
solve this issue, we conduct the same analysis as before using our measure of fore-
casting quality instead of accuracy. As our measure of quality take into account the
diﬀerences in volatility, a significant persistence would imply that financial analysts
possess diﬀerential abilities to forecast target prices. In order to allow for a direct
comparison with the previous results, we use the ex-post version of our measure. The
individual analyst performance is here defined as the mean of the ex-post quality of
all the target prices issued by the analyst within the considered period.
For this measure, we only take into account the target prices with a 12-month
horizon. The quality of the forecasts is computed at the end of the 12-month horizon.
The revisions are considered as new independent forecasts. As defined in equation
(2.7), the ex-post quality at time T of a target price issued at time t with horizon T
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is equal to
γt,T = Et [|ST − Φt,T |]− |ST − Φt,T |
= er(T−t) [N(d1,t)−N(−d1,t)]− Φt,T [N(d2,t)−N(−d2,t)]
− |ST − Φt,T | , (2.11)
where St = 1 and Φt,T is the target price issued at time t.
The results in Table 2.6 show that when controlling for diﬀerences in volatility,
the persistence vanishes. In the measurement period, the analysts in the first quintile
(i.e., best performance) exhibit an average forecasting quality of 0.3536 while the
analysts in the last quintile (i.e., worst performance) exhibit an average forecasting
quality of −0.2487. This diﬀerence in forecasting quality between the first and the
last quintile is no more significant in the test period. We obtain this result both for
quarterly and semiannual periods.
2.5.2 The absence of forecasting skills
Persistence in forecasting quality over the short run
The main limitation of the ex-post measure of quality used in the previous sub-
section is that it is necessary to introduce a 12-month lag between the measurement
period and the test period. A second limitation is that the forecasting quality is
measured using the stock price at the end of the 12-month horizon. However, in prac-
tice, when a revision occurs the first forecast becomes inactive and only the revision
is taken into account. The measure of forecasting quality FQ defined in equation
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(2.9) permits to overcome these drawbacks. For a given stock and a given analyst,
the forecasting quality over the period ]t; t+ 1] can be measured using only informa-
tion over this same period. This feature allows us to evaluate the persistence over
the short-run, e.g. we set the measurement period on ]t; t + 1] and the test period
on ]t + 1; t + 2]. Another advantage is that this measure allows us to test for the
persistence using smaller frequencies.
When using the forecasting quality measure FQ, we need to restrict the sample
period to the 2001-2010 period. Indeed, for 2000, we do not observe the target prices
issued in 1999 which could still be active. Therefore, we do not have the full portfolio
of target prices for the first year of the sample. These unobserved target prices could
influence the forecasting quality of the analysts.
The results in Table 2.7 show that, even over the short run, there is no persistence
in forecasting quality. For all the three frequencies, we do not observe any significant
diﬀerence, in the test period, between the forecasting quality in the first quintile and
the forecasting quality in the last quintile.
Robustness check: the impact of learning
One reason why we might not observe any persistence in the forecasting quality
is that financial analysts learn over time and subsequently improve their forecasting
quality. If the experience influences the forecasting quality, young inexperienced
analysts will be ranked in the lower quintiles when they enter the sample period.
They will then gradually move toward the highest quintiles as they learn and acquire
experience. These agents would therefore add noise to our analysis of the persistence
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in forecasting quality.
We run the same analysis as above on a restricted sample containing only analysts
with at least two years of experience. We compute, at time t, the experience of an
analyst by observing the time t − τ at which she issued her first target price; the
experience is then simply equal to t− (t− τ) = τ . We restrict the sample period to
2003-2010 in order to have enough observations for the first period.
The results presented in Table 2.8 show that a potential learning process cannot
explain the absence of persistence in forecasting quality. When restricting the sample
to analysts with at least two years of experience, we still do not observe any significant
diﬀerence between the first and last quintiles in the test period.
Robustness check: slow adjustment of target prices
Dechow and You (2013) assume that financial analysts might be slow at adjusting
their target prices. One of the reasons for this slow adjustment is that target prices are
usually embedded in analysts’ reports. Because writing a report is a long, diﬃcult
task, financial analysts may not adjust their target prices as often as they should.
For example, if the analyst changes her opinion about the future price of a stock one
month after her initial forecast, she might have to wait for the next report publication
to revise her target price. This feature might cause the analysts to appear less skilled
than they actually are.
In order to test this hypothesis, we restrict the validity of the target prices to
a shorter period of time (e.g. one month). That is, for a given stock and a given
target price, we compute the forecasting quality only for the first month following the
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issue date. In other words, we consider the forecasts to be inactive after one month.
We then compute the analysts’ average performance using these short-validity target
prices.
We conduct the same analysis as before to test for the existence of diﬀerential
abilities. The results (unreported) we obtain, using 1 month, 3 months and 6 months
for the validity of the target prices, do not indicate any changes in the persistence of
forecasting quality. We still observe no diﬀerential forecasting abilities.
2.5.3 Scoring
An alternative way to check whether some analysts consistently outperform (or
underperform) their colleagues is to compute the average relative performance over
the sample period. The methodology is the following. Each month, we compute the
average analyst performance using our measure of forecasting quality FQ. We then
rank the analysts in five quintiles. The score of the analyst is equal to (quintile-1)/4.
Thus, the best analysts receive a score of 1 while the worst analysts receive a score
of 0. The analysts ranked in the intermediate quintiles obtain a score of 0.25, 0.5 or
0.75. As the 2001-2010 period contains 120 months, we have, for each analyst, up to
120 monthly scores. In order to be able to compare the diﬀerent scores, we remove
the analysts with less than 24 monthly scores (less than 2 years of activity). The
total number of analysts in the restricted sample is 5,481. Finally, we compute, for
each analyst, the average of her monthly scores. An analyst who always ranks with
the 20% best analysts will then have an average score equal to 1. An analyst who
oscillates between the first quintile and the second quintile will have an average score
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between 0.75 and 1, and so on.
Figure 2.3 shows the average score of all the financial analysts for whom we were
able to compute at least 24 monthly scores. We observe that only one analyst has
a score higher than 0.75 and none have a score below 0.25. The average score is
concentrated around the value 0.5. The solid curve corresponds to a Gaussian dis-
tribution. We observe that the distribution of the average score is a close fit with
the Gaussian distribution. This additional result confirms our previous findings that
financial analysts do not exhibit diﬀerential abilities when forecasting target prices.
2.6 Conclusion
This article sets a new framework for evaluating the forecasting quality of target
prices made by financial analysts. We show that measuring target price accuracy is
not suﬃcient to evaluate the quality of target prices. Diﬀerences in volatility lead
to diﬀerent degrees of diﬃculty (predictability) when forecasting future stock prices.
These diﬀerences of diﬃculty must be incorporated when evaluating the forecasting
ability of financial analysts. Our measure of target price quality is defined as the
diﬀerence between the target price predictability (the expected value of the absolute
forecast error estimated at the issue date) and the target price inaccuracy (the realized
absolute forecast error). By using option-pricing theory, we are able to estimate the
expected value of the absolute forecast error. We are then able to evaluate forecast
predictability. The contributions of our measure are the following. First, our measure
accounts for diﬀerences in volatility. Second, it allows us to consider forecasts with
diﬀerent horizons. Third, we account for the boldness of the forecasts. Fourth, our
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measure is a dynamic measure, meaning that we are able to measure the quality
of a forecast at any moment in time. As a consequence of this last feature, our
measure also provides a simple and consistent solution to the issue of measuring the
quality of a target price when a revision occurs. In the empirical part of our study,
we show that, when taking into account the issue of the predictability, financial
analysts do not exhibit persistent diﬀerential abilities. Our measure of quality is
designed for evaluating the quality of target prices. However, this measure could
also be used to evaluate the quality of other types of forecasts (exchange rates, for
instance). A very challenging objective for the future is to adapt our measure so
that it can be used to evaluate the quality of earnings forecasts. In its current state,
the literature on earnings forecast employs relative measures of accuracy to control
for diﬀerences in predictability. An important contribution would therefore be to
introduce a methodology that permits a precise estimation of forecast predictability.
However, the feasibility of such a measure is unclear as, contrary to target prices, the
earnings forecast process is highly discontinuous.
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Appendix A
Consider two forecasts Φ1t,T = St−∆ and Φ2t,T = St+∆. As we do not distinguish
between under- and over-achievement, we should have
∣∣ST − Φ1t,T ∣∣ = ∣∣ST − Φ2t,T ∣∣ =⇒
γ1t,T = γ
2
t,T . However, because ln(
St
St+∆
) = − ln( St
St−∆), we have
[
Ct
(
Φ1t,T
)
+ Pt
(
Φ1t,T
)]
er(T−t) <
[
Ct
(
Φ2t,T
)
+ Pt
(
Φ2t,T
)]
er(T−t) and, therefore, we have γ1t,T < γ
2
t,T . Even
though the absolute deviation of the target price from the stock price St is the same
for target price A and target price B and the absolute forecast errors are the same at
the end of the horizon, we do not obtain the same quality for the two forecasts. We
apply a simple transformation to correct this.
As we do not distinguish between under- and over-achievement, the quality of the
forecast depends only on the size of the deviation of the stock price from the target
price. We therefore adopt the following convention. When a target price is below the
stock price, we consider the symmetric of the price with respect to the target price.
That is, we set the target price equal to 1 and consider the stock price to be equal
to 1 + |St − Φt,T |. However, when there is a positive drift µ = r > 0, the probability
of reaching a target price of Φt,T = St −∆′ is lower than the one of reaching a target
price of Φt,T = St+∆
′. Therefore, we need to consider the symmetric of the price with
respect to the discounted target price. The consequence of defining the stock price as
a function of the discounted target price is that the risk-free rate in the Black-Scholes
model is equal to 0.
Definition 6 We consider the function f which measures the discounted deviation
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of the stock price from the target price. We write
f(St+τ ,Φt,T , r) = 1 +
∣∣St+τ − Φt,T e−r(T−t−τ)∣∣ (2.12)
The quality of a target price issued at time t with horizon T − t writes
γt,T = (Ct + Pt) e
r(T−t) − |f(ST ,Φt,T , r)− 1|
= er(T−t) (f(St,Φt,T , r) [N (d1,t)−N (−d1,t)]− [N (d2,t)−N (−d2,t)])
− |f(ST ,Φt,T , r)− 1| (2.13)
with
d1,t =
ln (f(St,Φt,T , r)) +
(
1
2
σ2t
)
(T − t)
σt
√
T − t
d2,t = d1,t − σt
√
(T − t)
N() is the Gaussian cumulative distribution function. t is the time at which the
forecast was issued, Ct is the value of the call option at time t, Pt is the value of
the put option at time t, σt is the stock return volatility estimated at time t, r is the
risk-free rate and T − t is the horizon of the target price.
Appendix B
Proposition 7 For a given final stock price ST and a given target price Φt,T , the
quality γt,T of a target price is an increasing function of the length of the horizon
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T − t.
Proof. For a given final stock price ST and a given target price Φt,T , the sensitivity
of the quality γt,T to the horizon T − t writes
∂γt,T
∂ (T − t) =
[
∂Ct
∂ (T − t) +
∂Pt
∂ (T − t)
]
er(T−t) + rer(T−t) (Ct + Pt) . (2.14)
The sensitivity of a straddle to the maturity T − t writes
∂Ct
∂ (T − t) +
∂Pt
∂ (T − t) = StN
′(d1,t)
∂d1,t
∂ (T − t)
− e−r(T−t)Φt,TN(d2,t) ∂d2,t
∂ (T − t)
+ StN
′(−d1,t) ∂d1,t
∂ (T − t)
+ e−r(T−t)Φt,TN ′(d2,t)
∂d2,t
∂ (T − t)
=
σ√
T − tStN
′(d1,t)
+ rΦt,T e
−r(T−t) [N(d2,t)−N(−d2,t)] (2.15)
with N ′(x) = 1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 .
The sensitivity of a call option to the maturity T − t is always positive. The
sensitivity of a put option to the maturity T − t is also positive except when the
option is deep in the money. The transformation we apply (see Appendix A) implies
that the put option is never in the money. Thus, the sensitivity of the straddle to the
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horizon T − t is always positive. We then have
∂γt,T
∂ (T − t) =
[
∂Ct
∂ (T − t) +
∂Pt
∂ (T − t)
]
er(T−t) + rer(T−t) (Ct + Pt) > 0. (2.16)
Proposition 8 For a given final stock price ST and a given target price Φt,T , the
quality γt,T of a target price is an increasing function of the volatility.
Proof. For a given final stock price ST and a given target price Φt,T , the sensitivity
of the quality γt,T to the volatility σt writes
∂γt,T
∂σt
=
[
∂Ct
∂σt
+
∂Pt
∂σt
]
er(T−t)
= 2er(T−t)St
√
(T − t)N ′(d1,t) > 0 (2.17)
with N ′(x) = 1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 .
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Figure 2.1
An illustration of the properties of the forecasting quality
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Figure 2.2
The influence of stock return volatility on forecasting quality
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Figure 2.3
Average score of the financial analysts’ forecasting quality over the 2001-2010 period
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This figure presents the histogram of the average score of 5,481 analysts over the 2001-2010 period. We include an analyst in the sample only if we can compute at
least 24 monthly average forecasting qualities. Each month, the analysts are ranked in five quintiles with respect to their average forecasting quality. The monthly
score is then computed as (quintile-1)/4. The average score corresponds to the mean of the monthly scores over the sample period.
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Table 2.1
Descriptive statistics
Number of
forecasts
Number of
active
analysts
Number of analysts
covering a stock
Number of stocks
covered per analyst
Mean Median Max Mean Median Max
2000 36,825 - - - - - - -
2001 44,178 4,466 6.30 4.00 50.00 6.38 4.00 213.00
2002 48,756 4,611 7.10 5.00 50.00 6.31 4.00 183.00
2003 51,263 4,342 7.22 5.00 55.00 6.61 4.00 102.00
2004 54,863 3,773 6.54 4.00 44.00 7.16 5.00 64.00
2005 56,291 3,731 6.67 5.00 51.00 7.72 6.00 76.00
2006 59,952 3,800 6.82 5.00 45.00 7.97 6.00 87.00
2007 65,377 3,768 7.00 5.00 46.00 8.42 7.00 100.00
2008 77,281 3,829 7.53 6.00 46.00 8.59 7.00 92.00
2009 75,275 3,833 8.00 6.00 50.00 8.48 7.00 81.00
2010 79,410 3,908 8.69 6.00 59.00 8.47 7.00 79.00
The sample consists in a total of 649,471 target prices made by 9,367 analysts (583 brokers) on 7,268 U.S. stocks for
the 2000-2010 period. The first column indicates the number of target prices issued each year. The second column
shows the number of active analysts. The three following columns report the average, median and maximum number
of active analysts per stock. The remaining columns indicate the average, median and maximum number of stocks
covered per analyst. The statistics for 2000 are not reported as the target prices issued in 1999 and still active in 2000
cannot be observed.
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Table 2.2
Relationship between volatility and target price accuracy
Panel A: Accuracy computed using actual target prices
Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 (Low volatility) 0.2813 0.2522 0.2431 0.1994 0.1759 0.1656 0.1698 0.2852 0.4712 0.2265 0.1796
2 0.3821 0.3549 0.3154 0.2558 0.2331 0.2153 0.2197 0.3824 0.5458 0.3091 0.2385
3 0.5274 0.5210 0.4161 0.3193 0.2903 0.2661 0.2865 0.4692 0.5538 0.3844 0.3015
4 0.7947 0.7711 0.5742 0.3953 0.3698 0.3351 0.3654 0.5624 0.6064 0.4952 0.3760
5 (High volatility) 1.2803 1.1467 0.8577 0.6502 0.5284 0.5075 0.4958 0.7327 0.7671 0.7782 0.5092
Diﬀ (5-1) 0.9989 0.8946 0.6146 0.4508 0.3525 0.3419 0.3260 0.4475 0.2959 0.5517 0.3296
Mean t-test 104.0171*** 109.6470*** 71.6153*** 62.3884*** 76.3825*** 67.8006*** 61.2385*** 94.0024*** 45.3043*** 68.8016*** 85.0555***
Panel B: Accuracy computed using na¨ıve forecasts
Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 (Low volatility) 0.2534 0.1908 0.1903 0.2213 0.1648 0.1508 0.1590 0.2450 0.3328 0.2365 0.1927
2 0.3210 0.2499 0.2484 0.2898 0.2370 0.2039 0.2058 0.3239 0.4038 0.3201 0.2408
3 0.3963 0.3513 0.3211 0.3545 0.2885 0.2493 0.2600 0.3927 0.4216 0.4052 0.2859
4 0.5342 0.4659 0.4468 0.4200 0.3333 0.3104 0.3210 0.4554 0.4975 0.5374 0.3526
5 (High volatility) 0.6954 0.6052 0.7336 0.6852 0.3729 0.4319 0.4017 0.5264 0.6874 0.8857 0.4160
Diﬀ (5-1) 0.4420 0.4144 0.5433 0.4639 0.2081 0.2811 0.2427 0.2814 0.3546 0.6492 0.2233
Mean t-test 83.8646*** 99.4626*** 59.7663*** 57.8992*** 54.8949*** 57.6214*** 49.7714*** 84.4185*** 54.5609*** 72.9812*** 64.2128***
Each year, the target prices in the sample are assigned to five quintiles with respect to the 6-month historical volatility of the underlying stock estimated at the
issue date. The table reports, for each year and each quintile, the average target price accuracy. Panel A reports the average accuracy using the actual target prices
from our sample. Panel B reports the average accuracy using na¨ıve forecasts (each target price is replaced by a forecast that is equal to the price at the issued
date capitalized by the risk-free rate). The statistical significance of the diﬀerence across top and bottom quintiles is computed using a t-test. ***/**/* represent
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level.
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Table 2.3
Nonlinear relationship between volatility and accuracy
Accuracy (Absolute forecast error)
k-th decile= 1kjtσjt Coeﬃcient (βk) Standard error t-statistic p-value
1st decile (Low volatility) 0.2311*** 0.060756 3.80 0.000
2nd decile 0.4129*** 0.045587 9.06 0.000
3rd decile 0.4824*** 0.038026 12.69 0.000
4th decile 0.5361*** 0.032872 16.31 0.000
5th decile 0.5850*** 0.028770 20.33 0.000
6th decile 0.5979*** 0.025255 23.67 0.000
7th decile 0.5990*** 0.022002 27.22 0.000
8th decile 0.6059*** 0.018644 32.50 0.000
9th decile 0.6136*** 0.015021 40.85 0.000
10th decile (High volatility) 0.6395*** 0.010952 58.39 0.000
Number of observations 604,677
R-squared 0.1893
This table shows the coeﬃcient estimates (Coeﬃcients) from the following OLS regression: |TPERROR|jt = α +
10∑
k=1
βk1
k
jtσjt+ǫjt, where |TPERROR|jt is the absolute forecast error of a target price on firm j issued by any analyst
at time t, σjt is the stock return volatility of stock j measured at time t and 1
k
jt is an indicator that takes the value 1
if the stock return volatility σjt belongs to the k-th volatility decile and 0 otherwise. We denote the variable 1
k
jtσjt as
the k-th decile. ***/**/* correspond to 1%/5%/10% significance levels. P-values are computed using robust standard
errors.
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Table 2.4
Test of forecasting ability using the absolute forecast error
Panel A: Quarterly period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ τ + 1 Time t+ τ + 3
|TPERROR| Volatility Nb obs |TPERROR| Volatility Nb obs |TPERROR| Volatility
1 (Best) 0.1551 0.3870 11,083 0.3322 0.3720 9,470 0.3355 0.3743
2 0.2847 0.4364 11,079 0.3654 0.4161 9,465 0.3677 0.4142
3 0.4026 0.4919 11,085 0.4108 0.4673 9,471 0.4039 0.4552
4 0.5627 0.5720 11,079 0.4838 0.5284 9,465 0.4609 0.5073
5 (Worst) 0.9693 0.6850 11,083 0.5779 0.5973 9,470 0.5386 0.5638
Diﬀ (5-1) 0.8143 0.2980 0.2456 0.2253 0.2031 0.1895
Mean t-test 17.7540*** 11.0277*** 12.5456*** 12.6069*** 15.5653*** 14.7648***
Panel B: Semiannual period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ τ + 1 Time t+ τ + 3
|TPERROR| Volatility Nb obs |TPERROR| Volatility Nb obs |TPERROR| Volatility
1 (Best) 0.1713 0.3747 6,258 0.3266 0.3653 4,629 0.3306 0.3784
2 0.2992 0.4291 6,260 0.3672 0.4102 4,625 0.3613 0.4082
3 0.4128 0.4924 6,256 0.4116 0.4648 4,628 0.3983 0.4452
4 0.5662 0.5729 6,260 0.4847 0.5217 4,625 0.4426 0.4973
5 (Worst) 0.9559 0.6876 6,258 0.5758 0.5897 4,629 0.5170 0.5440
Diﬀ (5-1) 0.7847 0.3128 0.2491 0.2244 0.1864 0.1656
Mean t-test 12.6568*** 8.1821*** 10.5185*** 10.6874*** 19.0406*** 10.4888***
This table presents the analysts’ performance at time t+τ+1 and t+τ+3 conditional on their performance at time t. τ is a 12-month lag which insures independence
in prices (the measurement and the test periods are not overlapping). The measurement periods are quarterly (Panel A) and semiannual (Panel B). For period
t, we measure the analyst performance as the average of the absolute forecast errors on all the target prices issued within this period. We rank the analysts in
5 quintiles based on their performance during the measurement period and obtain the corresponding performance in the test periods. We also report the analyst
forecast underlying volatility computed as the average of the 6-month historical volatilities on all the target prices issued by the analyst within the considered period.
Conditional on the ranking made at time t, we report both the average of the absolute forecast errors and the analyst forecast underlying volatility at time t+ τ +1
and t + τ + 3. The statistical significance of the diﬀerence across top and bottom quintiles is computed using a t-test. ***/**/* represent significance at the 0.01,
0.05 and 0.1 level.
C
hapter
2:
T
he
(lack
of)
forecastin
g
qu
ality
of
fi
n
an
cial
an
alysts’
target
prices
111
Table 2.5
Persistence in accuracy using na¨ıve forecasts
Panel A: Quarterly period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ τ + 1 Time t+ τ + 3
|TPERROR| Volatility Nb obs |TPERROR| Volatility Nb obs |TPERROR| Volatility
1 (Best) 0.1317 0.4044 11,083 0.3057 0.3845 9,470 0.3170 0.3873
2 0.2422 0.4445 11,079 0.3254 0.4199 9,465 0.3336 0.4163
3 0.3357 0.4988 11,085 0.3564 0.4678 9,471 0.3612 0.4561
4 0.4550 0.5673 11,079 0.3975 0.5219 9,465 0.3910 0.5022
5 (Worst) 0.7614 0.6573 11,083 0.4481 0.5870 9,470 0.4195 0.5531
Diﬀ (5-1) 0.6297 0.2529 0.1424 0.2025 0.1025 0.1658
Mean t-test 16.3544*** 9.9624*** 6.9959*** 11.8540*** 7.1992*** 14.1030***
Panel B: Semiannual period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ τ + 1 Time t+ τ + 3
|TPERROR| Volatility Nb obs |TPERROR| Volatility Nb obs |TPERROR| Volatility
1 (Best) 0.1465 0.3908 6,258 0.3033 0.3756 4,629 0.3221 0.3874
2 0.2554 0.4386 6,260 0.3319 0.4180 4,625 0.3381 0.4142
3 0.3434 0.4944 6,256 0.3603 0.4609 4,628 0.3570 0.4474
4 0.4567 0.5720 6,260 0.3964 0.5192 4,625 0.3938 0.4953
5 (Worst) 0.7507 0.6609 6,258 0.4475 0.5779 4,629 0.4115 0.5288
Diﬀ (5-1) 0.6042 0.2701 0.1442 0.2022 0.0893 0.1414
Mean t-test 12.2240*** 7.3593*** 6.2430*** 9.4990*** 5.3543*** 10.4273***
This table presents the analysts’ performance at time t+τ+1 and t+τ+3 conditional on their performance at time t. τ is a 12-month lag which insures independence
in prices (the measurement and the test periods are not overlapping). The measurement periods are quarterly (Panel A) and semiannual (Panel B). For period t, we
measure the analyst performance as the average of the absolute forecast errors on all the target prices issued within this period. This analysis uses na¨ıve forecasts
instead of the real target prices. That is, the analysts systematically issue target prices with an implied return equal to the risk-free interest rate. We rank the
analysts in 5 quintiles based on their performance during the measurement period and obtain the corresponding performance in the test periods. We also report the
analyst forecast underlying volatility computed as the average of the 6-month historical volatilities on all the target prices issued by the analyst within the considered
period. Conditional on the ranking made at time t, we report both the average of the absolute forecast errors and the analyst forecast underlying volatility at time
t+ τ + 1 and t+ τ + 3. The statistical significance of the diﬀerence across top and bottom quintiles is computed using a t-test. ***/**/* represent significance at
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level.
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Table 2.6
Test of forecasting ability using the ex-post measure of forecasting quality
Panel A: Quarterly period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ τ + 1 Time t+ τ + 3
Ex-post quality Volatility Nb obs Ex-post quality Volatility Nb obs Ex-post quality Volatility
1 (Best) 0.3536 0.6222 11,082 0.0716 0.4967 9,469 0.0662 0.4862
2 0.1700 0.5000 11,079 0.0637 0.4470 9,463 0.0536 0.4360
3 0.0819 0.4588 11,082 0.0585 0.4385 9,472 0.0565 0.4278
4 −0.0122 0.4647 11,079 0.0578 0.4634 9,463 0.0598 0.4514
5 (Worst) −0.2487 0.5148 11,082 0.0651 0.5231 9,469 0.0676 0.5012
Diﬀ (5-1) −0.6023 −0.1075 −0.0065 0.0264 0.0013 0.0151
Mean t-test −20.2776*** −6.3892*** −0.9256 1.7703* 0.1979 1.2910
Panel B: Semiannual period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ τ + 1 Time t+ τ + 3
Ex-post quality Volatility Nb obs Ex-post quality Volatility Nb obs Ex-post quality Volatility
1 (Best) 0.3268 0.6095 6,257 0.0651 0.4905 4,629 0.0646 0.4726
2 0.1560 0.4961 6,260 0.0614 0.4402 4,624 0.0618 0.4321
3 0.0762 0.4613 6,254 0.0551 0.4358 4,629 0.0604 0.4297
4 −0.0086 0.4660 6,260 0.0577 0.4585 4,624 0.0650 0.4435
5 (Worst) −0.2292 0.5131 6,257 0.0633 0.5149 4,629 0.0747 0.4835
Diﬀ (5-1) −0.5561 −0.0963 −0.0018 0.0244 0.0101 0.0109
Mean t-test −14.5024*** −4.1288*** −0.2123 1.2637 1.1673 0.6948
This table presents the analysts’ performance at time t+τ+1 and t+τ+3 conditional on their performance at time t. τ is a 12-month lag which insures independence
in prices (the measurement and the test periods are not overlapping). The ex-post quality is measured as the expected value of the absolute forecast error estimated
at the time the forecast is issued minus the realized absolute forecast error measured at the end of the 12-month horizon. In this set-up, we consider a revision as a
new and independent forecast. The measurement periods are quarterly (Panel A) and semiannual (Panel B). For period t, we measure the analyst performance as the
average of ex-post qualities on all the target prices issued within this period. We then rank the analysts in 5 quintiles. We also report the analyst forecast underlying
volatility computed as the average of the 6-month historical volatilities on all the target prices issued by the analyst within the considered period. Conditional on
the ranking made at time t, we report both the average quality of the forecasts and the analyst forecast underlying volatility at time t + τ + 1 and t + τ + 3. The
statistical significance of the diﬀerence across top and bottom quintiles is computed using a t-test. ***/**/* represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level.
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Table 2.7
Test of forecasting ability using the forecasting quality measure
Panel A: Monthly period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ 1 Time t+ 3
Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ)
1 (Best) 0.0732 72,104 0.0061 67,388 0.0071
2 0.0261 72,113 0.0068 67,394 0.0073
3 0.0076 72,093 0.0058 67,369 0.0065
4 −0.0114 72,113 0.0055 67,395 0.0059
5 (Worst) −0.0654 72,104 0.0032 67,388 0.0044
Diﬀ (5-1) −0.1386 −0.0029 −0.0027
Mean t-test −31.7852*** −0.9546 −1.1829
Panel B: Quarterly period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ 1 Time t+ 3
Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ)
1 (Best) 0.1312 21,684 0.0207 17,429 0.0227
2 0.0551 21,687 0.0200 17,435 0.0189
3 0.0211 21,680 0.0188 17,427 0.0181
4 −0.0135 21,687 0.0196 17,435 0.0188
5 (Worst) −0.1043 21,684 0.0149 17,429 0.0223
Diﬀ (5-1) −0.2355 −0.0059 −0.0004
Mean t-test −17.0704*** −0.5806 −0.0694
Panel C: Semiannual period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ 1 Time t+ 3
Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ)
1 (Best) 0.1904 9,251 0.0414 6,296 0.0402
2 0.0853 9,249 0.0387 6,295 0.0358
3 0.0395 9,250 0.0334 6,293 0.0317
4 −0.0071 9,249 0.0306 6,295 0.0339
5 (Worst) −0.1326 9,251 0.0223 6,296 0.0390
Diﬀ (5-1) −0.3230 −0.0191 −0.0012
Mean t-test −12.6962*** −1.3708 −0.1745
This table presents the analysts’ performance at time t+ 1 and t+ 3 conditional on their performance at time t. For
the period considered, we measure the performance of an analyst as the average of the forecasting quality (computed
with our new measure FQ) across all stocks covered. The measurement periods are monthly (Panel A), quarterly
(Panel B) and semiannual (Panel C). We rank the analysts in 5 quintiles. In order to be included in the analysis, an
analyst must have an active target price for at least 80 percent of the days in the sample period. Conditional on the
ranking made at time t, we report the average forecasting quality at time t+ 1 and t+ 3. The statistical significance
of the diﬀerence across top and bottom quintiles is computed using a t-test. ***/**/* represent significance at the
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level.
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Table 2.8
The influence of the experience on the persistence of the forecasting quality
Panel A: Monthly period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ 1 Time t+ 3
Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ)
1 (Best) 0.0612 15,878 0.0053 13,428 0.0052
2 0.0212 15,879 0.0051 13,423 0.0042
3 0.0058 15,869 0.0054 13,428 0.0056
4 −0.0098 15,879 0.0044 13,423 0.0050
5 (Worst) −0.0560 15,878 0.0048 13,428 0.0044
Diﬀ (5-1) −0.1173 −0.0006 −0.0008
Mean t-test −28.9400*** −0.6208 −1.1953
Panel B: Quarterly period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ 1 Time t+ 3
Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ)
1 (Best) 0.1136 4,246 0.0155 3,533 0.0133
2 0.0451 4,241 0.0167 3,528 0.0150
3 0.0168 4,245 0.0134 3,533 0.0136
4 −0.0124 4,241 0.0128 3,528 0.0161
5 (Worst) −0.0953 4,246 0.0147 3,533 0.0128
Diﬀ (5-1) −0.2090 −0.0008 −0.0005
Mean t-test −14.9959*** −0.3498 −0.2169
Panel C: Semiannual period
Performance
quintile (ranked
at time t)
Time t Time t+ 1 Time t+ 3
Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ) Nb obs Quality (FQ)
1 (Best) 0.1602 1,761 0.0293 1,277 0.0205
2 0.0678 1,763 0.0267 1,277 0.0305
3 0.0246 1,764 0.0249 1,275 0.0289
4 −0.0173 1,763 0.0299 1,277 0.0224
5 (Worst) −0.1426 1,761 0.0267 1,277 0.0245
Diﬀ (5-1) −0.3028 −0.0026 0.0040
Mean t-test −10.4057*** −0.5724 1.0912
We restrict the sample to the analysts who have at least two years of experience. The sample period is 2003-2010. This table presents
the analysts’ performance at time t + 1 and t + 3 conditional on their performance at time t. For the period considered, we measure
the performance of an analyst as the average of the forecasting quality (computed with our new measure FQ) across all stocks covered.
The measurement periods are monthly (Panel A), quarterly (Panel B) and semiannual (Panel C). At time t, we measure the average
forecasting quality on all the target prices that are issued during this period of time. We then rank the analysts in 5 quintiles. In
order to be included in the analysis, an analyst must have an active target price for at least 80 percent of the sample period length.
Conditional on the ranking made at time t, we report the average forecasting quality at time t+1 and t+3. The statistical significance
of the diﬀerence across top and bottom quintiles is computed using a t-test. ***/**/* represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
level.
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Abstract
In this paper, we show that experienced financial analysts tend to cover diﬀerent
firms than inexperienced analysts. Experienced analysts tend to follow blue chips
(i.e., large, international, mature firms) while inexperienced analysts focus on small,
young, growth-oriented firms. These diﬀerences in coverage decisions imply that in-
experienced analysts issue target prices on firms for which stock returns are more
volatile, and thus less predictable. As a consequence, the accuracy measure of target
prices fails to evaluate diﬀerences in ability and skill between experienced and inex-
perienced analysts. When taking into account these diﬀerences in coverage decisions,
we still find that experienced analysts do a better job at forecasting stock prices.
Our results on the influence of analysts’ characteristics on target price quality are
statistically significant but economically weak.
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3.1 Introduction
Studies on the determinants of forecast accuracy have investigated the influence
of analysts’ characteristics on their forecasting ability (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis,
1997; Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999; Clement, 1999). The main characteristics con-
sidered in these studies are the analysts’ ability, the forecasting task complexity and
the resources available to the analysts. These three characteristics are proxied, re-
spectively, by the analysts’ experience, the number of firms or industries followed and
the employer size. This article investigates whether these same characteristics have
an influence on coverage decisions. Using a large database of analysts’ forecasts, we
show that experienced analysts and inexperienced analysts do not follow the same
type of firms. More generally, the greater the experience gap between two analysts,
the less correlated their coverage decisions are. Our analysis of the profile of the
firms covered by experienced analysts and inexperienced analysts indicates that ex-
perienced analysts tend to focus on “blue chips”1 while inexperienced analysts cover
mainly young, small, growth firms. Taking into account this diﬀerential coverage,
we study whether the ability of financial analysts to accurately issue target prices
is associated with the combination of their experience, the number of firms followed
and employer size. In line with the findings on earnings forecasts (Clement, 1999),
we obtain that experienced analysts issue better target prices. However, contrary to
what is obtained for earnings forecasts, we find that the ability of financial analysts
1Firms referred to as “blue chips” are usually characterized by a large market capitalization, a
proven record of financial strength, a capacity to produce earnings and a limited amount of debt.
They are established, well-known companies considered to be stable and mature, and leader in their
industry.
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to issue accurate target prices is positively related to the number of firms followed
and negatively related to employer size. We point out that our results are statistically
significant but economically weak.
Our first analysis studies whether diﬀerences in coverage decisions between an-
alysts can be explained by diﬀerences in experience. In this preliminary test, we
do not seek to determine the respective profiles of firms covered by experienced and
inexperienced analysts. Rather, we aim to show that experienced analysts and inex-
perienced analysts cover diﬀerent sets of firms. This analysis is done by computing ,
for each possible pair of analysts, their degree of joint coverage. The degree of joint
coverage is obtained by considering the number of firms covered by both analysts
while controlling for the total number of firms covered by each analyst composing the
pair. We show that the degree of joint coverage is higher when analysts have similar
levels of experience. We also find that the degree of joint coverage between two an-
alysts increases with their average experience. This result suggests that experienced
analysts tend to cover firms with higher analyst coverage.
In our second analysis, we aim at determining the profiles of firms covered respec-
tively by experienced analysts and inexperienced analysts. We consider an extensive
set of variables which cover both financial characteristics and fundamentals. We use
a Principal Component Analysis to summarize these diﬀerent characteristics into a
single measure. Our measure, called the “Blue Chip Index” (BCI), is the first prin-
cipal component of a Principal Component Analysis on the following variables: (1)
Capitalization; (2) Book-to-market ratio; (3) Free cash flow scaled by average total as-
sets; (4) External financing scaled by average total assets; (5) Institutional ownership
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(the fraction of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors); (6) Ownership
breadth; (7) Asset growth (average over the past five years); (8) Sales growth (average
over the past five years); (9) Accruals (as calculated in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman,
and Tuna, 2006); (10) Analyst coverage (number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts
for a given firm); (11) Stock return volatility; and, (12) Bid-ask spread. Our measure
(BCI) is positively related to the level of capitalization, the number of analysts cov-
ering the firm, the level of ownership breadth and the size of the free cash flows, and
negatively related to the amount of external financing, the asset growth rate, the sales
growth rate, the size of the bid-ask spread and the stock return volatility. On average,
our measure takes a high value for firms with the following characteristics: firms that
are large and liquid, that attract a lot of attention from market participants, that
generate cash and rely only moderately on external financing. These firms have a
large investor base, a low rate of growth and their returns are not too volatile. A
large positive value for BCI indicates that the firm is a “blue chip” while a negative
value corresponds to a young, small, growth firm.
We use a multivariate regression to investigate the link between our BCI measure
and analysts characteristics. Our results indicate that the firms covered by experi-
enced analysts and analysts working for large brokerage firms take higher BCI values.
We also find a positive association between the number of firms covered by analysts
and the BCI value of the firms they covered.
Blue chips have typically a lower stock return volatility. Because target price
accuracy is mechanically influenced by volatility (As shown by Roger and Fontaine,
2013), the fact that experienced analysts cover mainly blue chips induces a bias in
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the analysis of the impact of experience on target price accuracy. In our analysis, we
control for firm-year diﬀerences and use the measure of Roger and Fontaine (2013)
which takes into account the impact of volatility when evaluating the quality of target
prices. Hence, we neutralize the impact of the diﬀerential coverage. Our results show
that experienced analysts do issue better target prices. However, the influence of
experience on target prices’ quality is economically small.
Financial analysts specialize by industry. However, within industries, the common
assumptions made in the literature are that analysts share similar preferences (about
the profile of firms to cover) and that these preferences are stable over the analysts’
life.2 The literature on analysts’ preferences focuses mainly on the link between
analyst coverage (the number of analysts covering a firm) and firm characteristics.
For instance, Bhushan (1989) shows that analyst coverage is positively associated
with firm size and institutional ownership. O’Brien and Bushan (1990) find that
a decrease in a firm’s stock return volatility leads to an increase in the number of
analysts following the firm. Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) show that analyst
coverage is higher for firms with high intangible assets. Finally, Lang, Lins, and Miller
(2004) find that analyst coverage is lowered by potential firms’ incentives to withhold
or manipulate information. The article of McNichols and O’Brien (1997) stands out
as they focus on analysts’ behavior rather than on analyst coverage. Their findings
indicate that analysts tend to issue forecasts on firms for which they have favorable
views and choose not to cover firms for which they are pessimistic about the firms’
future performance.
2We point out that these assumptions are never clearly stated in the literature. However, the
approaches that are usually followed in the diﬀerent articles imply that such assumptions are made.
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We believe our results on the relationship between coverage decisions and expe-
rience to shed a new light on analysts’ preferences. In particular, these results lead
us to question whether the existence of a link between analyst coverage and a firm
characteristic expresses analysts’ preference for this characteristic. Our reasoning is
the following. The fact that experienced analysts cover a diﬀerent type of firms than
inexperienced analysts has potentially two explanations. The simplest one is that the
preferences of analysts evolve with their experience. The second explanation, which
seems more probable, is that preferences are stable but coverage decisions are con-
strained. Preferences are stable over the analysts’ life but their coverage decisions are
constrained by the brokerage firm and these constraints evolve with experience (and
with their position in the hierarchy). Inside a brokerage firm, analysts specialize by
industry. If all the analysts within an industry share similar preferences, they would
all cover the same limited pool of firms. This situation is of course not eﬃcient for
the brokerage firm as the revenues resulting from analyst coverage increase with the
number of firms covered. It follows that the brokerage firm has incentives to constrain
the number of analysts covering each firm.3 The brokerage firm thus faces a matching
problem. Assuming that experienced analysts have priority over inexperienced ana-
lysts, the former choose which firms to cover according to their preferences. As the
firms that match inexperienced analysts’ preferences are already taken by experienced
analysts, inexperienced analysts are assigned to the remaining firms in the industry.
As a result of this matching mechanism, analysts gradually move towards the firms
that correspond to their preferences as they gain experience.
3It is probable that a relationship between the maximum number of analysts covering a firm and
the potential revenues associated with this firm exists.
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If analysts share similar experiences but their coverage decisions are constrained by
the brokerage firm, the link between analyst coverage and firm characteristics may be
driven not only by analysts’ preferences but also by brokerage firms’ preferences. For
instance, the findings of Bhushan (1989) showing that analyst coverage is positively
associated with firm size might also be explained by brokerage firms assigning more
analysts to large firms (because potential revenues are higher for large firms). It
follows that analyst coverage should be interpreted with respect to both analysts’
preferences and brokerage firms’ incentives.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the diﬀerent analysts’
characteristics considered in the article and introduce their proxy. We outline our
hypotheses on the impact of these characteristics on coverage decisions. In section
3, we present the data used in our study. Section 4 focuses on the link between
experience and coverage decisions. In section 5, we study the relationship between
analysts’ characteristics and target price quality. The last section concludes the paper.
3.2 Analysts’ characteristics
The analysts’ characteristics considered in this article are, as in Clement (1999),
the experience (a proxy for analyst ability), the number of firms followed (a proxy
for forecasting task complexity) and the employer size (a proxy for the level of re-
sources available to the analyst). In this section, we present our hypotheses on the
influence of these variables on the type of firms covered by analysts. We then explain
the methodology used to compute proxies for analyst ability, task complexity and
resources available.
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3.2.1 Hypotheses for analyst ability (experience)
Our hypothesis is that experienced analysts cover mainly large, international,
mature firms. We propose two explanations to why experienced analysts would tend
to cover blue chips.
The first explanation is that the coverage is motivated by brokerage firms’ incen-
tives. Blue chips are of special interest for brokerage firms as these firms generate
the most trading and investment banking (IPOs, underwriting activity...) fees. How-
ever, these firms are also the ones for which competition is fiercest. Because financial
analysts participate in the reputation of the brokerage firm, it seems reasonable to
assume that these brokerage firms assign their best analysts to blue chips. Experience
is often seen as a proxy for analyst’s ability. Experienced analysts are, by definition,
individuals who managed to stay in the profession. Clement (1999) points out that,
because the analyst labor market functions as a tournament4, the best analysts stay
in the profession while the worst ones are forced out. It is therefore a safe assumption
that experienced analysts are, on average, individuals who are good at doing their
job. A second reason why experienced analysts would be more skillful is that skills
and knowledge improve over time (learning-by-doing). Finally, because the analyst’s
work also includes contacts with companies’ managers, brokerage firms have incen-
tives to select analysts who have a long term relationship with the executives of the
covered company.
The second explanation to why blue chips are covered by experienced analysts
4This is the way brokerage firms and clients evaluate analysts. Also, the Institutional Investor
ranking uses a tournament-like process to nominate All-star analysts.
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is that experienced analysts have a larger discretion, with respect to inexperienced
analysts, regarding which firms to cover and that analysts have an intrinsic preference
for blue chips. Assuming that experienced analysts are higher up in the hierarchy,
they have priority when choosing which firms to cover (either because they are already
covering them, or because they get priority when choosing) while young inexperienced
analysts are left with the remaining firms. There are some incentives to cover blue
chips. First, researching a young, growth firm may result in a waste of the analyst’s
time and resources if the firm ends up disappearing or if it is acquired by a larger
firm. In this sense, researching a blue chip guarantees the acquired knowledge (su-
perior information) to be useful for a longer period of time. Second, large, mature
firms attract more attention. The reports written on firms of this type have a larger
potential client base and typically generate more revenues than reports written on
small, growth firms5.
3.2.2 Hypotheses for task complexity (number of firms fol-
lowed)
Our hypothesis is that analysts following blue chips cover a small number of
firms. This hypothesis is motivated by the diﬀerent nature of the work done when
covering blue chips compared to covering small, young, growth firms. Blue chips have
several business activities, located in diﬀerent countries and often related to diﬀerent
industries. Their structure is much more complex than that of small, growth firms and
5The profits of sell-side analysts arise mainly from the brokerage house’s investment banking fees
and trading fees.
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thus their coverage is more time demanding. We therefore expect analysts covering
blue chips to focus on a limited number of firms.
3.2.3 Hypotheses for resources (employer size)
Large brokerage firms have a competitive advantage when concluding investment
banking deals with large companies.6 Therefore, it might be a successful strategy for
smaller brokerage firms to target smaller, younger companies. We therefore expect
smaller brokerage firms to specialize in growth, young firms where they are not at a
disadvantage with regards to the main investment banks.
3.2.4 Proxies for analysts’ characteristics
The study of the influence of analysts’ characteristics on their forecasting behav-
ior is a diﬃcult task because standard databases such as I/B/E/S do not provide
information, other than an identifying code, about analysts. However, some charac-
teristics can be extracted from the data. Clement (1999) provides a methodology to
build proxies for analysts’ experience, employer size as well as the number of firms fol-
lowed. Although our article studies target prices, we choose to follow the methodology
of Clement (1999) and to construct analysts’ characteristics proxies using earnings
forecasts. We use earnings rather than target prices to compute proxies because (1)
forecasting earnings is the core activity of financial analysts (they cover more stocks
than the ones for which they issue target prices); (2) financial analysts only recently
started to issue target prices (i.e., they start issuing target prices on stocks they have
6For instance, Facebook IPO’s lead underwriters were Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan and Goldman
Sachs.
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been covering for many years); and, (3) the data on target prices is left-censored (the
number of observations is very small before 2000).
When building proxies for experience and the number of firms followed, we exclude
earnings forecasts that are issued less than 30 days or more than one year before
the end of the fiscal year. As stated by Clement (1999), an analyst who only issues
forecasts more than a year before the end of the fiscal year is not likely to be following
the company closely. In the same way, an analyst who only issues forecasts in the
month preceding the end of the fiscal year is likely to build her forecasts upon the
forecasts of other analysts rather than by carefully investigating the company.
The general experience GEXPit is calculated as the number of years through year
t for which analyst i supplied at least one forecast. When computing the proxy for
experience, we also take into account the firms for which the analysts do not issue
target prices. Indeed, analysts might issue target prices only for a limited number
of stocks. Not considering the other firms that they cover can bias the estimation
of the experience level. In other words, when calculating the experience proxies, we
only care about earnings forecasts and not about target prices. We use as the proxy
for the forecasting task complexity, the number of firms (NFit) covered by analyst i
during year t.
Finally, we define the employer size (ESit) as the number of analysts employed in
year t by the broker for which analyst i works during year t. We assume, as in Stickel
(1995) and Clement (1999), that two level of resources can be distinguished. On one
hand, large employers provide analysts with important resources. On the other hand,
smaller brokerage firms provide analysts with more limited resources. We define a
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dummy (DESit) that takes the value 1 if analyst i is employed by a broker that
belongs to the top size decile and 0 otherwise.7
3.3 Data
Our primary dataset consists of a total of 686,863 target prices made by 10,137
analysts (620 brokers) on 7,646 U.S. stocks for the 2000-2010 period. The provider for
the target prices is I/B/E/S. For each forecast, we have the code of the analyst (and
the broker code) who issues the forecast, the issue date, the horizon in months (usually
6 or 12 months), and the target price. We remove from the database the forecasts for
which the stock price is not available on the issue date (20,766 forecasts), or is less
than one dollar (2,044 forecasts). We also delete from the database the forecasts for
which the ratio of the target price over the stock price is in the bottom one percent of
the distribution (7,468 forecasts) and the forecasts for which this ratio is higher than
four (2,313 forecasts). Finally, we discard the observations for which the price history
is too short to compute an acceptable estimation of the historical volatility8 (4,801
forecasts). After deleting these 37,392 observations, 770 analysts are removed from
the database as they are left with no forecasts. Our final sample consists of 649,471
target prices made by 9,367 analysts (583 brokers) on 7,268 stocks.
Our secondary dataset consists of all the one-year ahead earnings forecasts for
the 1982-2010 period. The data on earnings forecasts is used to compute proxies for
7About 50% of the analysts are employees of the top size decile brokers.
8We delete the observations for which there are less than 2 months of price history prior to the
forecast.
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analysts’ experience. Following Clement (1999), we only keep the earnings forecasts
issued between 365 and 30 days before the end of the fiscal year to compute proxies
for experience and task complexity (but we keep all the forecasts to calculate the
employer size variable).
Our third dataset contains daily stock prices, market capitalizations and bid-ask
spreads for the 7,268 stocks considered. This third dataset comes from CRSP. Target
prices and stock prices are adjusted for splits and corporate actions.
Finally, we obtain fundamental data from Compustat Xpressfeed. Each fiscal year,
we compute accruals, asset growth, sales growth and external financing. Data on in-
stitutional ownership is obtained through Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings.
Table 3.1 reports for each year the number of target prices issued, the number
of active analysts, the average, median and maximum number of active analysts per
stock, and the average, median and maximum number of stocks covered per analyst.
We observe that the number of forecasts per year more than doubles over the sample
period while the number of active analysts remains roughly constant. It appears that
the inclusion of a target price in analysts’ reports is an increasingly popular practice.
An analyst typically covers 4 diﬀerent stocks at the beginning of the sample period;
this number increases to 7 in the last years. Conversely, the number of analysts
covering a given stock increases over the sample period from 4 to 6.
On average, the analysts in our sample revise their forecasts approximately every
6 months (137 trading days). The target prices in our sample are on average 23%
higher than the current stock price.9 This statistic is similar to what can be observed
9The annualized return for the S&P 500 Composite index for the same period is −1.21%.
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for other periods and/or countries. For instance, Brav and Lehavy (2003) find that
target prices on U.S. stocks for the 1997-1999 period are on average 28% higher than
the current price while Kerl (2011) reports an implicit return of 18.07% for German
stocks for the 2002-2004 period. Finally, it appears that the analysts in our sample
are mainly optimistic about stock prices with only 13% of the target prices below the
concurrent price.
The average (median) level of experience of the analysts in our sample is 7.15 years
(6 years). The 5th percentile is equal to 1 year while the 95th percentile is 18 years.
The average (median) number of firms followed is 16.20 (15). The 5th percentile is
equal to 5 firms while the 95th percentile is 28 firms.
3.4 Experience and coverage decisions
3.4.1 Joint coverage
Our first analysis consists in checking whether experienced analysts and inexperi-
enced analysts cover the same firms. For each possible pair of analysts, we compute
their degree of joint coverage. This degree of joint coverage corresponds to the degree
to which two analysts cover the same firms. It is a function of the number of firms
jointly covered by the two analysts and of the number of firms covered by each analyst
composing the pair.
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Methodology
Our methodology to compute the degree of joint coverage is the following. For a
given year, there areM firms covered by at least one analyst and N analysts covering
at least one firm. First, let us consider the case where analysts choose randomly which
stocks to cover. An analyst Ai (Aj) chooses to cover a subset Si (Sj) of mi (mj) firms
with max(mi,mj) ≤M. As stocks are randomly chosen, the number (denoted mij) of
elements in the intersection Si ∩Sj, is the number of firms jointly covered by the two
analysts Ai and Aj. mij is a random variable following a hypergeometric distribution
with parameters (M,mi,mj), denoted H(M,mi,mj).
10
Our methodology is the following. For a year t, we define the coverage matrix C
as
Ct =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
c11t ... ... ... c1Nt
... ... ...
ci1t cijt ciNt
... ... ...
cM1t ... ... ... cMNt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (3.1)
where M is the number of firms covered during year t, N is the number of active
analysts and cijt is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if analyst i covers firm j
during year t.
The number of firms jointly covered by a pair of analysts is obtained by the
multiplication of the transposed of the coverage matrix CT by the coverage matrix
10In the set of M firms, there are mi firms followed by analyst i. If analyst j draws mj firms
among the M existing ones, the number mij of firms drawn by analyst j in the subset of mi firms
follows H(M,mi,mj).
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C. The joint coverage matrix JC is a symmetric matrix of size (N,N), written as
JCt = C
T
t × Ct
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
n11t ... ... ... n1Nt
... ... ...
ni1t nijt niNt
... ... ...
nN1t ... ... ... nNNt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (3.2)
where niit is number of diﬀerent firms covered by analyst i. For i = j, nijt is the
number of firms covered simultaneously by analysts i and j.
Obviously, the number of firms jointly covered by two analysts depends on the
number of firms covered by each analyst and on the total number of firms in the
universe.11 The probability for an analyst j to cover the same firms as another
analyst i increases with the number of firms she covers and with the number of firms
covered by the other analyst i. This probability decreases with the total number of
firms in the universe. In order to compare the joint coverage of a pair of analysts
with the joint coverage of another pair of analysts, we need to control for the number
of firms covered by the analysts in each pair. Similarly, if we want to compare joint
coverages at diﬀerent points in time, we need to control for the total number of firms
in the universe. We therefore define the matrix SJC of standardized joint coverage
11For a given year, we estimate this number by the number of firms covered by at least one analyst.
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where the elements are defined as
sjcijt =
nijt − E(nijt)√
V (nijt)
, (3.3)
where E(nijt) and V (nijt) are the expected value and the variance of joint coverage
under the random choice assumption.12
We provide below a numerical example to illustrate our methodology.
Example 9 Consider the situation where the total number of firms is M = 5 and
the number of analysts is N = 4. We have the following coverage matrix C
C =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (3.5)
12The first two moments of the hypergeometric distribution are given by
E(nij) =
ninj
M
V (nij) =
ninj (M − ni) (M − nj)
M2 (M − 1) . (3.4)
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The joint coverage is obtained by calculating the product JC = CT × C and we have
JC =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2 1 0 1
1 2 1 2
0 1 3 3
1 2 3 4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (3.6)
The elements on the diagonal represent the number of firms covered by each analyst.
The two first analysts cover two firms each, the third analyst covers three firms and
the fourth analyst covers four firms in the sample. The joint coverage is expressed
by the elements that are outside the diagonal. We have JC34 = 3, which means
that analyst 3 and analyst 4 cover three stocks in common (these two analysts jointly
cover the last three firms as can be seen on matrix C). Obviously, because the last
analyst covers four firms (the highest number) in the sample, his joint coverage with
the other analysts is higher. In order to control for these diﬀerences in the number of
firms covered per analyst, we consider the standardized joint coverage matrix SJC,
which is equal to
SJC =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.3333 −2.0000 −1.2247
0.3333 −0.3333 0.8165
−2.0000 −0.3333 1.2247
−1.2247 0.8165 1.2247
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (3.7)
Note that we leave the diagonal empty: we do not compute the standardized joint
coverage of an analyst with himself as the number of firms covered by an analyst
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does not follow a hypergeometric distribution (it is a constant). We observe that the
standardized joint coverages of the pairs (1;2), (2;4) and (3;4) are positive. These
positive values mean that the joint coverage is higher than what should be observed if
coverage decisions were independent. On the contrary, the joint coverages of (1;3),
(1;4), (2;3), (2;4) are below what should be expected under independence.
We want to analyze whether diﬀerences in experience between analysts influence
their degree of joint coverage. We part, each year, the population of analysts in five
groups. The first group is composed of the analysts with the most experience (at least
16 years of experience). The second group is characterized by a level of experience
between 12 years and 16 years (8 years to 12 years for the third group; 4 years to 8
years for the fourth group). Finally, the fifth group of analysts is composed of the
inexperienced analysts (between 0 and 4 years).
In order to measure the degree of joint coverage between two groups of analysts,
we introduce the Intergroup Joint Coverage (IJC) measure. The Intergroup Joint
Coverage between a group of analysts K and a group of analysts L is defined as
IJCKLt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(∑
k∈K
∑
l∈L
sjcklt
)
/ (KL) if K = L⎛
⎜⎜⎝∑
k,l∈K
k =l
sjcklt
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ / ((K − 1)K) if K = L
, (3.8)
where K = Card(K) is the number of analysts in group K and L = Card(L) is the
number of analysts in group L.
When K = L, IJC measures the degree of joint coverage between analysts in
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group K and analysts in group L. When K = L, IJC measures the degree of joint
coverage between the diﬀerent analysts composing group K.
We define the Global Level of Joint Coverage (GLJC) as
GLJCt =
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
sjcijt
)
/
(
N2 −N
2
)
, (3.9)
where N is the number of active analysts during year t.
GLJC is simply the average of sjcij. It measures the global degree of correlation
between the analysts’ coverage decisions for a year t. If coverage decisions were
random, we would haveGLJC = 0. However, because coverage decisions are clustered
(few firms gather most of the analyst coverage), GLJC takes positive values.
Finally, we define a measure of Intergroup Excess Joint Coverage (IEJC) as the
diﬀerence between IJC and GLJC. It writes
IEJCKLt = IJCKLt −GLJCt. (3.10)
IEJC takes a positive (negative) value if the coverage decisions of the analysts
of group K and analysts of group L are more (less) correlated than what is typically
observed in the rest of the population.
Results
If analysts with similar levels of experience tend to follow the same firms, we ex-
pect to obtain that IEJCKK > IEJCKL and we expect the Intergroup Excess Joint
Coverage IEJCtKL to become smaller when the experience gap between groups K
Chapter 3: Analyst experience, diﬀerences in coverage decisions and target price
quality 136
and L increases. Table 3.2 provides the Intergroup Excess Joint Coverages between
the five groups defined above. The highest value (0.0727) for IEJC is obtained for
the analysts of the group 1 with themselves. The intensity of the joint coverage di-
minishes monotonically as the experience gap increases. The Intergroup Excess Joint
Coverage is not significantly diﬀerent from zero between group 1 and group 4. It
becomes negative between the most experienced analysts and the least experienced
analysts. This negative value means that the coverage decisions of the most expe-
rienced analysts and the least experienced analysts are less correlated than what is
typically observed in the whole population. We find that the Intergroup Excess Joint
Coverage decreases when the diﬀerence in experience between two groups increases.
This is true for all groups except for group 4 (analysts in group 4 have a higher de-
gree of joint coverage with analysts of group 3 than with themselves). The Intergroup
Excess Joint Coverage appears to decrease with the average level of experience of the
two groups. In particular, inexperienced analysts have globally a low degree of joint
coverage with the rest of their peers (and with themselves). A plausible explanation
for this lower degree of joint coverage is that inexperienced analysts cover only few
firms (as it can be observed in the table) and these firms have, on average, low analyst
coverage. They follow firms that do not attract a lot of attention and that are covered
only by analysts with low experience. In other words, the universe of firms covered
by the first four groups is diﬀerent from the universe of firms covered by analysts who
just started working.
We conduct a second analysis to describe the role of experience on coverage de-
cisions. For a given pair of analysts, we want to understand how the diﬀerence in
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experience levels between the two analysts influences the degree of joint coverage.
Also, we want to check how the average level of experience of the two analysts com-
posing the pair impacts this joint coverage (The results reported in Table 3.2 seem to
indicate that a positive relationship exists between the level of experience and the de-
gree of joint coverage). We introduce the following variables: (1) the Pair Experience
Diﬀerential, defined as PEDijt = |GEXPit −GEXPjt|; and, (2) the Pair Average
Experience, defined as PAEijt = (GEXPit +GEXPjt) /2. We adopt the following
specification to measure the relationship between joint coverage and experience
sjcijt = α + β1PEDijt + β2PAEijt + β3nit + β4njt + year t eﬀects + ǫijt, (3.11)
where ni (nj) is the number of firms covered by analyst i (respectively j) during year
t and year t eﬀects is a set of dummies for each year of the sample.
With this specification, we can consider the joint eﬀects of both the diﬀerence in
experience between two analysts and the average level of experience of the analysts
composing the pair. However, it is not possible to incorporate in the regression the
joint coverage between all the diﬀerent pairs of analysts as the number of observations
is too large. Indeed, for each year, we have (N2t −Nt)/2 diﬀerent pairs of analysts. This
represents an average of 4, 854, 305 pairs each year. Thus, we reduce the number of
observations by drawing randomly 500, 000 observations each year. The final sample
consists of 5, 500, 000 observations.
We provide the results of the regression in Table 3.3. As expected, the coeﬃcients
associated with the Pair Experience Diﬀerential (PED) variable is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that there is a higher degree of joint coverage when analysts have
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similar levels of experience. The coeﬃcient of the Pair Average Experience (PAE)
variable is positive and significant: the correlation between the coverage decisions of
two analysts is higher when both analysts are experienced. We also observe that the
degree of joint coverage increases with the number of firms followed by analysts.13 We
note however that the R-squared of the regression is quite small. This low fraction
of explained variance finds its source in the high number of observations and in the
fact that, for a given level of Pair Experience Diﬀerential, there are a multitude of
diﬀerent realizations for the joint coverage variable (there are more than 5 millions
diﬀerent realizations for the standardized joint coverage variable while there are only
30 realizations for the Pair Experience Diﬀerential variable and 59 realizations for the
Pair Average Experience variable).
3.4.2 Experience and sector coverage
We showed in the previous subsection that experience has an influence on cover-
age decisions. A possible explanation for this feature is that experienced analysts do
not cover the same sectors as inexperienced analysts. We provide, in Table 3.4, some
descriptive statistics on the proportion of target prices per sector with respect to the
experience. We first note that target prices are extremely popular among the firms of
the technology sector. At the beginning of our sample period (which corresponds to
the Internet bubble), the target prices issued on technology stocks represent as much
as one quarter of all the target prices issued. Although this proportion decreases over
time, it remains the sector with the most target prices in 2010. With respect to the
13Note that, theoretically, we should obtain the same coeﬃcient for nit and njt. The diﬀerence
comes from the fact that we drew randomly 500,000 observations each year.
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analysts’ experience, we observe some important diﬀerences in the proportion of tar-
get prices per sector. For instance, analysts with the least experience issue a higher
proportion of target prices in the technology sector than experienced analysts. The
diﬀerence in percentages between inexperienced and experienced analysts is as high
as 8 points in 2003. On the contrary, experienced analysts issue a higher proportion of
target prices on firms from the Consumer Services sector than inexperienced analysts.
We also note that these diﬀerences in proportions are not stable over time. Over-
all, the diﬀerences in proportions appear too small to explain our previous findings.
However, we will need to control for these diﬀerences in our subsequent tests.
3.4.3 Experience and firm characteristics
We demonstrated that experienced analysts and inexperienced analysts do not
cover the same firms. We now aim to characterize the profile of the firms covered,
respectively, by experienced analysts and inexperienced analysts.
Univariate analysis
We characterize the profile of each firm using the following variables: (1) Capital-
ization; (2) Book-to-market ratio; (3) Free cash flow scaled by average total assets; (4)
External financing scaled by average total assets; (5) Institutional ownership (the frac-
tion of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors); (6) Ownership breadth;
(7) Asset growth (average over the past five years); (8) Sales growth (average over
the past five years); (9) Accruals (as calculated in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and
Tuna, 2006); (10) Analyst coverage (number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for
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a given firm); (11) Stock return volatility; and, (12) Bid-ask spread. We provide a
complete description of these variables in the Appendix.
We first proceed to univariate tests. Each year, we assign analysts to five quin-
tiles with respect to their general experience GEXP . We then report, for diﬀerent
quintiles, the average values of the characteristics listed above for the firms covered
by the analysts. The results in Table 3.5 allow us to detail what drives the diﬀerences
in coverage decisions. These diﬀerent characteristics establish a dichotomy between
blue chips (large, international, mature firms) and growth, young, small firms. Ex-
perienced analysts cover firms that are characterized by a large capitalization, a high
institutional ownership, a high ownership breadth, a high level of free cash flows,
a high analyst coverage but a low asset growth, a low sales growth, a low level of
external financing, low accruals, low bid-ask spread and low stock return volatility.
Blue Chip Index
Our findings (reported in Table 3.5) indicate that the profile of the firms cov-
ered by the diﬀerent analysts is linked to their experience. Our exploratory analysis
shows that experienced analysts cover firms that are larger and more mature. So far,
we have explored the relationship between analyst’s experience and each of the firm
characteristics separately. We turn to Principal Component Analysis (PCA hereafter)
to determine a measure of firms’ profile. This methodology permits to characterize
the common factors across firms. Our assumption is that one of these factors, if not
the most important factor, is a proxy for firm maturity. The purpose of PCA is to
reduce the dimensionality of the data space. In the smaller space, interpreting the
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data is easier. Formally, PCA is a change of basis which permits to locate firms on
a meaningful system of coordinates.14 The first principal component is the linear
combination of the initial variables that maximizes the variance of the projection of
the observations on these principal components (i.e., so that it accounts for as much
of the variability in the data as possible). The second component is the linear com-
bination of the diﬀerent variables which maximized the variance under the condition
that it is orthogonal to the first component, and so on. If the diﬀerent variables are
perfectly correlated, the first component would explain 100% of the variance. On the
contrary, if the diﬀerent variables are uncorrelated, each component would explain
the same amount of the variance (one divided by the number of variables).
In our analysis, an individual is a firm-year while the variables are the ones used
in the univariate tests (see Appendix for a full description). The first eigenvalue is
2.7425; it implies that 2.7425/12 = 22.85% of the total variation in the firm character-
istics can be explained by a single common factor. The second component explains
about 20.37% of the total variation. Figure 3.1 shows how the diﬀerent variables
contribute to the first and the second components. Along the first axis, we have,
on one side, the variables that characterize blue chips (Capitalization, Analyst cov-
erage, Ownership breadth and Free cash flow) while we have, on the other side, the
variables that characterized small, young, growth firms (External financing, Stock
return volatility, Asset growth, Sales growth and Bid-ask spread). Note that the
contribution of the variables Accruals, Book-to-market and Institutional ownership is
too small to be taken into account. Our measure, called the Blue Chip Index (BCI),
14Our PCA is performed on the correlation matrix due to the heterogeneity of the variables.
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is defined as the projection of the firms on the first component of the PCA. As an
illustration of our methodology, Table 3.6 provides the year and the name of the firm
for the 50 observations with the highest BCI values and the 50 observations with the
lowest BCI values. Not surprisingly, we find Dow Jones components like Microsoft,
Intel, Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson among the firms with the highest BCI values.
We adopt the following specification to measure the relationship between analysts’
experience and the BCI of the firms they cover
BCIijt = α + β1 GEXPit + β2 NFit + β3 DESit
+ year t eﬀects + industry jt eﬀects + ǫijt, (3.12)
where BCIijt is the Blue Chip Index value of firm j covered by analyst i for year t,
GEXPit is the general experience of analyst i for year t, NFit is the number of firms
covered by analyst i during year t, DESit is a dummy variable that takes the value
1 if analyst i’s employer is in the top decile size, year t eﬀects is a set of dummies for
each year of the sample and industry jt eﬀects is a set of dummies for each industry.
15
The coeﬃcient of interest for us is β1 which measures whether experienced analysts
cover mainly blue chips firms. We include year eﬀects in the regression specification in
order to control for potential time-varying factors that would influence the BCI value
of the firms covered. Because analysts typically specialize in a couple of industries
and because the level of analysts’ experience influences the choice of the industries
she covers, we include industry eﬀects. The inclusion of industry eﬀects allows us to
15Note that for a given analyst, we only consider the firms she covers.
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control for diﬀerences of BCI between the diﬀerent industries and therefore guaran-
tees that the industries covered do not have an impact on the relationship between
analyst’s experience and BCI. Table 3.7 reports the results of the regression. The co-
eﬃcient for GEXP is positive and significant. This result suggests that experienced
analysts cover firms with higher BCI values. The coeﬃcient for NF is significant and
takes the value −0.0089. This means that analysts who cover a large number of firms
follow young, growth firms. This result seems logical. Blue chips tend to have a com-
plex organization. Thus, covering a blue chip takes more time than covering a young,
growth firm. Covering blue chips constrains the capacity of the analyst to cover a
large number of diﬀerent firms. Finally, analysts who work for a large employer tend
to cover firms that are large, more international and more mature. The coeﬃcient
for DES is positive and significant. This is in line with our hypothesis that smaller
brokerage firms specialize in growth, young firms where the competition with large
investment banks is lower.
3.5 Target prices quality and analysts’ character-
istics
In this section, we study the relationship between analysts’ characteristics and
their ability to forecast future stock prices. Given our previous results, we design our
empirical analysis to account for diﬀerences in the type of firms covered by experienced
analysts and inexperienced analysts.
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3.5.1 Measuring target price quality
The most popular measure of accuracy in the target prices literature is the absolute
forecast error; it is equal to the ex-post deviation between the realized stock price and
the target price, scaled by the stock price at the issue date. Formally, the accuracy
measure is defined as
|TPERROR|t =
|ST − Φt,T |
St
, (3.13)
where Φt,T is the value of a target price issued at time t with horizon T , ST is the
stock price at the end of the forecast horizon and St is the stock price at the time the
forecast was issued.
Despite its wide use in the literature, this measure of accuracy has a number of
drawbacks and is not well suited to evaluate whether a forecast is better than an-
other or whether an analyst is better than her peers. Roger and Fontaine (2013) raise
a major concern regarding its use for evaluating the ability of financial analysts to
issue accurate target prices. They show that there exists a mechanical relationship
between the accuracy of a target price and the volatility of the underlying stock. This
mechanical relationship implies that target prices issued on volatile stocks have lower
accuracy, regardless of the ability of the analyst issuing the forecasts. Furthermore,
the relationship between accuracy and volatility is nonlinear. It follows that adding
volatility as a control in regressions does not permit to circumvent the issue. Our
previous findings indicate that the type of firms covered depends on the analysts’
characteristics. In particular, experienced analysts tend to cover firms that are less
volatile than the firms covered by inexperienced analysts. These diﬀerences in cover-
age could drive the relationships between accuracy and analysts’ characteristics and
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mask whether some analysts are better than others. In order to analyze the influence
of analysts characteristics on their ability to issue accurate target prices, we thus
choose to use the measure of target price quality of Roger and Fontaine (2013) which
accounts for both the target price accuracy and the target price predictability (i.e.,
the volatility and the horizon).
The idea behind the measure is that the mechanical relationship between accu-
racy and volatility reflects a more general link between accuracy and predictabil-
ity. The diﬃculty of issuing a target price is not the same for all stocks (in other
words, predictability varies across stocks) and can be estimated by taking the ex-
pected value of the absolute forecast error Et [|ST − Φt,T |]. The ex-post measure of
quality γt,T of Roger and Fontaine (2013) is defined as the abnormal absolute forecast
error Et [|ST − Φt,T |]−|ST − Φt,T |. They show that it is possible, by applying option-
pricing theory, to obtain a good estimation of the expected value of the absolute
forecast error at the time the target price is issued. The use of option-pricing theory
also permits to circumvent several technical drawbacks of the accuracy measure: (1)
we are able to measure the quality of a target price at any date rather than ex-post
only; (2) it controls for diﬀerences in volatility; (3) it accounts for the horizon of the
forecast; (4) it rewards bold and timid forecasts diﬀerently; and, (5) it permits a clean
treatment of target price revisions.
3.5.2 Results
The literature on earnings forecasts evidences that forecast accuracy is positively
associated with experience (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997; Clement, 1999), neg-
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atively associated with the number of firms followed (Clement, 1999) and positively
related to the size of the brokerage firm where the analysts is employed (Clement,
1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999). We expect to find the same kind of relation-
ships between target price quality and analysts’ characteristics. Although Bilinski,
Lyssimachou, and Walker (2013) find a positive association between accuracy and
experience, it is unclear whether this result will hold when taking into account both
the diﬀerences in coverage decisions and the predictability of target prices.
The empirical specification of our multivariate regression is
γijt = α + β1GEXPit + β2 NFit + β3 DESit + firm-year jt eﬀects + ǫijt, (3.14)
where γijt is the ex-post quality (as defined in Roger and Fontaine, 2013) of a target
price issued by analyst i on firm j at time t with horizon T , GEXPit is the general
experience of analyst i for year t, NFit is the number of firms covered by analyst i
during year t, DESit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if analyst i’s employer
is in the top decile size, and firm-year jt eﬀects is a set of dummies for each year and
each firm of the sample.
Results from the estimation are reported in Table 3.8. As predicted, the coeﬃcient
for GEXP is positive and significant. This coeﬃcient takes the value 0.0003. An
analyst who has fifteen years of experience (the 90th percentile value) will have an
expected quality that is 0.0042 greater than an analyst who has one year of experience
(the 10th percentile value). Although the coeﬃcient is statistically significant, it is
economically weak (the standard deviation of the quality is equal to 0.3855). The
coeﬃcient for NFit is significant and takes the value 0.0002. This means that an
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analyst who covers 24 firms (the 90th percentile value) will have an expected quality
that is 0.0033 greater than an analyst who covers only five firms (the 10th percentile
value). Finally, the coeﬃcient for DESit is negative and significant. This result
indicates that the target price quality of analysts working for large brokerage firms
is 0.0119 smaller than analysts working for other brokerage firms. The results for
the task complexity (number of firms followed) and the resources available (employer
size) are surprising and not in line with what can be observed for earnings forecasts.
However, the strength of the relationship between analysts’ characteristics and target
price quality appears weak (although statistically significant).
3.6 Conclusion and discussion
Using a large database of target prices, we show that experienced analysts and in-
experienced analysts do not follow the same type of firms. Experienced analysts tend
to cover blue chips while inexperienced analysts cover mainly small, young, growth
firms. Controlling for diﬀerences in coverage decisions, we analyze the influence of
analysts’ experience, the number of firms they follow and employer size on the ability
of financial analysts to issue accurate target prices. In line with previous results on
earnings forecasts, we find that experienced analysts issue better target prices. How-
ever, and contrary to what is obtained for earnings forecasts, we find that the quality
of target prices increases with the number of firms followed and decreases with the
employer size. We stress out that, although our results are statistically significant,
the economic impact of analysts’ characteristics on forecasting ability appears weak.
The empirical evidence that experience influences coverage decisions has impor-
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tant consequences for the study of analysts’ forecasting activity. We discuss below
the possible implications of such diﬀerences in coverage decisions.
The fact that inexperienced analysts cover a diﬀerent type of firms than their
more experienced colleagues shed a new light on some results previously obtained in
the literature. For instance, Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) indicate that their
forecast accuracy measure is likely to be impacted by the number of analysts covering
a firm and the number of firms covered by the analyst. They warn against the fact
that analysts who cover few firms are more likely to obtain extreme values of forecast
accuracy. Similarly, analysts who cover thinly followed firms are more likely to be
in the extremes. Inexperienced analysts follow fewer companies than their older col-
leagues and they tend to cover firms that are thinly followed. As a consequence, they
are much more likely to obtain extreme values of forecast accuracies than experienced
analysts.
These diﬀerences in coverage decisions may also have consequences for the study
of analysts’ career outcomes. In Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), an analyst faces
a positive career outcome if she transfers to a larger brokerage firm and faces a
negative career outcome if she moves to a smaller firm or if she gets fired. This
assumption may hold for experienced analysts but not for inexperienced analysts.
Indeed, if the negative career outcomes are the same for both types of analysts, the
positive career outcomes might diﬀer. Rather than moving to a larger brokerage
firm, an inexperienced analyst may be promoted by getting assigned to blue chips
(while staying at the same brokerage firm). If this is the case, overlooking the issue
of diﬀerences in coverage decisions related to experience would lead to conclude that
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inexperienced analysts are less likely to get promoted.
Firm-specific experience, defined as the number of years for which an analyst made
forecasts for a specific firm, is often seen as a good proxy for analyst ability (some
researchers even argue that firm-specific experience should be used instead of general
experience). We discuss here, in light of the results on diﬀerential coverage obtained
in this paper, whether firm-specific experience does necessarily measure analyst abil-
ity. Let us assume that analysts start their career by covering small, young, growth
firms (i.e., firms that do not attract a lot of attention from market participants)
and that the most successful analysts are gradually assigned to blue chip firms. It
would follow that the firm-specific experience needs to be interpreted with respect to
the profile of the firms covered. While a high-level of firm-specific experience asso-
ciated with a blue chip may be linked to analyst ability (or success), a similar level
of firm-specific experience for a small, growth firm might indicate that the analyst is
not skilled enough to get assigned to blue chips. Obviously, because the firm-specific
experience is highly correlated with the general experience (by construction, the gen-
eral experience is at least equal to the firm-specific experience), the unconditional
relationship between firm-specific experience and analyst ability is expected to be
positive. Indeed, in order to have a high level of firm-specific experience for a given
firm, an analyst needs to have at least the same level of general experience, which
biases the sample of analysts with high firm-specific experience towards high ability
analysts (analysts that manage to stay in the profession for a long time). However, a
low level of firm-specific experience is not necessarily informative. It can mean either
that the analyst just entered the profession (and therefore has a lower ability) or that
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she just got assigned to diﬀerent firms (which can be a sign of ability if these firms
are large, international, mature firms). It follows that firm-specific experience should
always be interpreted with regards to the level of general experience.
These diﬀerences in coverage decisions may also explain another finding of Hong,
Kubik, and Solomon (2000). Their results indicate that experienced analysts issue
more timely forecasts and proceed to less frequent revisions. In theory, an analyst
should adjust her earnings forecast as soon as she receives new information leading
to changes in her evaluation of the future earnings. However, this is not the case in
practice; analysts revise their forecast only a couple of times during the fiscal year.
There are two reasons why revising forecast frequently may not be the best strategy.
The first reason is the benefit cost ratio associated with a revision. Each time an
analyst decides to revise her forecast, she needs to provide written motivation of
her reasons to do so. It follows that revising a forecast is a time-demanding action.
Thus, the analyst has some incentives to delay her revision until the discrepancy
between her initial forecast and her new evaluation is large enough. The second
reason is reputation. An analyst who would revise her forecasts very frequently
would appear as uncertain (lacking of confidence) about her evaluation of the future
earnings. The optimal strategy for revising forecasts is therefore a trade-oﬀ between
accuracy and low frequency of revisions. We could formalize the analyst’s choice as
follows. A revision occurs as soon as the distance between the initial forecast and
the current estimation is higher than a predetermined value. This rule of thumb
implies that an analyst revises more often her forecasts on a firm with high volatile
earnings. Because inexperienced analysts cover young, growth firms with volatile
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earnings, they tend to revise their forecasts more frequently.16Indeed, high earnings
volatility increases the probability that the distance between the initial forecast and
the current estimation exceeds the predetermined threshold. A similar logic could
apply to provide an explanation to the fact that inexperienced analysts issue their
final forecasts later during the fiscal year than experienced analysts (who issue more
timely forecasts).
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Appendix
Variable Description
Capitalization Market capitalization of common equity (in billions of
dollars).
Book-to-market ratio Book-to-market ratio, calculated as the ratio of the book
value to the market value of common equity.
Free cash flow Free cash flow scaled by average total assets.
External financing External financing scaled by average total assets.
Institutional
ownership
Fraction of outstanding shares owned by institutional
investors.
Ownership breadth Ratio of the number of institutional investors who hold
a long position in the stock to the total number of insti-
tutional investors covered in the Thomson database for
that quarter.
Asset growth Average asset growth over the past five years.
Sales growth Average sales growth over the past five years.
Accruals Total accrual as calculated in Richardson, Sloan, Soli-
man, and Tuna (2006).
Analyst coverage Number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for a given
firm.
Stock return volatility 6-month historical stock return volatility.
Bid-ask spread Bid-ask spread divided by bid-ask midpoint.
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Figure 3.1
Projection of firms’ characteristics variables on the two first components of the PCA
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Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics
Number of
forecasts
Number of
active
analysts
Number of analysts
covering a stock
Number of stocks
covered per analyst
Mean Median Max Mean Median Max
2000 36,825 - - - - - - -
2001 44,178 4,466 6.30 4.00 50.00 6.38 4.00 213.00
2002 48,756 4,611 7.10 5.00 50.00 6.31 4.00 183.00
2003 51,263 4,342 7.22 5.00 55.00 6.61 4.00 102.00
2004 54,863 3,773 6.54 4.00 44.00 7.16 5.00 64.00
2005 56,291 3,731 6.67 5.00 51.00 7.72 6.00 76.00
2006 59,952 3,800 6.82 5.00 45.00 7.97 6.00 87.00
2007 65,377 3,768 7.00 5.00 46.00 8.42 7.00 100.00
2008 77,281 3,829 7.53 6.00 46.00 8.59 7.00 92.00
2009 75,275 3,833 8.00 6.00 50.00 8.48 7.00 81.00
2010 79,410 3,908 8.69 6.00 59.00 8.47 7.00 79.00
The sample consists in a total of 649,471 target prices made by 9,367 analysts (583 brokers) on 7,268 U.S. stocks for
the 2000-2010 period. The first column indicates the number of target prices issued each year. The second column
shows the number of active analysts. The three following columns report the average, median and maximum number
of active analysts per stock. The remaining columns indicate the average, median and maximum number of stocks
covered per analyst. The statistics for 2000 are not reported as the target prices issued in 1999 and still active in 2000
cannot be observed.
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Table 3.2
Experience and joint coverage
Intergroup Excess Joint Coverage (IEJC)
Group 1
Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Group 5
(High experience) (Low experience)
Group 1
0.0727*** 0.0651*** 0.0485*** 0.0137 -0.0260**
(High experience)
Group 2 0.0793*** 0.0568*** 0.0256 -0.0205**
Group 3 0.0594*** 0.0354*** -0.0104
Group 4 0.0247 -0.0091
Group 5
-0.0129
(Low experience)
Average number of firms covered 9.9385 9.7565 9.5924 8.3651 4.7172
This table presents the Intergroup Excess Joint Coverages (IEJC) between five diﬀerent groups of analysts. The
first group is composed of the most experienced analysts (at least 16 years of experience). The second group is
characterized by a level of experience between 12 years and 16 years. The third group is characterized by a level
of experience between 8 years and 12 years. The fourth group is characterized by a level of experience between 4
years and 8 years. The fifth group of analysts is composed of the inexperienced analysts (between 0 and 4 years).
Intergroup Excess Joint Coverage is positive (negative) if the degree of joint coverage between the two groups is higher
(lower) than what is observed in the whole population. ***/**/* indicate that the Intergroup Excess Joint Coverage
is diﬀerent from zero at the 1%/5%/10% significance levels.
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Table 3.3
Multivariate analysis: Joint coverage and experience
Standardized joint coverage
Coeﬃcient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Pair Experience Diﬀerential (PED) −0.0054*** 0.000240 −22.46 0.000
Pair Average Experience (PAE) 0.0076*** 0.000374 20.43 0.000
Number of firms followed by analyst i 0.0019*** 0.000148 12.71 0.000
Number of firms followed by analyst j 0.0020*** 0.000149 13.25 0.000
Year dummies Yes
Number of observations 5,500,000
R-squared 0.0015
This table shows the coeﬃcient estimates (Coeﬃcients) from the following OLS regression: sjcijt = α+ β1PEDijt +
β2PAEijt + β3nit + β4njt + yeart eﬀects +ǫijt, where sjcijt is the standardized joint coverage between analysts i
and j for year t, PEDijt is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the level of experience of analyst i and the
level of experience of analyst j, PAEijt is the average level of experience of the pair of analysts i and j, nit (njt)
is the number of firms covered by analyst i (respectively j) during year t and yeart eﬀects is a set of dummies for
each year of the sample. ***/**/* correspond to 1%/5%/10% significance levels. P-values are computed using robust
standard errors.
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Table 3.4
Proportion of forecasts (target prices) per sector
Panel A: Proportion of forecasts per sector (all analysts)
SIG Sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Finance 0.1439 0.1527 0.1626 0.1890 0.1832 0.1887 0.1837 0.1860 0.1828 0.1682 0.1602
Health 0.1011 0.1041 0.1133 0.1172 0.1095 0.1194 0.1098 0.1079 0.0978 0.1030 0.1009
Consumer non-durables 0.0381 0.0362 0.0374 0.0383 0.0363 0.0389 0.0417 0.0431 0.0398 0.0501 0.0463
Consumer services 0.1874 0.1840 0.1875 0.1708 0.1757 0.1597 0.1614 0.1519 0.1490 0.1453 0.1527
Consumer durables 0.0249 0.0230 0.0279 0.0303 0.0274 0.0306 0.0287 0.0229 0.0205 0.0186 0.0221
Energy 0.0755 0.0760 0.0638 0.0650 0.0809 0.0880 0.0762 0.0902 0.1155 0.1041 0.1080
Transportation 0.0195 0.0180 0.0176 0.0217 0.0232 0.0224 0.0261 0.0295 0.0263 0.0295 0.0319
Technology 0.2517 0.2638 0.2402 0.2076 0.2141 0.2006 0.2091 0.1969 0.1965 0.1891 0.1866
Basic industries 0.0442 0.0360 0.0387 0.0489 0.0466 0.0508 0.0561 0.0555 0.0547 0.0623 0.0611
Capital goods 0.0506 0.0498 0.0566 0.0609 0.0591 0.0603 0.0690 0.0759 0.0780 0.0860 0.0862
Public utilities 0.0631 0.0563 0.0544 0.0503 0.0440 0.0405 0.0381 0.0402 0.0392 0.0437 0.0440
Panel B: Diﬀerence of the proportions of forecasts per sector between low experience and high experience analysts
SIG Sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Finance 0.0650 0.0603 0.0535 0.0304 0.0290 0.0400 0.0539 0.0090 −0.0023 −0.0166 −0.0275
Health −0.0288 0.0199 0.0088 0.0164 0.0239 0.0345 0.0366 0.0288 0.0360 0.0259 0.0315
Consumer non-durables −0.0221 −0.0163 −0.0148 −0.0284 −0.0084 0.0103 0.0031 0.0076 0.0023 0.0069 0.0054
Consumer services 0.0114 −0.0309 −0.0522 −0.0766 −0.0400 −0.0237 −0.0316 −0.0410 −0.0213 −0.0134 −0.0330
Consumer durables −0.0133 −0.0143 −0.0088 −0.0021 0.0014 −0.0008 −0.0063 −0.0015 −0.0109 −0.0079 −0.0028
Energy 0.0353 0.0083 0.0279 0.0280 −0.0075 −0.0291 −0.0027 0.0375 0.0453 0.0339 0.0366
Transportation −0.0008 −0.0008 −0.0106 −0.0013 −0.0058 −0.0062 −0.0114 0.0079 0.0210 0.0127 0.0193
Technology 0.0563 0.0431 0.0616 0.0859 0.0630 0.0353 0.0385 0.0168 −0.0122 −0.0151 −0.0159
Basic industries −0.0494 −0.0391 −0.0377 −0.0136 −0.0256 −0.0355 −0.0491 −0.0285 −0.0310 −0.0282 −0.0248
Capital goods −0.0117 −0.0095 −0.0212 −0.0260 −0.0124 −0.0158 −0.0272 −0.0274 −0.0043 0.0203 0.0232
Public utilities −0.0421 −0.0207 −0.0066 −0.0126 −0.0177 −0.0090 −0.0039 −0.0093 −0.0226 −0.0187 −0.0120
This table provides, for each year of the 2000-2010 period, the proportion of target prices issued for each sector. We define 11 diﬀerent sectors with respect to the
SIG (Sector Industry Group) classification provided by I/B/E/S. Each year, we assign, with respect to their experience (GEXP), the analysts to five quintiles. Panel
B provides the diﬀerence of the proportions of forecasts per sector between the first quintile (inexperienced analysts) and the fifth quintile (high experience analysts).
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Table 3.5
Experience and firm characteristics
Panel A: Capitalization (in billions of dollars)
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 10.0219 7.5959 7.8234 7.0737 6.2186 6.6503 7.5951 8.3945 6.7724 7.2611 9.2102
Quintile 3 12.6125 9.6389 7.6874 8.3234 9.5545 10.1233 10.8323 12.5050 9.8305 8.7595 10.3386
Quintile 5 (High experience) 15.4122 11.4323 10.4372 9.8322 10.6347 10.1736 11.5971 13.6057 11.1543 9.3420 11.6554
Panel B: Book-to-market
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.4385 0.5140 0.5803 0.5065 0.4155 0.4104 0.4243 0.4510 0.6265 0.7934 0.5480
Quintile 3 0.4433 0.5360 0.5574 0.5177 0.4123 0.3948 0.3886 0.4274 0.6404 0.7835 0.5591
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.4624 0.5106 0.5353 0.5276 0.4380 0.4040 0.4019 0.4616 0.6791 0.8087 0.5759
Panel C: Asset growth (average over the past five years)
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.3158 0.3737 0.3150 0.2691 0.2491 0.2216 0.1784 0.1817 0.2039 0.2009 0.1803
Quintile 3 0.3038 0.3523 0.3282 0.2846 0.2446 0.2219 0.1757 0.1737 0.1928 0.1854 0.1662
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.2384 0.2654 0.2510 0.2204 0.2012 0.1895 0.1620 0.1494 0.1658 0.1702 0.1509
Panel D: Sales growth (average over the past five years)
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.2552 0.2957 0.2657 0.2156 0.1899 0.1815 0.1653 0.1732 0.1982 0.1990 0.1618
Quintile 3 0.2537 0.2871 0.2692 0.2345 0.1907 0.1793 0.1580 0.1588 0.1840 0.1854 0.1526
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.2032 0.2313 0.2155 0.1793 0.1619 0.1678 0.1497 0.1447 0.1618 0.1692 0.1392
Panel E: External financing scaled by average total assets
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.1691 0.1707 0.0701 0.0330 0.0447 0.0583 0.0508 0.0560 0.0613 0.0264 0.0089
Quintile 3 0.1349 0.1577 0.0749 0.0304 0.0229 0.0433 0.0367 0.0363 0.0317 0.0077 −0.0008
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.0702 0.0830 0.0500 0.0139 0.0021 0.0175 0.0118 0.0107 0.0200 0.0054 −0.0117
Panel F: Institutional ownership (fraction of outstanding shared)
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.5505 0.5907 0.6199 0.6296 0.6503 0.6752 0.7064 0.7349 0.7729 0.7262 0.7228
Quintile 3 0.5503 0.5756 0.6249 0.6499 0.6765 0.6953 0.7215 0.7526 0.7743 0.7379 0.7312
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.5856 0.6106 0.6326 0.6658 0.6821 0.7002 0.7368 0.7678 0.7845 0.7413 0.7347
Panel G: Ownership breadth
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.1108 0.1089 0.1207 0.1088 0.0964 0.0923 0.0890 0.0841 0.0834 0.0859 0.0940
Quintile 3 0.1172 0.1208 0.1212 0.1197 0.1187 0.1110 0.1083 0.1055 0.1049 0.1007 0.1030
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.1483 0.1350 0.1386 0.1342 0.1322 0.1181 0.1145 0.1115 0.1084 0.1043 0.1075
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Table 3.5 (Continued)
Panel H: Accruals (calculated as in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna, 2006)
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.1650 0.1956 0.1033 0.0433 0.0495 0.1094 0.1032 0.0985 0.0862 0.0400 0.0253
Quintile 3 0.1311 0.2050 0.1044 0.0506 0.0512 0.1032 0.0944 0.0880 0.0727 0.0234 0.0170
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.0849 0.1291 0.0802 0.0431 0.0433 0.0802 0.0822 0.0661 0.0588 0.0244 0.0174
Panel I: Free cash flow scaled by average total assets
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) −0.1110 −0.0970 −0.0441 −0.0199 −0.0175 −0.0362 −0.0299 −0.0364 −0.0284 −0.0104 0.0140
Quintile 3 −0.1029 −0.0975 −0.0448 −0.0110 0.0039 −0.0210 −0.0174 −0.0182 −0.0092 0.0068 0.0192
Quintile 5 (High experience) −0.0467 −0.0411 −0.0259 0.0049 0.0183 −0.0027 −0.0013 −0.0007 −0.0048 0.0092 0.0303
Panel J: Analyst coverage (Number of analysts)
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 13.9991 13.6173 14.6555 14.2127 13.5507 12.9555 13.0934 13.1215 13.8009 15.3138 16.9309
Quintile 3 14.6601 15.4064 15.2522 14.9689 15.2388 15.4390 15.0124 15.2732 15.3982 16.4715 17.7310
Quintile 5 (High experience) 15.4380 15.4668 15.0176 15.4634 15.6193 15.1459 14.8578 14.5976 14.9671 15.7892 17.4266
Panel K: 6-month historical stock return volatility
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.7295 0.6508 0.5506 0.4453 0.3749 0.3428 0.3547 0.3607 0.6236 0.7434 0.4087
Quintile 3 0.6823 0.7045 0.5802 0.4390 0.3614 0.3408 0.3541 0.3459 0.5870 0.7236 0.3926
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.6196 0.6131 0.5122 0.4214 0.3202 0.3096 0.3232 0.3180 0.5626 0.7246 0.3805
Panel L: Bid ask spread
’ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Quintile 1 (Low experience) 0.0125 0.0085 0.0074 0.0038 0.0021 0.0020 0.0017 0.0022 0.0043 0.0024 0.0013
Quintile 3 0.0131 0.0088 0.0077 0.0036 0.0017 0.0016 0.0015 0.0018 0.0033 0.0024 0.0013
Quintile 5 (High experience) 0.0138 0.0090 0.0074 0.0036 0.0016 0.0017 0.0014 0.0017 0.0034 0.0024 0.0013
Analysts are assigned to five quintiles with respect to their general experience (GEXP ). The diﬀerent firm characteristics are: (1) the capitalization; (2) the
book-to-market ratio; (3) the free cash flow scaled by average total assets; (4) the external financing scaled by average total assets; (5) the institutional ownership
(measured as the fraction of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors); (6) the ownership breadth; (7) the asset growth rate (average over the past five
years); (8) the sales growth rate (average over the past five years); (9) the level of accruals (as calculated in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna, 2006); (10) the
analyst coverage (number of analysts issuing EPS forecasts for a given firm); (11) the 6-month historical stock return volatility; and, (12) the bid-ask spread.
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Table 3.6 Firms-years with the highest and the lowest degrees of maturity
Firm-year with highest scores Firm-year with lowest scores
Firm-year Degree of maturity Firm-year Degree of maturity
INTEL CORP (2000) 12.6909 R H DONNELLEY CORP (2003) -6.0307
MICROSOFT CORP (2007) 12.6284 ENCORE MEDICAL CORP (2005) -6.0320
MICROSOFT CORP (2006) 12.4193 CREE RESEARCH INC (2001) -6.0995
CISCO SYSTEMS INC (2000) 11.6855 M G I PHARMA INC (2005) -6.2053
MICROSOFT CORP (2000) 11.5085 CELERITEK INC (2001) -6.2071
MICROSOFT CORP (2008) 11.3425 WINSTAR COMMUNICATIONS INC (2001) -6.2722
MICROSOFT CORP (2005) 11.1387 ATLAS PIPELINE PARTNERS L P (2009) -6.2992
MICROSOFT CORP (2004) 11.0327 LIVEWIRE MOBILE INC (2001) -6.3421
MICROSOFT CORP (2003) 10.6746 KRAUSES FURNITURE INC (2000) -6.3461
MICROSOFT CORP (2001) 10.6702 N T E L O S INC (2001) -6.3552
MICROSOFT CORP (2002) 10.3810 FLOTEK INDUSTRIES INC (2009) -6.4056
PFIZER INC (2004) 10.1553 FUELCELL ENERGY INC (2002) -6.4404
MICROSOFT CORP (2010) 9.9800 S D L INC (2001) -6.4439
PFIZER INC (2003) 9.8998 NETWORK PERIPHERALS INC (2001) -6.4661
PFIZER INC (2001) 9.8652 INAMED CORP (2000) -6.5373
MICROSOFT CORP (2009) 9.2742 C T C COMMUNICATIONS GROUP INC (2001) -6.6238
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2005) 8.8281 DRYSHIPS INC (2009) -6.6911
INTEL CORP (2005) 8.7683 EDGE PETROLEUM CORP DEL (2008) -6.7432
PFIZER INC (2002) 8.7629 P C GROUP INC (2008) -6.7566
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2006) 8.6651 MIDCOAST ENERGY RESOURCES INC (2001) -6.7753
INTEL CORP (2004) 8.5916 MCMORAN EXPLORATION CO (2008) -6.8263
ORACLE SYSTEMS CORP (2000) 8.4798 MOVIE GALLERY INC (2006) -6.8419
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS CO (2000) 8.4263 DELTA PETROLEUM CORP (2009) -6.8564
INTEL CORP (2003) 8.3915 CEPHALON INC (2000) -6.8623
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2002) 8.3558 CYTOGEN CORP (2004) -6.8832
PFIZER INC (2000) 8.3205 NEWPORT CORP (2001) -6.8905
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2004) 8.2577 COR THERAPEUTICS INC (2001) -6.8910
A T & T INC (2007) 8.2373 ODETICS INC (2002) -6.9627
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2003) 8.2176 T X C O RESOURCES INC (2009) -7.0357
CISCO SYSTEMS INC (2006) 8.2119 ALLIED WASTE INDUSTRIES INC (2000) -7.0696
MERCK & CO INC NEW (2000) 8.1834 SILICON STORAGE TECHNOLOGY INC (2001) -7.1016
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS CO (2010) 8.1826 ANAREN MICROWAVE INC (2001) -7.1452
INTEL CORP (2001) 8.1567 EMCORE CORP (2001) -7.1652
PFIZER INC (2007) 8.0892 ATLAS ENERGY L P (2009) -7.2329
INTEL CORP (2006) 8.0714 AUTHENTIDATE HOLDING CORP (2005) -7.3091
PFIZER INC (2005) 8.0394 COMTECH TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP (2001) -7.5640
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2001) 7.9944 N T L INC (2001) -7.6098
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2010) 7.9927 EXCEL MARITIME CARRIERS LTD (2006) -7.7005
APPLE COMPUTER INC (2010) 7.9795 ATLAS ENERGY INC (2008) -7.7382
INTEL CORP (2007) 7.9713 APPLIED MICRO CIRCUITS CORP (2001) -7.9006
MERCK & CO INC NEW (2001) 7.9261 ENCYSIVE PHARMACEUTICALS INC (2008) -7.9251
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS CO (2001) 7.8968 MILLENNIUM PHARMACEUTICALS INC (2001) -8.0619
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO (2006) 7.8965 HANGER ORTHOPEDIC GROUP INC (2000) -8.0697
PFIZER INC (2006) 7.8961 ATLAS PIPELINE PARTNERS L P (2008) -8.0836
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO (2010) 7.8671 ENZON INC (2001) -8.1188
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO (2007) 7.8381 EMULEX CORP NEW (2000) -8.1548
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2008) 7.8028 RURAL CELLULAR CORP (2001) -8.2124
CISCO SYSTEMS INC (2005) 7.7962 PSINET INC (2000) -8.6630
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (2007) 7.7680 PHOTON DYNAMICS INC (2001) -9.9450
INTEL CORP (2002) 7.7574 RADIO ONE INC (2008) -12.0359
This table provides the name and year of the 50 observations (firm-year) with the highest degree of maturity and the
50 observations with the lowest degree of maturity. The degree of maturity is computed using the first component
from a Principal Component Analysis performed on the following firm characteristics: (1) Capitalization; (2) Book-to-
market ratio; (3) Free cash flow scaled by average total assets; (4) External financing scaled by average total assets; (5)
Institutional ownership (the fraction of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors); (6) Ownership breadth;
(7) Asset growth (average over the past five years); (8) Sales growth (average over the past five years); (9) Accruals
(as calculated in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna, 2006); (10) Analyst coverage (number of analysts issuing EPS
forecasts for a given firm); (11) Stock return volatility; and, (12) Bid-ask spread. The sample period is 2000-2010.
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Table 3.7 Multivariate analysis: analysts’ characteristics and firms covered
Blue Chip Index (BCI) of firms covered
Coeﬃcient Standard error t-statistic p-value
General Experience (GEXP ) 0.0159*** 0.002947 5.41 0.000
Number of firms followed (NF ) −0.0089*** 0.002139 −4.16 0.000
Dummy Employer size (DES) 0.3458*** 0.027448 12.60 0.000
Year dummies Yes
Industry dummies Yes
Number of observations 143,189
R-squared 0.2289
This table shows the coeﬃcient estimates (Coeﬃcients) from the following OLS regression: BCIijt = α+β1GEXPit+
β2NFit + β3DESit + yeart eﬀects +industryj eﬀects +ǫijt, where GEXPit is the general experience, NFit is the
number of firms covered by analyst i during year t, DESit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if analyst i’s
employer is in the top decile size, year t eﬀects is a set of dummies for each year of the sample and industryj eﬀects is
a set of dummies for each industry. ***/**/* correspond to 1%/5%/10% significance levels. P-values are computed
from robust analyst-clustered standard errors.
Table 3.8 Multivariate analysis: Target price quality and analysts’ characteristics
Target price quality
Coeﬃcient Standard error t-statistic p-value
General Experience (GEXP ) 0.0003*** 0.000107 2.65 0.008
Number of firms followed (NF ) 0.0002*** 0.000062 2.82 0.005
Employer size dummy (DES) −0.0119*** 0.001100 −10.81 0.000
Firm-year dummies Yes
Number of observations 600,295
Adj R-squared 0.3673
This table shows the coeﬃcient estimates (Coeﬃcients) from the following OLS regression: γijt = α+ β1GEXPit +
β2NFit+β3DESit+firm − year t eﬀects +ǫijt, where GEXPit is the general experience, NFit is the number of firms
covered by analyst i during year t, DESit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if analyst i’s employer is in the
top decile size, firm-year t eﬀects is a set of dummies for each firm and each year of the sample. ***/**/* correspond
to 1%/5%/10% significance levels. P-values are computed from robust analyst-clustered standard errors.
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Conclusion
The contributions of this PhD dissertation are both methodological and empirical.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, we study the herding behavior of individual
investors. The main methodological contribution of this chapter is to introduce a
measure of herding at the individual level. Using traditional measures of herding
behavior, we are able to observe, for a given stock, whether there is an abnormal
concentration of investors on either the buy side or the sell side. However, these
measures of herding do not allow us to track the herding behavior of a given investor
over time. The Individual Herding Measure (IHM) defined in this first chapter fills
this gap. This first chapter is the first study on herding behavior focusing on French
individual investors. We show that the level of herding behavior for French individual
investors is similar to the level observed for individual investors in the U.S. and
slightly greater than the level observed for German investors. This chapter contains
several empirical results. First, we find that the level of sophistication is inversely
related to the level of herding. Second, we establish that adverse past performance
increases the propensity to engage into correlated trading. Finally, we show that
individual investors do not benefit from herding. Individuals trading against the
crowd typically exhibit more extreme returns and lower Sharpe ratios than the rest
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of the population. The main limitation of this chapter is that, although we are able
to observe how trading is correlated, we do not have any information regarding how
individual investors observe their peers’ actions. In this regard, our use of the term
“herding behavior” should be interpreted in the sense of Devenow and Welch (1996)
(“Behavior patterns that are correlated across individuals”) rather than in the sense of
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) (“Actions that were not considered are undertaken
because others are doing so and vice versa”).
The second chapter of this PhD dissertation deals with financial analysts’ tar-
get prices. This chapter consists in both a theoretical contribution and an empirical
analysis. Building on existing evidence from the literature on earnings forecasts that
forecast predictability needs to be taken into account when assessing forecast quality,
we provide a comprehensive framework for evaluating the quality of target prices. It
is common practice in the literature on target prices to consider a target price to be
superior to another if it is more accurate. We show, in this second chapter, that the
accuracy in itself is not suﬃcient to assess the quality of a target price as the target
price predictability varies across stocks and over time. We show that omitting the
issue of predictability (which is a function of the volatility and the forecast horizon)
prevents from evaluating correctly the ability of financial analysts to issue accurate
target prices. The contributions of our new measure of target price quality are the
following: (1) it accounts for diﬀerences in predictability (i.e. diﬀerences in stock
return volatility and forecast horizon); (2) it takes into account forecast boldness (i.e.
how far the analyst’s target price is from the current price); and, (3) it can be used
both ex-post and within a dynamic setting (i.e. it is possible to measure the target
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price quality at any moment in time). Our empirical analysis focuses on the impact of
omitting target price predictability when studying whether financial analysts exhibit
persistent diﬀerential abilities. We show that the persistent diﬀerential abilities found
in previous studies can be explained by the fact that the authors use the absolute
forecast error as a measure of quality and because there exists a strong non-linear
relationship between target price accuracy and stock return volatility. When using
our measure of quality, which accounts for diﬀerences in predictability, we no longer
observe that analysts exhibit persistent diﬀerential abilities. A current limitation of
our work is that we do not fully exploit the dynamic character of our measure. We re-
stricted most of our analysis to the ex-post version of our measure in order to compare
our results to previous findings of the literature (which uses solely ex-post measures).
This dynamic feature can prove useful to both academics and practitioners. For the
latter, our measure of quality could be used to generate performance feedbacks at a
high frequency.
The third chapter of this dissertation studies the influence of analysts’ character-
istics such as analyst ability (experience), task complexity (number of firms followed)
and resources available (employer size) on target price quality. We first show that
these analysts’ characteristics have a strong impact on coverage decisions. Our re-
sults indicate that experienced analysts cover mainly blue chips while inexperienced
analysts focus on young, small, growth firms. These diﬀerences in the type of firms
covered have important implications in terms of forecasts predictability. Because the
stock return volatility of blue chips is typically lower than the volatility of young,
small, growth firms, the predictability of target prices issued by experienced analysts
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will be higher than the predictability of forecasts made by inexperienced analysts. It
follows that it is necessary to consider both the accuracy and the predictability of
target prices when evaluating the influence of analysts’ characteristics on their ability
to issue accurate target prices. We find a positive and statistically significant rela-
tionship between the level of experience and the target price quality. However, we
note that, although our results are statistically significant, the economic impact of
analysts’ characteristics on target price quality is very weak.
I briefly conclude by discussing the directions I plan to take for my future research.
Note that some of the topics I plan to study were already broached in the conclusion
of the third chapter.
The first point in my agenda is to reproduce, using earnings forecasts instead
of target prices, the results of the third chapter on the influence of experience on
coverage decisions. However, because target prices are often issued in conjunction
with earnings forecasts, I do not expect the results to diﬀer much.
Although the research on financial analysts is pretty extensive, our knowledge of
how and why analysts choose to cover certain firms is rather limited. Notably, we
know little about analysts’ preferences for the firms they cover. I intend to study
further the way analysts make their coverage decisions, taking into account their
personal preferences, incentives, career concerns and the constraints imposed upon
them by brokerage firms.
The findings of the third chapter suggest studying the organization of brokerage
firms in order to better understand analysts’ coverage decisions. The first question
to address is whether coverage decisions are homogeneous when considered at the
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level of brokerage firms. I plan to study how brokerage firms’ characteristics (size,
reputation, location...) impact the coverage decisions of their employees. Another
direction is to analyze analysts’ career concerns within brokerage firms (with the
baseline assumption that the most successful analysts are oﬀered to cover blue chips).
The contribution of the second chapter of this dissertation is mainly methodolog-
ical. My agenda for future research is to build upon this framework and study the
determinants of target price quality. Because the ability of financial analysts to is-
sue accurate target prices is closely linked with market eﬃciency, obtaining a better
understanding of how analysts build their (accurate) forecasts is crucial. Another
direction for research is to study analysts’ motivations when revising target prices.
I plan on answering the following questions. When do analysts revise their target
prices? Why do they revise them? Do analysts improve their performance by revis-
ing often?
A very challenging objective for the future is to adapt the framework of the second
chapter to earnings forecasts. In its current state, the literature on earnings forecast
employs relative measures of accuracy to control for diﬀerences in predictability. An
important contribution would therefore be to introduce a methodology that permits
a precise estimation of forecast predictability. However, the feasibility of such a
measure is unclear as, contrary to target prices, the earnings forecast process is highly
discontinuous.
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Abstract: This dissertation is made of three distinct chapters. In the first chapter, we introduce a 
new measure of herding that allows for tracking dynamics of individual herding. Using a database 
of nearly 8 million trades executed between 1999 and 2006 by 87,373 individual investors, we 
show that individual herding is persistent over time and that past performance and the level of 
sophistication influence this behavior. We are also able to answer a question that was previously 
unaddressed in the literature: is herding profitable for investors? Our unique dataset reveals that 
the investors trading against the crowd tend to exhibit more extreme returns and poorer risk-
adjusted performance than the herders. In the second chapter, we show that measuring the 
accuracy of a target price is not sufficient to assess its quality, because the forecast predictability 
(which depends on the stock return volatility and on the forecast horizon) is likely to vary across 
stocks and over time. We argue that the evidence of time persistent differences in analysts' target 
price accuracy, obtained in previous studies, cannot be interpreted as a proof of persistent 
differential abilities. Our analysis indicates that the persistence in accuracy is driven by 
persistence in stock return volatility. We introduce a measure of target price quality that considers 
both the forecast inaccuracy and the forecast predictability. Using elements from option-pricing 
theory, we provide a simple solution to the issue of estimating target price predictability. Our 
empirical analysis reveals that, when forecast predictability is taken into account, financial analysts 
do not exhibit significant persistent differential abilities to forecast future stock prices. In the third 
chapter, we show that experienced financial analysts tend to cover different firms than 
inexperienced analysts. Experienced analysts tend to follow blue chips (i.e., large, international, 
mature firms) while inexperienced analysts focus on small, young, growth-oriented firms. These 
differences in coverage decisions imply that inexperienced analysts issue target prices on firms for 
which stock returns are more volatile, and thus less predictable. As a consequence, the accuracy 
measure of target prices fails to evaluate differences in ability between experienced and 
inexperienced analysts. When taking into account these differences in coverage decisions, we still 
find that experienced analysts do a better job at forecasting stock prices. Our results on the 
influence of analysts' characteristics on target price quality are statistically significant but 
economically weak. 
Key words: Herding, Individual investors, Financial analysts, Target prices, Forecasting quality, 
Coverage decisions 
Résumé : Cette thèse de doctorat comporte trois chapitres distincts. Dans le premier chapitre, 
nous étudions le comportement moutonnier d’investisseurs individuels français. Notre analyse 
empirique repose sur une base de données de presque 8 millions de transactions réalisées entre 
1999 et 2006 par 87 373 investisseurs individuels français. Nous montrons que le comportement 
moutonnier persiste dans le temps et que la performance passée ainsi que le niveau de 
sophistication influencent ce comportement. Nous tentons également d'apporter une réponse à 
une question très peu abordée dans la littérature : adopter un comportement moutonnier est-il 
profitable pour l'investisseur individuel ? Notre analyse empirique indique que les investisseurs 
contrariants obtiennent des rendements plus extrêmes (positifs ou négatifs) que les investisseurs 
moutonniers. Dans le second chapitre, nous montrons que mesurer la précision d’une prévision 
du prix futur d'une action n’est pas suffisant pour évaluer la qualité de cette prévision car la 
prévisibilité des prix est susceptible d’évoluer dans le temps et dépend du titre considéré. Nous 
montrons que la persistance dans les différences individuelles de précision des prévisions 
d'analystes, mis en avant dans la littérature, ne constitue pas une preuve de différences de 
compétences entre analystes. Cette persistance est, en réalité, causée par une persistance de la 
volatilité de la rentabilité des titres. Nous introduisons une mesure de qualité des prévisions qui 
incorpore à la fois l’erreur de prévision et la prévisibilité du prix. La théorie des options nous fournit 
les éléments nécessaires à l’estimation de cette prévisibilité. Lorsque celle-ci est prise en compte, 
il n’y a plus de différences de compétences entre analystes. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous 
montrons que les analystes expérimentés et inexpérimentés ne couvrent pas le même type 
d’entreprises. Les analystes expérimentés couvrent des entreprises de type « blue chips » tandis 
que les analystes inexpérimentés couvrent des entreprises petites, jeunes et en croissance. Ces 
différences de couvertures impliquent que les analystes inexpérimentés émettent des prévisions 
de prix sur des entreprises dont les rendements sont plus volatils et donc moins prévisibles. En 
conséquence, la précision des prévisions n’est pas une bonne mesure pour évaluer si les 
analystes expérimentés sont meilleurs ou moins compétents que les analystes inexpérimentés. 
Lorsque ces différences de couvertures sont prises en compte, nous obtenons que les analystes 
expérimentés émettent néanmoins de meilleures prévisions. Bien que statistiquement significatif, 
l’impact économique de l’expérience des analystes est faible. 
Mots-clés : ????????????????????????????? ??????????? ???????????????? ??????????? ????????????
